The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes:Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues by 高圣惕 & Michael Sheng-ti GAU
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2015 No. 1)166
The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on 
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I. Introduction 
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines presented a diplomatic notification to 
initiate arbitration against China under Article 287 and Annex VII of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).1 As said by the Notification 
and Statement of Claims (hereinafter “Notification”),2 the goal is “to seek a peace-
ful and durable resolution of the dispute in the West Philippine Sea [South China 
Sea]” between these two States. The Philippines challenges against China’s claims 
and entitlement in the eastern part of South China Sea (SCS) enclosed by the 
“U-Shaped Line”, which the Philippines requests the Arbitral Tribunal (hereinafter 
“Tribunal”) to declare as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.3 
Five groups of claims were presented by the Notification: 
Firstly, China’s rights concerning the SCS maritime areas are those established 
by UNCLOS only and consist of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ 
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1       For the official explanations of the Philippines, at http://www.imoa.ph/press-releases/stateme
nt-by-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-albert-del-rosario-on-the-unclos-arbitral-proceedings-
against-china-to-achieve-a-peaceful-and-durable-solution-to-the-dispute-in-the-wps/, 
20 April 2015. For the text of UNCLOS, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_
agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, 20 April 2015.
2     Department of Foreign Affairs of Republic of the Philippines in Manila, Notification and 
Statement of Claims, Serial No. 13-0211, January 22, 2013, p. 1, para. 2, at https://www.
dfa.gov.ph/index.php/component/docman/doc_download/56-notification-and-statement-of-
claim-on-west-philippine-sea?Itemid=546, 20 April 2015. [hereinafter “Notification”] 
3      See Notification, Section III (The Philippines’ Claims), para. 31, and Section V (Relief 
Sought), para. 41.
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and the continental shelf. China’s maritime claims therein based on the “U-Shaped 
Line”4 contravene UNCLOS and are invalid.5 Secondly, the Mischief, McKennan, 
Gaven and Subi Reefs are submerged features not above sea level at high tide, and 
should not be deemed as islands or rocks according to Article 121 of UNCLOS. 
None of them are located on China’s continental shelf. Rather, the Mischief and 
McKennan Reefs are part of the Philippines’ continental shelf. China’s occupation 
of these four maritime features and construction activities thereon are unlawful and 
should be terminated.6 Thirdly, Scarborough Shoal and the Johnson, Cuarteron, 
and Fiery Cross Reefs should be considered as rocks under Article 121(3), and 
may only generate State entitlement to the territorial sea. Having unlawfully 
claimed maritime entitlements beyond 12 nautical miles (M) from these features, 
China should refrain from preventing Philippine vessels from exploiting the living 
resources in waters adjacent to Scarborough Shoal and Johnson Reef, and from 
undertaking other activities inconsistent with UNCLOS at or in the vicinity of these 
features.7 Fourthly, the Philippines is entitled under UNCLOS to a 12-M territorial 
sea, a 200-M EEZ, and a continental shelf measured from its archipelagic baselines. 
China has unlawfully claimed and exploited the living and non-living resources in 
this EEZ and continental shelf, and prevented the Philippines from exploiting the 
living and non-living resources therein.8 Fifthly, China has unlawfully interfered 
with the Philippines’ exercise of its navigational rights and other rights under 
UNCLOS within and beyond the Philippines’ EEZ. China should desist from these 
unlawful activities.9
4       The term “nine-dash line” is interchangeable with “U-Shaped Line” and “eleven-dash line”. 
For various names of this line, see Zou Keyuan, China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China 
Sea Revisited, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 43, 2012, p. 18.
5       See Notification, para. 31, 1st-2nd claims and para. 41, 1st-3rd reliefs.
6       See Notification, para. 31, 3rd-5th claims and para. 41, 4th-7th reliefs. 
7       See Notification, para. 31, 6th-7th claims and para. 41, 8th-9th reliefs. 
8       See Notification, para. 31, 8th-9th claims and para. 41, 10th-11th reliefs. 
9       See Notification, para. 31, 10th claim and para. 41, 12th-13th reliefs.
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On February 19, 2013, China officially refused to join the litigation,10 based 
on, inter alia, its 2006 Declaration covering the disputes brought by the Philippines 
and depriving the Tribunal of necessary jurisdiction to entertain the case. The 
default rules were applied to establish the Tribunal. On June 25, 2013, the fifth 
arbitrator was appointed and the Tribunal was established. 
The first meeting of the Members of the Tribunal was held on July 11, 2013, 
when they decided to use the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) as Registry.11 
On August 27, 2013, the Tribunal adopted the Rules of Procedure for this arbitra-
tion and issued the first Procedural Order to fix March 30, 2014 as the deadline 
for the Philippines to submit its Memorial. The Tribunal directed the Philippines 
to fully address all issues in the Memorial, including matters relating to the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the admissibility of the Philippines’ claims, and the 
merits of the dispute.12 
As directed, the Philippines presented the Memorial on March 30, 2014, which 
consists of 15 Submissions as follows:
(1) China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the 
Philippines, may not extend beyond those permitted by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea; 
(2) China’s claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and to “historic 
rights”, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompass-
ed by the so-called “nine-dash line” are contrary to the Convention and with-
out lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive 
10    See the statement made on 19 February 2013 by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry 
of China: “China’s position on the South China Sea issue is clear and consistent. China’s 
sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters is based on sufficient 
historical and jurisprudential evidence. Meanwhile, bearing in mind the larger interests 
of China-Philippines relations and regional peace and stability, China has always been 
committed to solving disputes through bilateral negotiations and has made unremitting 
efforts to safeguard stability in the South China Sea and promote regional cooperation. It 
is also the consensus reached by ASEAN countries and China in the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) to resolve disputes through negotiations 
between directly concerned sovereign States. The Philippines’ note and its attached notice 
not only violate the consensus, but also contain serious errors in fact and law as well as 
false accusations against China, which we firmly oppose.” At http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
xwfw/s2510/2511/t1015317.shtml, 20 April 2015. 
11    See First Press Release by the Tribunal for this arbitration, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1529, 20 April 2015. 
12      See the Rules of Procedure, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529, 20 Ap-
ril 2015. 
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limits of China’s maritime entitlements under UNCLOS; 
(3) Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an EEZ or continental 
shelf; 
(4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef are LTEs that do 
not generate entitlements to a territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf, and are 
not features that are capable of appropriation by occupation or otherwise; 
(5) Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the EEZ and 
continental shelf of the Philippines; 
(6) Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are LTEs 
that do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf, 
but their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is 
measured; 
(7) Joshson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no 
entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf; 
(8) China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of 
the sovereign rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living 
resources of its EEZ and continental shelf; 
(9) China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from 
exploiting the living resources in the EEZ of the Philippines; 
(10) China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing 
their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarbo-
rough Shoal; 
(11) China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect 
and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second 
Thomas Shoal; 
(12) China’s occupation of and construction activities on Mischief Reef: 
(a) violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands, 
installations, and structures; (b) violate China’s duties to protect and preserve 
the marine environment under the Convention; and (c) constitute unlawful act 
of attempted appropriation in violation of the Convention; 
(13) China has breached its obligation under the Convention by operating 
its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner causing serious risk of 
collision to Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal; 
(14) Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, China 
has unlawfully aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other things: 
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(a) Interfering with the Philippines’ rights of navigation in the waters at, and 
adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal; (b) Preventing the rotation and resupply of 
Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal; and (c) Endangering 
the health and well-being of Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas 
Shoal.
(15) China shall desist from further unlawful claims and activities.13
Clearly, these Submissions largely maintain the structure of the Notification. 
The original 4th Group of Claims disappears. However, the legal argument14 and 
the figures15 offered by the Memorial reveal that the settled Sino-Philippine mari-
time boundary is used as the point of departure. Besides, the original 5th Group of 
Claims were reduced and subsumed by Submissions 13 and 14(a) in the Memorial. 
For the low-tide elevation (LTE) part of the arguments in the original 2nd Group 
of Claims, Second Thomas Shoal is added into the Memorial, together with the 
Sino-Philippine maritime confrontations occurring there since January 2013. Most 
unusually, the chapter on Jurisdiction16 comes after the chapters on substantive 
legal arguments.17 
On December 7, 2014, which is eight days before the deadline (December 
15)18 set by the Tribunal for China to submit its Counter-Memorial, the Position 
Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of 
Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the 
Philippines19 was released in Beijing through the mass media “Xinhua”. It puts 
forward China’s legal arguments to explain (1) its non-participation in and non-
acceptance of this arbitration, (2) why the claims made by the Philippines are 
13      See final Submissions of the Memorial, pp. 271~272. The Memorial was submitted on Mar-
ch 30, 2014. Volume I of the Memorial is on file with the author. [hereinafter “Memorial”]
14      See the Memorial, p. 162, para. 6.6.
15     See Figures 3.4, 4.1, and 4.2 after pages 46, 70 and 72 respectively, the Memorial. They are 
Figs. 8, 11, and 12 of this paper.
16    See the Memorial, Chapter 7 (The Tribunal’s Jurisdiction over the Claims of the Phili-
ppines), pp. 217~270.
17    They are Chapter 4 (China’s Claims of “Historic Rights” to Maritime Areas beyond Its 
Entitlements under UNCLOS), Chapter 5 (China’s Claims to Areas of the South China Sea 
beyond the Entitlements of Maritime Features), and Chapter 6 (China’s Violations of the 
Philippines’ Rights under UNCLOS), the Memorial, pp. 69~216.
18     See Second Press Release by the PCA, 3 June 2014, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.
asp?pag_id=1529, 20 April 2015.
19     China’s Position Paper on South China Sea, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-12
  /07/content_19037946.htm, 20 April 2015. [hereinafter “China’s Position Paper”]
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inadmissible, and (3) why the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the disputes presen-
ted by the Philippines.20 Without citing specific paragraphs of the Philippines’ 
Memorial, this Position Paper is neither meant by China nor taken by the Tribunal 
as China’s Counter-Memorial as requested.21 However, following the reasoning 
of a recent Award on Jurisdiction in the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration,22 such China’s 
Position Paper may be held by the Tribunal as implying China’s “Plea concer-
ning Jurisdiction”. Obviously, there are outstanding issues of jurisdiction and 
admissibility facing the Tribunal, before it rules on the substantive legal issues. 
In this connection, China’s default of appearance and participation provides a 
room for academia to contribute by providing professional advice to the Tribunal.23 
With such assistance, the Tribunal may better fulfill the obligation under Article 9 
of Annex VII to UNCLOS, which is to “satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction 
over the dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.”24 This 
paper aims at scrutinizing the admissibility and jurisdiction problems hidden in 
the Philippines’ Memorial of 30 March 2014.25 The structure of this paper hence 
20     China’s Position Paper, para. 3. 
21    China’s Position Paper, para. 2. Also see Third Press Release by the PCA, 17 December 
2014, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529, 1 April 2015.
22     On 26 November 2014, the Annex VII Tribunal established for the Arctic Sunrise Arbitra-
tion between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Russian Federation made its Award 
on Jurisdiction. Award, particularly paras. 6, 9, 41, 44, 48, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1556, 1 April 2015.
23    By the end of 2014, published academic papers are only commenting on the Notification 
of the Philippines released on January 2013, without touching upon the Philippines’ 
Memorial of 2014. See Sienho Yee, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v. 
China): Potential Jurisdictional Obstacles or Objections, Chinese Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 13, 2014, pp. 663~739; Andreas Zimmermann and Jelena Braumler, Navigating 
through Narrow Jurisdictional Straits: The Philippines-PRC South China Sea Disputes 
and UNCLOS, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 12, 2013, 
pp. 431~461; Stefan Talmon and Bingbing Jia eds., The South China Sea Arbitration: A 
Chinese Perspective, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014.
24    Article 9 of Annex VII to UNCLOS provides: “If one of the parties to the dispute does not 
appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the 
tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or failure 
of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before making 
its award, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the 
dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.” 
25    The author is aware of the situation that the Philippines is requested to submit Further 
Written Arguments to the Tribunal by March 15, 2015, in accordance with Article 25(2) 
of the Rules of the Procedure for this arbitration. See Third Press Release by the PCA, at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529, 1 April 2015. The jurisdiction and 
admissibility issues that will be left unaddressed by this Filipino Further Written Arguments 
will have to be dealt with by a separate paper.
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follows the order of Philippine Submissions as contained in pages 271~272 of its 
Memorial.26
II. Admissibility Issues concerning Submission 1
Submissions 1~2 address the U-Shaped Line, based on the legal arguments 
provided by Chapter 4 of the Memorial. In Submission 1, the Philippines requests 
the Tribunal to adjudge and declare that “China’s maritime entitlements in the 
South China Sea, like those of the Philippines, may not extend beyond those 
permitted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”. However, it 
is believed that no Sino-Philippine dispute can be constituted by Submission 1, as 
China in fact does not oppose the idea that its maritime entitlements in the SCS 
may not extend beyond those permitted by UNCLOS, for the following reasons.
A. China’s Official Position Seems Clear That Its Maritime Entitlements
     in SCS Conform to What Is Permitted by UNCLOS
In the Notification, the Philippines argues that China claims sovereignty and 
sovereign rights over the entire waters based on, within, or encompassed by the 
U-Shaped Line in SCS in violation of UNCLOS.27 In the Memorial, the Philippines 
clarifies its arguments by asserting that China uses historic rights as the basis for 
its maritime claim of sovereign rights for the entire waters, seabed and subsoil 
within or encompassed by the U-Shaped Line. And such claim is criticized as being 
incompatible with UNCLOS provisions.28 
However, the official statements released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
China have not unequivocally made this kind of sweeping maritime claims in SCS 
that need not conform to UNCLOS. On the contrary, the 2011 UNCLOS-upholding 
26    As the Memorial brings the debate into a higher level than the Notification, the discussion 
presented in this paper will go deeper than what the author has done in his previous work. 
See Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-
Dash-Line Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default of Appearance, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 28, 
2014, pp. 81~133. 
27     See the Notification, paras. 2, 11, 13.
28     See the Memorial, paras. 4.1~4.2 and Chapter 4, Section I.   
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Note Verbale (NV) of China, as a response to the 2011 NV of the Philippines,29 
states clearly that, exactly for the very maritime area this arbitration is about, 
Since 1930s, the Chinese Government has given publicity several times the 
geographical scope of China’s Nansha Islands and the names of its compo-
nents. China’s Nansha Islands is therefore clearly defined. In addition, under 
the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, as well as the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) and the Law on the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People’s Republic of China (1998), 
China’s Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.30 
The above position may be challenged by the Philippines that the 1998 Chinese 
domestic law on EEZ and continental shelf, with the provision of preserving the 
right to invoke historical right,31 does not comply with UNCLOS to which China 
is a party. However, as admitted in the Memorial itself,32 China’s position for the 
conformity of its internal law with UNCLOS had already been conveyed to the 
Philippines on July 30, 1998, by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, who said 
that
And in our view, the law China has promulgated on the exclusive economic 
zones and continental shelves conforms to the provisions of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, particularly we refer to the principles concerning the 
delimitation of the exclusive economic zones and continental shelves that 
29    On 5 April 2011, the Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the UN produced a Note 
Verbale (11-00494 No. 000228) to comment on PRC’s two Notes Verbales dated on 7 May 
2009 (to protest against Vietnam/Malaysia Joint Submission and Vietnam Submission for 
outer limits of outer continental shelf in SCS). Philippine Note Verbale, at http://www.
un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/phl_re_chn_2011.pdf, 1 March 
2015.
30     Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Note Verbale, CML/8/
2011, 14 April 2011, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33
_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf, 1 March 2015.
31     Article 14 of the 1998 Act of EEZ and Continental Shelf provides that its provisions “shall 
not affect the historic rights of the People’s Republic of China”. See the Memorial, pp. 
184~185, paras. 4.28 & 6.63~6.65.
32     The Memorial, pp. 49~50, para. 3.34.
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the Chinese Government is ready to follow the regulations in this regard 
and properly settle the issue concerning the overlapping claims of maritime 
jurisdiction between China and our neighboring countries through friendly 
negotiations and friendly talks.33 
 
The Philippines dug further into the exchange of NVs between China and, 
inter alia, the Philippines between 2009 and 2011 in the forum of the United Na-
tions Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS).34 The Chinese posi-
tion revealed in both its 2009 and 2011 NVs is quoted by Paragraph 4.6 of Chapter 
4 of the Philippine Memorial35 to prove the alleged sweeping and UNCLOS-
incompatible maritime claims of China in SCS. However, a different picture 
emerges if we carefully look into the wording of such Chinese position, as follows:
[The 2009 Chinese NV] China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in 
the South China Ses and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof 
(see attached map). The above position is consistently held by the Chinese 
Government, and is widely known by the international community.36 
[The 2011 Chinese NV] China has indisputable sovereignty over the 
islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and 
subsoil thereof. China’s sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction in the 
33     The Memorial, pp. 49~50, para. 3.34.
34   On 6 May 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia filed a Joint Submission for the Outer Limits 
of Outer Continental Shelf in SCS to the CLCS. Several SCS bordering States raised 
comments and protests against such Joint Submission, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_
new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm, 1 March 2015. On 7 May 2009, 
Vietnam made its own submission for a different region in SCS, which was also protested 
by several States, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_
vnm_37_2009.htm, 1 March 2015. 
35      The Memorial, p. 70.
36     Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Note Verbale, CML/17/
2009 and CML/18/2009, 7 May 2009. These Notes Verbales were issued to oppose the 
Malaysia-Vietnam Joint Submission and Vietnam Individual Submission for Outer Conti-
nental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the SCS Region. At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf and http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm_c.pdf, 1 March 
2015. 
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South China Sea are supported by abundant historical and legal evidence. 37
To be noted, the above two paragraphs from 2009 and 2011 Chinese NVs 
share the identical wording for the first sentence, except that the phrase “(see 
attached map)” is missing in the 2011 document. What China said here is that it has 
sovereignty over the four groups of islands38 enclosed by the U-Shaped Line shown 
in the map (see Fig. 1 of this paper). Both the 2009 and 2011 Chinese NVs did not 
mention the special term “U-Shaped Line” or “Nine-Dash Line” nor did the NVs 
claim the entire SCS waters as based on, within, or encompassed by the U-Shaped 
Line. What was said is “(see attached map)”, which indicates four groups of islands 
on the map over which China claims territorial sovereignty and two kinds of 
maritime areas (adjacent waters and relevant waters) related to the islands. Besides, 
the U-Shaped Line is not of continuous nature and incapable of enclosing water. 
It is doubtful that such line is meant or able to enclose “water” over which China 
claims maritime jurisdiction.39
Importantly, China claims sovereignty over the “adjacent waters” to those 
islands, due to its sovereignty over the islands. This surely can be based on the “the 
land dominates the sea” principle under customary international law and recognized 
by ICJ decisions,40 provided China’s territorial claims over those islands are not 
overruled. China does not specify how far its sovereignty goes in the “adjacent 
water” or how wide the “adjacent waters” extend. Will it go beyond 12 M from the 
baselines? The answer will most probably be no, as it has to follow the 1992 Law 
of the PRC on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which complies with 
UNCLOS. 
Next question is about the range of “relevant waters” that China claims to have 
37　  Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Note Verbale, CML/8/
2011, 14 April 2011, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33
_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf, 1 March 2015.
38   They are Dongsha Qundao (the Pratas Islands), Xisha Qundao (the Paracel Islands), 
Zhongsha Qundao (the Macclesfield Bank) and Nansha Qundao (the Spratly Islands). 
Qundao means archipelago in Chinese. Also see China’s Position Paper, para. 4.
39     Masahiro Miyoshi, China’s “U-Shaped Line” Claim in the South China Sea: Any Validity 
Under International Law?, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2012, 
pp. 1~17.
40     See North Sea Continental Shelf, I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 51, para. 96; Aegean Sea Conti-
nental Shelf, I.C.J. Reports, 1978, p. 36, para. 86; Case concerning Maritime Delimitation 
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, I.C.J. Reports, 2001, p. 97, 
para. 185. Also see China’s Position Paper, para. 11.
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Fig. 1     The Map Produced by China in Its 2009 NVs to Protest 
Malaysia-Vietnam Joint and Vietnam Individual Outer Continental Shelf 
Submissions in SCS
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sovereign rights and jurisdiction. This is most controversial as people may jump to 
the conclusion that the boundary for the “relevant waters” must be the U-Shaped 
Line on the map attached to China’s two NVs of 2009.41 If this is true, then China 
would be seen claiming sovereign rights and jurisdiction for more than 200 M 
inconsistently with UNCLOS. However, such a view is groundless for ignoring 
the context. When using the word “relevant”, we must ask “relevant to what”. The 
answer can only be found by looking at the background against which China sent 
two NVs in 2009 to the UN. They were in fact used to protest42 against (1) the 
Vietnam/Malaysia Joint Submission for the Outer Limits of Outer Continental Shelf 
in SCS,43 and (2) the Vietnamese Individual Submission for the Outer Limits of 
41      Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Potential 
South China Sea Change, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 
29, 2014, pp. 204~206. To be noted, in the Notification, the Philippines said that “11. 
Notwithstanding its adherence to UNCLOS, China claims almost the entirety of the 
South China Sea, and all of the maritime features, as its own. Specifically, China claims 
‘sovereignty’ or ‘sovereignty rights’ over some 1.94 million square kilometers, or 70% 
of the Sea’s waters and underlying seabed within its so-called ‘nine dash line.’ China first 
officially depicted the ‘nine dash line’ in a letter of 7 May 2009 to the United Nations 
Secretary General. It is reproduced below. According to China, it is sovereign over all of the 
waters, all of the seabed, and all of the maritime features within this ‘nine dash line’.” The 
Notification, p. 4, para. 11.
42    Para. 5(a) of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the CLCS provides that: “[i]n cases 
where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall not consider and qualify a 
submission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute. However, the Commission 
may consider one or more submissions in the areas under dispute with prior consent given 
by all States that are parties to such a dispute.” China provided two NVs to the UN to (1) 
prove the existence of land and maritime disputes that are involved in the Vietnam/Malaysia 
Joint Submission and the Vietnamese Submission, and (2) express the unwillingness of 
China, as one of the parties to such land and maritime disputes, for the CLCS to consider 
these two outer continental shelf submissions. Therefore, the words “relevant waters” in 
China’s NVs can indicate nothing but the maritime region of outer continental shelves as 
reflected by those two submissions. The Rules of Procedure of the CLCS, at http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/309/23/PDF/N0830923.pdf?OpenElement, 1 March 
2009.
43    Mission of the PRC to the UN, Note Verbale, CML/17/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 1, at http://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_
e.pdf, 1 March 2015.
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Outer Continental Shelf in SCS.44 Fig. 2 45 and Fig. 3 46 in this paper are the illustra-
tions provided by these two submissions respectively. Putting these two figures 
Fig. 2     Vietnam/Malaysia 2009 Outer Continental Shelf Joint Submission
44    Mission of the PRC to the UN, Note Verbale, CML/18/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 1, at http://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf, 1 
March 2015.
45    Executive Summary of the Vietnam/Malaysia Joint Submission Dated on 6 May 2009, 
p. 5, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mys_
vnm2009excutivesummary.pdf, 1 March 2015.
46    Executive Summary of the Vietnam Individual Submission Dated on 7 May 2009, p. 
5, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/vnm2009n_
executivesummary.pdf, 1 March 2015.
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Fig. 3     Vietnam’s 2009 Outer Continental Shelf Submission in SCS
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Fig. 4     2009 Malaysia/Vietnam Joint Submission & Vietnam Submission with 
China’s Territorial/Maritime Claims Inside
together with Fig. 1 of this paper, it becomes evident why China raised objections 
and what China objected against. It is because the two submissions overlap with 
China’s EEZ and continental shelf generated by the Spratly Islands Group and 
the Paracel Islands over which China maintains territorial claims. Hence, it is 
justified to say that the word “relevant waters” means the waters (and the seabed 
and subsoil thereof) enclosed by these two outer continental shelf submissions, 
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instead of the whole range of waters enclosed by the U-Shaped Line. Fig. 4 of this 
paper47 demonstrates all these factors as it puts the regions under those two outer 
continental shelf submissions into a SCS map with the U-Shaped Line, together 
with the locations of the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands that are next to the 
regions marked by these two submissions. 
To conclude, it is incorrect to say that China uses the U-Shaped Line as the 
boundary of maritime claims in SCS based on China’s 1998 domestic law and 2009 
& 2011 NVs to the UN. 
B. The Alleged China’s Maritime Claims within U-Shaped Line, 
    Based on Historic Rights, if Any, Are Ambiguous and Unspecific, 
    and Are Not Capable of Creating Any Dispute
The evidences collected by the Memorial of the Philippines show that the 
alleged China’s maritime claim of sovereign rights in SCS enclosed by the U-
Shaped Line based on historic rights, if any, can only be considered ambiguous and 
unspecific. Article 14 of 1998 Chinese Law on the EEZ and Continental Shelf may 
be used to prove that China claims historic rights in the SCS region. That article 
reads: “The provisions of this Act shall not affect the historic rights of the People’s 
Republic of China.” The Philippines admits several times48 that “[the] law offered 
no explanation as to the nature of the ‘historic rights’ China claimed, or any specific 
area of land or sea where they were claimed.”49 As shown by Paragraphs 4.29~4.30 
of the Memorial, renowned scholars of the law of the sea from Chinese Mainland 
and Taiwan could only speculate on the legal effect of Article 14 of the 1998 
Law. They did not know whether Chinese Government has invoked that article to 
justify its historic rights claim in SCS as enclosed by the U-Shaped Line.50 Had 
47     Lori Fisler Damrosch and Bernard H. Oxman, Editors’ Introduction, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 107, 2013, pp. 95~96.
48     The Memorial, pp. 79~80, para. 4.28.
49     The Memorial, p. 44. Also see the Memorial, pp. 83, 108, paras. 4.36, 4.87.
50       The Memorial, pp. 80~81. The scholars are Zou Keyuan, Song Yann-huei, Li Jinming and 
Li Dexia. See Song Yann-huei and Zou Keyuan, Maritime Legislation of Mainland China 
and Taiwan: Developments, Comparison, Implications, and Potential Challenges for the 
United States, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2000, p. 318; Li 
Jinming and Li Dexia, The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A 
Note, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 34, Nos. 3~4, 2003, p. 293; Zou Ke-
yuan, Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice, Ocean Development & 
International Law, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2001, p. 160.
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China done that, they would have known it and said so. Such ambiguity of China’s 
maritime claims based on historic right is noticed by other renowned scholars, 
too.51 
The Philippines does identify other eminent Chinese lawyers giving seemingly 
positive judgment. They are Judge Zhiguo Gao and Professor Bingbing Jia who 
published a paper in 2013 in the American Journal of International Law.52 How-
ever, they do not represent Chinese Government, while their opinion on China’s 
assertion of historic rights within U-Shaped Line is also uncertain. Paragraph 4.18 
of the Memorial reads: 
According to Judge Gao: “In addition to these rights conferred by UNCLOS, 
China can assert historic rights within the nine-dash line – under Article 
14 of its 1998 law on the EEZ and Continental Shelf – in respect of fishing, 
navigation, and exploration and exploitation of resources”.53 
Instead of saying that China “has been” or “is” asserting historic rights… 
Judge Gao and Professor Jia say that “China can assert historic rights…” This 
confirms their uncertain view.
Paragraph 4.11 of the Memorial points out the map by China’s state-owned 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in 2012 entitled “Location for 
Part of Open Blocks in Waters under Jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China 
Available for Foreign Cooperation in the Year of 2012”. The map was shown in 
Figure 4.3 of the Memorial54 (see Fig. 5 of this paper). The Philippines says that 
“[a]s is evident from the map, shown in Figure 4.3 (following page 72), the nine 
‘open blocks’ are bounded in the west by the nine-dash line.”55
Be that as it may, the dispute indicated by this CNOOC map relates to the 
Sino-Vietnamese dispute and goes beyond the Tribunal’s mandate. Hence, Figure 
51      Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Potential 
South China Sea Change, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29, 
2014, p. 205.
52      Gao Zhiguo and Jia Bingbing, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, 
and Implications, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, 2013, p. 98. 
53     The Memorial, p. 75.
54    See the Memorial, Figure 4.3 before p. 73. Also see CNOOC website for description of this 
release, at http://www.cnooc.com.cn/data/html/news/2012-06-22/chinese/322013.html, 1 
March 2015 (in Chinese).
55     The Memorial, p. 72, para. 4.11.
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4.3 and Paragraph 4.11 of Philippines’ Memorial should be deemed inadmissible 
and better be deleted, taking into consideration Articles 20(2)56 and 25(2)57 of the 
Rules of Procedure. 
Fig. 5    Location for Part of Open Blocks in Waters under Jurisdiction of the 
PRC Available for Foreign Cooperation in the Year of 2012 
(Figure 4.3 of the Memorial)
56     Article 20(2) of the Rules of Procedure reads: “A plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not 
have jurisdiction shall be raised no later than in the Counter-Memorial. A Party is not 
precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that it has appointed, or participated in the 
appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the Arbitral Tribunal is exceeding the scope of its 
authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority 
is raised during the arbitral proceedings. The Arbitral Tribunal may, in either case, admit a 
later plea if it considers the delay justified.” At http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_
id=1529, 20 April 2015.
57     Article 25(2) of the Rules of Procedure reads: “In the event that a Party does not appear 
before the Arbitral Tribunal or fails to defend its case, the Arbitral Tribunal shall invite 
written arguments from the appearing Party on, or pose questions regarding, specific issues 
which the Arbitral Tribunal considers have not been canvassed, or have been inadequately 
canvassed, in the pleadings submitted by the appearing Party. The appearing Party shall 
make a supplemental written submission in relation to the matters identified by the Arbitral 
Tribunal within three months of the Arbitral Tribunal’s invitation…” At http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529, 20 April 2015.
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To be added, all the last sentences at Paragraphs 4.13,58 4.15,59 and 4.17 60 of 
the Memorial prove China’s ambiguous position. Paragraph 4.12 of the Memorial 
identifies the remarks by Mr. Liu Feng in August 2012 who explained that China 
claims sovereign rights, including rights to oil and gas extraction and to fishing, in 
“all the waters within the nine-dash line”.61 However, Mr. Liu no longer works for 
China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Haikou, Hainan Province. 
This Institute does not represent PRC Government. The remarks by Mr. Liu can 
hardly be interpreted as China’s official position.
C. If the Tribunal Considers China’s Historic Right Claims to Be Clear 
    and Specific, the Facts Prove that Such Claims Are UNCLOS-
    Compatible and Incapable of Forging any Dispute concerning 
    Inconsistency with UNCLOS
58   “In the same year, China formally included the area encompassed by the nine-dash line 
within the scope of its Regulations on Marine Observation and Forecast. The Philippines 
protested this action on the ground that ‘extending those regulations to areas outside 
[China’s] jurisdiction and well within the territories and jurisdiction of other countries, 
including the Philippines, is unacceptable and non-recognizable under international law’. 
China responded: ‘[i]t is completely within China’s sovereignty … to take any legislative, 
executive and public-service actions, including maritime observation and forecast, on the 
islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters’.” See the Memorial, pp. 72~73.
59   “In December 2012, China revised the ‘Coast Border Security Regulations’ for Hainan 
Province, to require consent by the provincial authorities for entry by any foreign vessel 
into any waters in the South China Sea under Chinese jurisdiction. Vietnam formally 
protested these regulations as ‘infring[ing] upon the sovereignty, sovereign rights and 
national jurisdiction of Viet Nam in the East Sea [South China Sea]’, adding that ‘Viet Nam 
resolutely opposes and demands China immediately cancel those wrongful activities’. For 
its part, the Philippines requested clarification of China’s new regulations, in particular in 
regard to whether they are intended to apply within the entire area covered by the nine-
dash line. China has not formally responded to the Philippines’ request.” The Memorial, pp. 
73~74.
60   “In January 2013, China issued a slightly amended version of the nine-dash line map, 
which included a tenth dash east of Taiwan. The January 2013 map, shown in Figure 4.4, 
depicts the ten dashes marking China’s ‘national boundary’. The map’s legend states that 
‘China’s border on this map is based on the ‘Geographical Map of the People’s Republic 
of China’ (1:4000000) published by [China Cartographic Publishing House] in 1989. The 
administrative district information is as at November 2012’. The Philippines protested this 
map by way of a NV dated 7 June 2013. It reiterated its position that the dashed line has 
no basis under UNCLOS, and encroaches on the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the 
Philippines within the latter’s maritime entitlements under the Convention. China responded 
by diplomatic note from its Embassy in Manila, which, after stating that China ‘does not 
accept the content’ of the Philippines’ note, asserted: ‘The Chinese side hereby reiterates 
that China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha [Spratly] Islands and their 
adjacent waters’.” The Memorial, p. 74.
61     The Memorial, p. 72.
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The Philippines itself proves that China does not claim any historic rights in 
SCS enclosed by the U-Shaped Line incompatible with UNCLOS. Paragraph 4.32 
of the Memorial reads: 
In a 21 June 2011 demarche to the Philippine Embassy in Beijing, General 
Hong Liang, Deputy Director of the Asia Department of China’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, asserted that, while the Philippines has rights under 
UNCLOS, “China also has ‘historical rights’ which are acknowledged under 
UNCLOS. Historical rights cannot be denied and must be respected”. General 
Hong Liang further elaborated: “China’s 9-dash line claim and map is based 
on the 1948 declaration by the Kuomintang government. UNCLOS also has 
a provision that historic rights cannot be denied and should be respected. 
UNCLOS is there, and the parties can use any clause that is useful to support 
its claim … China understands that the Philippines claim is based on its 
200 mile EEZ. China hopes, however, that its historic rights in the SCS be 
respected by the Philippines.” 62
Paragraph 4.33 of the Memorial provides further evidence: 
The following month, China dispatched a note to the Philippines protesting the 
Philippines’ offering of petroleum blocks to local and international companies 
for exploration and development. China wrote that: “Among the aforesaid 
blocks, AREA 3 and AREA 4 are situated in the waters of which China has 
historic titles including sovereign rights and jurisdiction”. As shown in Figure 
4.7 (in Volume II only), these areas, located at Reed Bank approximately 65 M 
from the Philippine coast at Palawan, are within the nine-dash line. China’s 
reliance on its alleged “historic” rights, as distinguished from its entitlements 
under the 1982 Convention, within the area encompassed by the line was 
made even clearer shortly thereafter in a 15 September 2011 statement by the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry that UNCLOS “does not restrain or deny a country’s 
right which is formed in history and abidingly upheld.”63
The above statements by China’s Foreign Ministry clearly prove that China has no 
62      The Memorial, pp. 81~82.
63      The Memorial, p. 82.
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intention to make any historic rights claim prohibited by UNCLOS. Such clarity is 
not weakened or blurred by the most recent statement of China’s Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson. Paragraph 4.35 of the Memorial reads: 
Responding to testimony by the United States’ Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs that China’s dashed line claim is unlawful 
under UNCLOS, Mr. Hong’s official statement declared: “China’s maritime 
rights and interests in the South China Sea were formed historically and are 
protected by international law.”64 
As UNCLOS forms part of international law, Mr. Hong Lei’s remarks can hardly 
imply China’s intention to defy UNCLOS or other branches of international law 
when China is seen claiming historic rights in SCS, if any.
III. Jurisdiction Issues of Submission 1
Should the Tribunal consider that within the U-Shaped Line China unequi-
vocally claims sovereign rights based on historic right beyond China’s maritime 
entitlements permitted by UNCLOS, the Sino-Philippine dispute could be created 
concerning the legality of (1) such historic rights claim, and (2) U-Shaped Line as 
Chinese maritime boundary in SCS. Based on the following reasons, both disputes 
may go beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
A. The Existence or Legality Disputes concerning China’s Historic 
     Rights Claim outside of Its UNCLOS-Granted Maritime Entitlements 
     but within the U-Shaped Line (the Left-over Area) are beyond the 
     Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
To be submitted, the existence or legality disputes concerning China’s historic 
rights claims in the Left-over Area are beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. It is 
because the resolution of such disputes are concerning the application of Articles 
64     The Memorial, p. 83.
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74(1)65 and 83(1)66 of UNCLOS, which is covered by Article 298(1)(a)(i).67 Such 
disputes become part of the disputes that Annex VII-Tribunal is precluded from 
settling due to China’s non-acceptance expressed by its written declaration dated 
August 25, 2006 according to Article 298. It reads:
The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of the 
procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect 
to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of 
Article 298 of the Convention.68
The Philippines has made it clear since initiating this arbitration that the disputes 
excluded by the 2006 China’s Declaration have not been submitted to this Tribu-
65    Article 74(1) of UNCLOS reads: “The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone be-
tween States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis 
of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”
66    Article 83(1) of UNCLOS reads: “The delimitation of the continental shelf between States 
with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international 
law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order 
to achieve an equitable solution.”
67    Article 298(1)(a)(i) of UNCLOS reads: “1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this 
Convention or at any time thereafter, a State may, without prejudice to the obligations 
arising under section 1, declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of the 
procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories 
of disputes: (a)(i) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 
74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles, 
provided that a State having made such a declaration shall, when such a dispute arises 
subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention and where no agreement within a 
reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between the parties, at the request of 
any party to the dispute, accept submission of the matter to conciliation under Annex V, 
section 2; and provided further that any dispute that necessarily involves the concurrent 
consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over 
continental or insular land territory shall be excluded from such submission.”
68     At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#Chin
a upon ratification, 1 March 2015.  
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nal.69 Here, clarification for a preliminary issue is needed. Is there a room for 
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS to apply to the confrontations between China 
and the Philippines in the the eastern part of SCS enclosed by the U-Shaped Line 
(hereinafter “Relevant Area”)? The answer from the Philippines is no, because, 
from Filipino perspective, China simply has no EEZ and continental shelf in the 
Relevant Area.70 As no Sino-Philippine disputes concerning overlapping EEZ and 
continental shelf claims will arise,71 Articles 74(1) and 83(1) become inapplicable 
in the Relevant Area. Later on, Section IV-A and IV-B of this paper will prove that 
China may lawfully claim EEZ and continental shelf there, giving Articles 74(1) 
and 83(1) a role to play in settling the ensuing Sino-Philippine maritime boundary 
delimitation disputes. 
If Articles 74(1) and 83(1) apply in the Relevant Area, we now address the 
issue whether the disputes concerning the existence or legality of China’s historic 
rights claims, if any, to support its sovereign rights in the Left-over Area are con-
cerning the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1). The question for decision is not 
whether the disputes in question are legally to be considered as concerning “EEZ or 
continental shelf delimitation”,72 as argued by the Philippines. The key issue is the 
interpretation of the term “concerning” as the second word in the first sentence of 
69    See the Notification, pp. 15~16, paras. 37~40. It is worth quoting that in the beginning of 
para. 40, the Philippines said that “[i]t follows that the Philippines’ claims do not fall within 
China’s Declaration of 25 August 2006, because they do not: concern the interpretation 
or application of Articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations…” Also 
see the Memorial, p. 257, para. 7.120. It reads: “The Philippines’s Amended Statement of 
Claim does not present a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 
15, 74 or 83, let alone a dispute relating to sea boundary delimitation. The Tribunal is not 
called upon to express any view on those articles. The dispute the Philippines has submitted 
raises questions of entitlements, not the delimitation of those entitlements. Questions of 
entitlement do not arise or entail the interpretation or application of Articles 15, 74 or 83.”
70     See Figures 3.4, 4.1, and 4.2 after pages 46, 70 and 72 respectively, the Memorial. They are 
Figs. 8, 11 and 12 of this paper.
71       In footnote 374 of the Memorial, the Philippines argues: “the question before this Tribunal 
is whether China’s claim to ‘historic rights’ survives its adherence to the Convention and 
can trump the Philippines’ entitlements to an EEZ and continental shelf.” The Memorial, p. 
98.
72     The ICJ was careful in such differentiation, see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece 
v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1978, p. 36, para. 86.
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Article 298(1)(a)(i).73 The ordinary meaning to be given to the term74 “concern” as 
a verb is75 (1) have relation to, (2) affect,76 and (3) be of importance to. Therefore, 
the term “concerning” should be interpreted as (1) having relation to or relating 
to,77 (2) affecting, and (3) being important to. It follows that any dispute relating 
to, affecting, or important to the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) should 
be considered as concerning the application of these two articles and caught by 
Article 298(1)(a)(i). To be noted, both Articles 74(1) and 83(1) explicitly address 
delimitation agreements concluded by disputing parties. However, as International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) said in Bangladesh v. Myanmar, these 
73    That is “disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 
relating to sea boundary delimitations…” See Art. 298(1)(a)(i) of UNCLOS.
74    Articles 31~32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provide general 
principles for the treaty interpretation. The starting point for interpretation is finding the 
ordinary meaning for the term to be interpreted. The ordinary meaning for the term to be 
interpreted can be found in standard dictionaries. 
75    A. S. Hornby ed., Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1980.
76     As confirmed by the ICJ in the Greece v. Turkey, the meaning of the term “concern” as a 
verb can be interpreted as “affect”. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. 
Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1978, p. 37, para. 89. “In the present case, moreover, 
quite apart from the question of the status of the above-mentioned Greek islands for the 
purpose of determining Greece’s entitlement to continental shelf, the Court notes that during 
the hearings in 1976 the Greek Government referred to a certain straight base-line claimed 
by Turkey which is, however, contested by Greece. Although it recognized that the resulting 
discrepancy between the Greek and Turkish views of the limits of Turkey’s territorial sea in 
the area is not great, it observed that the discrepancy ‘obviously affects the question of the 
delimitation of the continental shelf’. The question of the limits of a State’s territorial sea, 
as the Greek Government itself has recognized, is indisputably one which not only relates 
to, but directly concerns territorial status.”
77     The term “relating to” has been interpreted by the ICJ in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
Case as “emanating from” and “being an automatic adjunct of”. “86. … The question for 
decision is whether the present dispute is one ‘relating to the territorial status of Greece’, 
not whether the rights in dispute are legally to be considered as ‘territorial’ rights; and a 
dispute regarding entitlement to and delimitation of areas of continental shelf tends by its 
very nature to be one relating to territorial status … In short, continental shelf rights are 
legally both an emanation from and an automatic adjunct of the territorial sovereignty of 
the coastal State. It follows that the territorial regime – the territorial status – of a coastal 
State comprises, ipso jure, the rights of exploration and exploitation over the continental 
shelf to which it is entitled under international law. A dispute regarding those rights would, 
therefore, appear to be one which may be said to ‘relate’ to the territorial status of the 
coastal State.” Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports, 1978, p. 36, para. 86.
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two provisions also apply to judicial and arbitral delimitation decisions.78 Summing 
up, any dispute relating to, affecting, or important to the application of these two 
provisions to the settlement of maritime delimitation dispute by negotiation or by 
judicial body will be covered by Article 298(1)(a)(i).
Most interestingly, the Philippines may have admitted that the existence or 
legality dispute concerning China’s historic rights claims in the Left-over Area is 
relating to, affecting, or important to the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1). 
Contending that “there is no basis for China’s claim of ‘historic rights’ in the EEZ
or continental shelf of the Philippines, or any other State”,79 the Philippines’ Memo-
rial (in Chapter 4, Section II-A-2 entitled The Case Law) invoked international 
judicial decisions as evidences. Paradoxically, those judicial decisions all aim at 
resolving maritime delimitation disputes. They are the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
Case, the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland; Federal Repub-
lic of Germany v. Iceland), Continental Shelf Delimitation Case (Tunisia v. Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya), Gulf of Maine Case (Canada v. United States), Qatar v. Bahrain, 
Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, and Babados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration.80 
As proved by these judicial decisions, under the equidistance/relevant 
circumstances method81 historic right may constitute a “relevant circumstan-
78    See Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar), Judgment of 14 March 2012, 
para. 183, at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/C16_
Judgment_14_03_2012_rev.pdf, 1 March 2015. [hereinafter “Bangladesh v. Myanmar, 
Judgment”]
79     The Memorial, p. 91, para. 4.55.
80     The Memorial, pp. 91~99, paras. 4.55~4.69.
81       According to the Annex VII Tribunal which decided Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, “the 
equidistance/relevant circumstances method is the method normally applied by interna-
tional courts and tribunals in the determination of a maritime boundary. The two-step 
approach … results in the drawing of a provisional equidistance line and the consideration 
of a subsequent adjustment, a process the International Court of Justice explained as 
follows: ‘The most logical and widely practiced approach is first to draw provisionally an 
equidistance line and then to consider whether that line must be adjusted in the light of 
the existence of special circumstances (Qatar v. Bahrain, I.C.J. Reports, 2001, p. 94, para. 
176).’” See Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Award, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (11 
April 2006), para. 304, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1152, 1 March 
2015; Guyana/Suriname, Award, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (17 September 2007), 
paras. 340~342, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1147, 1 March 2015; 
Bangladesh v. Myanmar, Judgement, para. 229; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between 
Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1993, p. 62, 
paras. 55~56.
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ce”82 to be considered when certain conditions are met.83 This happens when 
applying Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS to achieve “an equitable solution 
82    As to what constitute relevant circumstances, ICJ in Denmark v. Norway quoted the 
judgments of North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 50, para. 93) 
and Libya/Malta Case (I.C.J. Reports, 1985, p. 40, para. 48). “[U]nder the heading of 
‘special circumstances’ and that of ‘relevant circumstances’, as to what circumstances 
are juridically relevant to the delimitation process ... In fact, there is no legal limit to the 
considerations which States may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they 
apply equitable procedures, and more often than not it is the balancing-up of all such 
considerations that will produce this result rather than reliance on one to the exclusion of 
all others. The problem of the relative weight to be accorded to different considerations 
naturally varies with the circumstances of the case.” And, “although there may be no legal 
limit to the considerations which States may take account of, this can hardly be true for 
a court applying equitable procedures. For a court, although there is assuredly no closed 
list of considerations, it is evident that only those that are pertinent to the institution of 
the continental shelf as it has developed within the law, and to the application of equitable 
principles to its delimitation, will qualify for inclusion.” See Maritime Delimitation in the 
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 
1993, p. 63, para. 57; Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1985, p. 
48, para. 65.
83      The conditions for historic fishing rights to qualify as a relevant circumstance are “catastro-
phic” and “long usage” tests, originated in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case of 1951. 
They were brought forward in the provisions inter alia of Article 7(5) of UNCLOS, and 
applied to the delimitation for overlapping EEZ and continental shelf as happening in the 
Eritrea v. Yemen. See Eritrea v. Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), Award, 1999, para. 50, at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160, 1 March 2015. Also see Barbados v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, where the Annex VII Tribunal confirms the resource-related criteria, 
i.e. traditional fishing activities may under certain circumstance be treated as a special 
circumstance. “241. Resource-related criteria have been treated more cautiously by the de-
cisions of international courts and tribunals, which have not generally applied this factor 
as a relevant circumstance. As noted above, the Jan Mayen decision is most exceptional 
in having determined the line of delimitation in connection with the fisheries conducted 
by the parties in dispute. However, as the question of fisheries might underlie a number 
of delimitation disputes, courts and tribunals have not altogether excluded the role of this 
factor but, as in the Gulf of Maine, have restricted its application to circumstances in which 
catastrophic results might follow from the adoption of a particular delimitation line. In 
the Gulf of Maine case the Chamber held: ‘It is, therefore, in the Chamber’s view, evident 
that the respective scale of activities connected with fishing – or navigation, defence or, 
for that matter, petroleum exploration and exploitation – cannot be taken into account as a 
relevant circumstance or, if the term is preferred, as an equitable criterion to be applied in 
determining the delimitation line. What the Chamber would regard as a legitimate scruple 
lies rather in concern lest the overall result, even though achieved through the application 
of equitable criteria and the use of appropriate methods for giving them concrete effect, 
should unexpectedly be revealed as radically inequitable, that is to say, as likely to entail 
catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of 
the countries concerned (I.C.J. Reports, 1984, p. 342, para. 237).’” See Barbados/Trinidad 
and Tobago, Award, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (11 April 2006), para. 241, at http://
www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1152, 1 March 2015; Maritime Delimitation in the 
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 
1993, p. 71, para. 75.
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or result” in settling maritime delimitation dispute.84 Put differently, historic right 
constitutes one of the factors to be addressed in the application of the delimitation 
process, i.e. the equidistance/relevant circumstances method, conceived by Articles 
74(1) and 83(1), and testified by, e.g. Eritrea v. Yemen85 and Tunisia v. Libya.86
Therefore, the dispute of existence or legality of China’s claim of historic righ-
ts, if any, as the basis to support its sovereign rights in the Left-over Area would be 
concerning the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS and caught by 
Article 298(1)(a)(i). Being covered by the 2006 China’s Declaration, such dispute 
falls outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
84    The footnote 373 of the Memorial is worth quoting in this connection. It reads: “The 
question of whether, under UNCLOS, historic rights can exist in another State’s EEZ is 
fundamentally different from whether, in delimitating a maritime boundary between two 
States with overlapping EEZ entitlements, historic fishing practices can be taken into 
account as a ‘relevant circumstance’. In Gulf of Maine, the ICJ Chamber refused to treat 
the parties’ historic fishing practices as a relevant circumstance, because the economic 
consequence of depriving them of access to their traditional fishing grounds would not 
be ‘catastrophic’. Canada v. United States, para. 237. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-12. The 
arbitral tribunal in Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago applied the same standard; it found 
that the consequences of denying Barbados access to its allegedly traditional fishing areas 
in waters claimed by Trinidad as its EEZ would not be ‘catastrophic’ and therefore were 
not relevant to the delimitation. Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Award, UNCLOS Annex 
VII Tribunal (11 Apr. 2006), para. 267. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-54. But in the Jan Mayen 
Case (Norway v. Denmark), the ICJ noted, as one factor justifying its delimitation of the 
parties’ overlapping EEZ entitlements, that it would preserve Greenland’s access to its 
traditional capelin fishing grounds. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland 
and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38. MP, Vol. XI, 
Annex LA-20.” Also see Tunisia/Libya, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1982, para. 50; Guyana/
Suriname, Arbitral Award, 2007, pp. 107~108, paras. 332~333.
85     For example, in Arbitration between Eritrea v. Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), the question 
of fishing (including historical practice) in the red sea and the traditional fishing regime 
are both essential parts and addressed in Chapters II & IV, which is under the general title 
“Proceedings in the Delimitation Stage of the Arbitration”. Both Eritrea and Yemen were 
in agreement on the effect of historical fishing rights upon the application of Articles 74(1) 
and 83(1) of UNCLOS. Paragraph 51 is worth quoting: “[t]hey also found an echo in the 
‘equitable solution’ called for by paragraph 1 of Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention, 
it being assumed that no ‘solution’ could be equitable which would be inconsistent with 
long usage, which would present a clear and present danger of a catastrophic result on the 
local economy of one of the Parties, or which would fail to take into account the need to 
minimize detrimental effects on fishing communities, and the economic dislocation, of 
States whose nationals have habitually fished in the relevant area.” The Eritrea-Yemen 
Arbitration, Award, para. 51, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160, 1 
March 2015.
86    Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1982, 
pp. 71~77, paras. 97~105.
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B. The Legality Dispute concerning the U-Shaped Line as the Boundary 
    of China’s Maritime Claim in SCS is beyond the Jurisdiction 
    of the Tribunal
The legality of the U-Shaped Line is being challenged by the Philippines as 
the boundary of maritime claims China guards in SCS.87 It is submitted that such 
dispute, if any, is also beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, for the following 
reasons.
Firstly, the U-Shaped Line, if ever considered by the Tribunal as the boundary 
of China’s maritime claims, has to be supported by the historic right under custo-
mary international law. Whether the conditions under customary international law 
to justify such claim of historic rights are fulfilled is not the question here, as this 
paper addresses jurisdiction and admissibility issues. As proved by the preceding 
section, the dispute whether such claim of China exists at all and whether such 
claim is lawful, if it does exist, is relating to, affecting, and concerning the 
application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) relating to Sino-Philippine sea boundary 
delimitation in the Relevant Area. Then the legality dispute concerning the outer 
limits of such claim, if it exists, will be also concerning the application of these two 
articles.
Secondly, the original (1948) eleven-dash line, the 2009 nine-dash line, 
and the present (2013) ten-dash line are all relating to and concerning maritime 
boundary delimitation between China and other States bordering SCS, based on (1) 
the diplomatic practice by China Mainland related to its negotiations with Vietnam 
concerning the disputes in the Gulf of Tonkin, (2) one of the dashes between 
Taiwan and the Philippines, and (3) another one dash between Taiwan and Japan.
The original U-Shaped Line or eleven-dash line was placed on the Location 
Map of the South China Sea Islands published by the Republic of China Govern-
ment in 1948 (see Fig. 6 of this paper). There were two dashes between China’s 
Hainan Island and Vietnam. These two dashes were removed in 1960s. The PRC 
Government did not explain the reason. Based on his observation, Professor Zou 
Keyuan is of the opinion that such removal might have been related to the transfer 
of the sovereignty over the Bai Long Wei (or Bach Long Vi) Island in the Gulf 
87      See the Notification, paras. 2~3, 5~6, 11, 31, 41.
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of Tonkin from China to Vietnam.88 If Professor Zou’s observation is correct, 
then those two dashes would have a bearing on China’s territorial claim while 
not directly related to China’s maritime claims. Still, an indirect impact would be 
made upon maritime boundary delimitation between China and Vietnam as Bai 
Long Wei Island would affect and be important to the process of delimitation in 
Vietnam’s favor.89 If Professor Zou’s observation is not true, the fact that those 
two dashes were removed before China and Vietnam reached maritime boundary 
delimitation agreement in Gulf of Tonkin90 would strongly suggest that those two 
dashes were previously used by China as a provisional maritime claim. Making 
the dashes negotiable or even dispensable will doubtlessly facilitate the China-
Vietnam maritime boundary delimitation negotiation. Put differently, after Sino-
Vietnamese maritime boundary is drawn in Gulf of Tonkin, the presence of those 
two dashes would not only be redundant but also confusing. In any case, those two 
dashes between China’s Hainan Island and Vietnam should be deemed relating to, 
important to, affecting and concerning maritime delimitation between China and 
Vietnam.
There is another dash between China Taiwan and the Philippines which app-
ears both in the 1948 Map and 2009 Map, which is attached to the China’s NV 
(Figure 1.1 in the Memorial and Fig. 1 of this paper).91 To be added, the U-Shaped 
Line appearing in the most recent maps published in January 2013 by China, as 
indicated by the Memorial in Figure 4.4,92 and the map obtained by the author 
has one more dash between China Taiwan and Japan (see Fig. 7 of this paper). It 
is well-known that the maritime boundary between Taiwan and the Phili-ppines, 
and the boundary between Taiwan and Japan have yet to be drawn. Given this, 
nobody will believe that these two dashes represent Taiwan-Philippine and Taiwan-
Japan maritime boundaries. However, when the time comes for such boundary to 
be drawn after agreement is reached by the parties concerned, such dashes will be 
88    Zou Keyuan, Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Prospects, London: Routledge, 2005, 
p. 50.
89    Zou Keyuan, Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, Ocean Development 
and International Law, Vol. 30, 1999, pp. 245~246, 248.
90     The Sino-Vietnam Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, Exclusive Econo-
mic Zone and Continental Shelf in the Beibu Gulf (which is also called Gulf of Tonkin) was 
signed on 25 December 2000 and entered into force on 30 June 2004. See Zou Keyuan, The 
Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, 
Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 36, 2005, pp. 13~24.
91     Figure 1.1 is placed after p. 4 of the Memorial.
92     Figure 4.4 is placed after p. 74 of the Memorial.
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removed without any doubt. Thus, it is hard to deny that the U-Shaped Line or the 
present ten-dash line drawn by China is relating to or concer-ning sea boundary 
delimitation between China on the one hand, and other States bordering SCS on the 
other hand.
Fig. 6    The 1948 Location Map of the South China Sea Islands
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Fig. 7    2013 Chinese Map Containing U-Shaped Line
Thirdly and most importantly, although, the Philippines criticizes China’s 
practice using U-Shaped Line as a maritime claim, it uses the same method itself 
in other sectors. Figure 3.4 in the Memorial (see Fig. 8 of this paper), entitled “The 
Encroachment of China’s Nine-dash Line into the Philippines’ EEZ and Continental 
Shelf”,93 has something very similar to the U-Shaped Line. We can take a close 
look at the dotted lines between Taiwan and the Philippines on the one hand, and 
between the Philippines and Indonesia, on the other hand. The common name 
given by the Philippines for these two dotted lines is “Provisional Equidistance 
Lines”. It is well-known that no Philippine-Taiwanese and Philippine-Indonesian 
maritime boundaries have been concluded. Therefore, what these dotted lines 
represent are definitely not the “settled” maritime boundaries, but the provisional 
93     Figure 3.4 is placed after p. 46 of the Memorial.
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ones unilaterally proposed by the Philippines. It is safe to say that such provisional 
lines will have to be removed once such maritime boundary lines are drawn by 
the agreements between the parties concerned. This practice of the Philippines 
confirms the lawful nature of the U-Shaped Line of China as being relating to, 
affecting or concerning sea boundary delimitations. With such nature, the legality 
dispute concerning the U-Shaped Line goes beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
Fig. 8    Philippine Maritime Boundary from Figure 3.4 of Its Memorial
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IV. The Totality of China’s UNCLOS-Consistent Maritime
       Entitlements in the SCS as Presented by the Philippines 
        Is a Gross Misrepresentation in Law and Fact
The Philippines’ Memorial contends that China invokes UNCLOS-inconsistent 
historic right to support its maritime claim in SCS beyond its UNCLOS-compatible 
maritime entitlements94 but within the U-Shaped Line. As China is deemed not 
having EEZ and continental shelf there, such Left-over Area becomes so huge95 
that all the Sino-Philippine maritime confrontations occurring in the Spratly Islands 
Group identified by the Memorial took place inside. China’s invocation of historic 
right as legal justification there becomes real and necessary. In case China’s historic 
right claim is overruled, China would have no legal basis to prevail over the 
Philippines for those maritime disputes. 
However, the Philippines is wrong about the size of the Left-over Area, due 
to a misrepresentation of the totality of China’s UNCLOS-consistent maritime 
entitlements in SCS. Such misrepresentation is built upon three pillars. One is the 
Philippines’ interpretation of Article 121 of UNCLOS, which violates the rules of 
international treaty law relevant to the interpretation of treaties. Secondly, the Phili-
ppines keeps a series of critical facts from the Tribunal. That is the origins and de-
velopment of Sino-Philippine territorial disputes in the Relevant Area. Thirdly, the 
Philippines is mistreating some widely-known SCS non-rock islands as “rocks” 
defined by Article 121(3) while arguing that no maritime features in the Spratly 
Islands Group can be considered as non-rock islands under Article 121(1), capable 
of generating any EEZ and continental shelf for China. In the following three 
sections, these misleading arguments will be anatomized and discussed. 
94    The Philippines argues that what China is allowed by UNCLOS to claim is no more than 
a few territorial waters generated by rocks that China currently occupies with disputed 
ownership and sovereign status. See the Memorial, Chapter 5, particularly p. 159, para. 
5.137.
95    See Figures 3.4, 4.1 and 4.2 after pages 46, 70 and 72 respectively of the Memorial. They 
are Figs. 8, 11, and 12 of this paper.
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A. Philippines’ Conclusion Is Based on a Manifest and 
    Essential Error of Law96
In Section I-B of Chapter 5 of the Memorial, the Philippines presented a ques-
tionable interpretation of Article 121 of UNCLOS,97 which was applied to the mari-
time features currently occupied by China98 in Scarborough Shoal and in the Sprat-
ly Islands Group as well as top three biggest maritime features in the Spratly Islan-
ds Group that the China does not occupy. There are four stages in the line of the 
Philippine arguments, as follows. 
Stage one: Part 1 of Section I-B introduces “History of Article 121(3)”.99 
Stage two: Part 2 (entitled “Interpretation of Article 121(3))100 and the remai-
ning parts of Section I-B demonstrate Philippines’ position that the word “rock” 
under Article 121(3) is interchangeable and equivalent to “insular feature”, “feature” 
96    Professor Cheng Bin, as one of the most highly qualified publicists, discusses the nullity 
and voidability of judicial decisions and provides certain causes for annulling, revising 
or otherwise setting aside a final judgment. One of them is manifest and essential error in 
law and in fact. Especially, Professor Cheng says that “VI. Manifest and Essential Error. 
– The Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal (1935) in its Final Award (1941) held that:- ‘A mere 
error in law is no sufficient ground for a petition tending to revision.’ In the Drier Case 
(1935), dealing with a petition for rehearing on grounds of alleged injustice and judicial 
error, the German-United States Mixed Claims Commission (1922) held that: - ‘No power 
resides in the Commission to redress an alleged injustice inherent in its award…. The only 
reason which may now be considered is the third, which asserts manifest juridical error in 
the award.’ As, however, the Umpire of the same Commission said in the Lehigh Valley 
Railroad Co. Case (1933): - ‘I think it clear that where the Commission has misinterpreted 
the evidence, or made a mistake in calculation, or where its decision does not follow 
its fact findings, or where in any other respect the decision does not comport with the 
record as made, or where the decision involves a material error of law, the Commission 
not only has power, but is under the duty, upon a proper showing, to reopen and correct a 
decision to accord with the facts and the applicable legal rules. My understanding is that 
the Commission has repeatedly done so where there was palpable error in its decision.’ … 
Yet it cannot be doubted that even where an error in law may be manifest, it needs also to 
be material to the actual question decided in order to constitute a ground for setting the 
judgment aside.” See Cheng Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals, London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1953, pp. 361~363.
97     Article 121 (Regime of islands) of UNCLOS reads: “1. An island is a naturally formed 
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. 2. Except as provided 
for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone 
and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 3. Rocks which cannot sustain 
human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf.”
98     The Memorial, p. 142, para. 5.96.
99     The Memorial, pp. 118~121, paras. 5.16~5.24.
100   The Memorial, pp. 122~125, paras. 5.25~5.34.
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and “island”,101 the last word of which is used in Article 121(1).
Stage three: Taking for granted that the word “rocks” in Article 121(3) carries 
the same meaning and scope as the word “island” in Article 121(1), the Philippines 
transplants the conditions attached to Article 121(3) to the regimes of islands under 
Article 121(1)~(2) by saying that insular features, islands, or features which cannot 
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or conti-
nental shelf. 
Stage four: Moreover, the Philippines changes the scope of the condition “whi-
ch cannot sustain human habitation” by instilling an additional qualification urged 
by a scholar, as lex ferenda, that “for an insular feature not to be a ‘rock’ within the 
meaning of Article 121(3), its natural conditions must make it capable, by itself, of 
providing the elements required to sustain, that is, to keep alive, a stable commu-
nity of human beings”.102
It is submitted that the general principles of treaty interpretation under Articles 
31~32 103 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) has not 
101     See carefully the words used in the Memorial, paras. 5.26, 5.28, 5.29, 5.36, 5.37, 5.39, 
5.44, 5.46, 5.48, 5.50~5.52, and 5.56.
102      The Memorial, p. 129, para. 5.48.
103     1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf, 1 March 2015. Article 31 
(General Rule of Interpretation) of VCLT reads: “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the 
interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by 
one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice 
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established 
that the parties so intended.” Article 32 (Supplementary Means of Interpretation) reads: 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) 
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
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been observed by the Philippines104 in the foregoing four stages when interpreting 
Article 121 of UNCLOS, for the following reasons.
In stage one, the Philippines invokes the preparatory work (drafting history) 
of Article 121 by using five paragraphs (Paragraphs 5.16~5.20) to present the 
proposals by Ambassador Arvid Pardo,105 Colombia,106 Libya,107 Romania,108 
Malta,109 Turkey,110 and a group of fourteen African States.111 Critically, the text 
of Article 121 adopted at the Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS III) proves the failure of these proposals. After presenting these 
unsuccessful proposals, the Philippines uses only one paragraph (Paragraph 5.21) 
104      China and the Philippines have ratified the VCLT, which has legally binding force upon 
these two States, at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtd
sg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en, 1 March 2015.
105      See the Memorial, p. 118, para. 5.16. “The Ambassador of Malta, Arvid Pardo, expressed 
the prevailing sentiment when he observed: ‘If a 200 mile limit of jurisdiction could be 
founded on the possession of uninhabited, remote or very small islands, the effectiveness 
of international administration of ocean space beyond national jurisdiction would be 
gravely impaired’.”
106      See the Memorial, p. 118, para. 5.17. “Colombia, for example, proposed: ‘Islands without 
a life of their own, without a permanent and settled population, that are closer to the 
coastline of another State than to the coastline of the State to which they belong, and 
located at a distance less than double the breadth of the territorial sea of that State will not 
have an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf’.” 
107    See the Memorial, p. 118, footnote 427. “Libya’s proposal reflected similar concerns and 
read: ‘3. Small islands and rocks, wherever they may be, which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no … exclusive economic zone, nor 
continental shelf.” 
108     See the Memorial, p. 119, para. 5.18. “Romania suggested that only islands, and not low-
tide elevations, islets or small uninhabited islands without economic life and situated 
outside the territorial sea, should be taken into consideration in delimiting ocean space 
between neighboring States … According to a further proposal by that State, the concept 
of ‘island[s] similar to an islet’ would cover any island ‘which is not or cannot be inha-
bited (permanently) or which does not or cannot have its own economic life’.” 
109      See the Memorial, para. 5.19. “Malta proposed that States should not be able to claim ju-
risdiction over maritime spaces by virtue of sovereignty or control over islets. It defined an 
‘islet’ as a ‘naturally formed area of land, less than one square kilometer in area, surround-
ed by water, which is above water at high tide’.”
110     See the Memorial, para. 5.19. “Turkey proposed that only islands with a surface area of at 
least one tenth that of the State to which they belonged would qualify for an EEZ and a 
continental shelf.” 
111      See the Memorial, pp. 119~120, para. 5.20. “A group of fourteen African States proposed 
to subject the entitlements of all islands (not only rocks or islets) to a variety of conditions. 
The proposal stated: Maritime spaces of islands shall be determined according to equitable 
principles taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including inter 
alia: the size of the islands; the population or the absence thereof; their contiguity to the 
principal territory; whether or not they are situated on the continental shelf of another 
territory; their geological and geomorphological structure and configuration.”
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to present the views of Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, and Denmark which can 
be seen as opposing the previous bunch of failed proposals and reflecting the 
intentions behind the text adopted.112 Under the principles of treaty interpretation 
indicated by Article 32 of VCLT, the preparatory work of the treaty is ranked as 
only the supplementary means of interpretation which may not be looked at if the 
interpretation according to Article 31(a) does not leave the meaning ambiguous 
or obscure; and (b) does not lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unrea-
sonable.113 By invoking the preparatory work of Article 121 of UNCLOS as the 
point of departure, the Philippines defies its treaty obligations under Articles 31~32 
of VCLT. Moreover, as the Philippines is relying on the first bunch of unsuccessful 
proposals alone while ignoring the second group of opinions in interpreting Article 
121. A serious doubt arises whether such unrepresentative proposals can be deemed 
“preparatory work of the treaty” for the purpose of treaty interpretation at all. Thus, 
the Philippines has also acted inconsistently with the supplementary rule of treaty 
interpretation under Article 32 of VCLT.
In stages two and three, the Philippines treats “rocks”, “islands”, “insular 
features”, and “features” as interchangeable terms and being equal to each other, 
based on the group of failed proposals made in UNCLOS III as discussed above. 
However, based on Article 31(1) of VCLT, such Philippines’ position does not 
conform to what is meant by Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, which at least must be 
interpreted in its immediate context, i.e., Article 121(1)~(2), while the ordinary 
meaning must be given to the critical term “rocks” as the subject of Article 121(3). 
To begin with, Article 121(3) is an exception to Article 121(1), as proved by 
Article 121(2), which reads: “Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial 
sea, the contiguous zone, the exlusive economic zone and the continental shelf 
of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention 
112    See the Memorial, p. 120, para. 5.21. “Trinidad and Tobago expressed the view that ‘it 
would be most undesirable if an uninhabited mid-ocean rock could create entitlement 
to a surrounding 200 mile exclusive economic zone’. Dominica agreed that ‘[t]o give 
‘rocks’ a competence to establish an exclusive economic zone would create a disturbing 
precedent…’ Both States supported the inclusion in the Convention of the provision 
that ultimately became Article 121(3). ‘Without such provision’, Denmark stated, ‘tiny 
and barren islands, looked upon in the past as mere obstacles to navigation, would 
miraculously become the golden keys to vast maritime zones. That would indeed be an 
unwarranted and unacceptable consequence of the new law of the sea’.” 
113      1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf, 1 March 2015.
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applicable to other land territory.”114 Article 121(2) has been declared by the 
ICJ in Qatar v. Bahrain to reflect customary international law rule that “islands, 
regardless of their size, in this respect enjoy the same status, and therefore gene-
rate the same maritime rights, as other land territory.”115 Coupled with the fact 
that the deliberately chosen wording “rock” is different from “island”, it is justi-
fied to say that the scope of island is bigger than but not equal to that of rock. 
Simply put, islands include but are not limited to rocks. These two terms are not 
interchangeable, after reading Article 121(1)~(3) as a whole. 
On this point the Philippines disagrees. Paragraph 5.26 of the Memorial argues 
that “Article 121(3) does not define the term ‘rocks’. There is no reason to believe 
that the geology or geomorphology of the feature is relevant; neither bears on the 
object and purpose of the provision.”116 
Such interpretation is again unjustified as being inconsistent with the formula-
tion of Article 121(1), which is the context of Article 121(3). Article 121(1) pro-
vides the definition of “island” exactly according to geology and geomorphology 
of the feature. It reads: “An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by 
water, which is above water at high tide.”117 With such context, it is unconvincing to 
consider the geology or geomorphology of the feature irrelevant when interpreting 
the word “rock”, as a sub-category of “island”. 
The above Philippines’ position is also inconsistent with another (more funda-
mental) rule of interpretation, which is to look at the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the term (“rock”) as the starting point. What is the ordinary meaning of “rock”? 
According to Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, “rock” is 
defined as “solid stony part of the earth’s crust” or “mass of rock standing out from 
the earth’s surface or from the sea.”118 Thus, the term “rock” under Article 121(3) 
of UNCLOS is a mass of solid stony part of the earth’s crust standing out from the 
sea. If we take Article 121(1)~(2) as context to the interpretation of Article 121(3), 
then the word “rock” should be understood as only a kind of islands with solid 
stony nature standing out from the sea, surrounded by water, and above water at 
high tide. 
114      Article 121 (Regime of islands) of UNCLOS.
115     Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports, 2001, para. 185.
116      See the Memorial, p. 122, para. 5.26.
117      Article 121 (Regime of islands) of UNCLOS.
118     A. S. Hornby ed., Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980.
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Article 121(3) does not stop here by saying that all “rocks” shall not have EEZ 
or continental shelf. It provides two alternative qualifications for three kinds of 
rocks, but not all kinds of rocks, to be devoid of EEZ or continental shelf entitle-
ments. That is to say, rocks which cannot sustain (a) human habitation, (b) econo-
mic life of their own, or (c) human habitation and economic life of their own, shall 
have no EEZ or continental shelf. 
Therefore, in order to judge whether any maritime feature in SCS that China 
claims sovereignty may not generate EEZ or continental shelf for China, the first 
threshold is to see if it is an island or not. If it is not an island at all,119 then of 
course that maritime feature does not even have territorial water, and contiguous 
zone. EEZ and continental shelf are out of the question. 
If it is an island, then we come to the second threshold to check if that mari-
time feature is a rock. If the maritime feature (an island) is not a rock, then it is en-
titled to EEZ and continental shelf. If that maritime feature is considered a rock, it 
is still incorrect to consider that maritime feature incapable of generating EEZ or 
continental shelf. The two alternative qualifications in Article 121(3) then come 
into play. 
Based on this reasoning, it will be totally wrong to treat the term of “island” 
under Article 121(1) and that of “rock” under Article 121(3) as being interchange-
able, due to its inconformity with various rules of treaty interpretation codified by 
Articles 31~32 of VCLT.
In this connection, perhaps the 1993 Jan Mayen Case may illustrate the diffe-
rence between islands and rocks under different paragraphs of Article 121. Den-
mark and Norway requested the ICJ for delimiting an overlapping continental shelf 
and fishery zone in the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen. “The distance … is 
some 250 nautical miles”.120 As found by the ICJ, 
Jan Mayen has no settled population; it is inhabited solely by technical and 
other staff, some 25 in all, of the island’s meteorological station, a LORAN-C 
station, and the coastal radio station. The island has a landing field, but no 
port; bulk supplies are brought in by ship … Norwegian activities in the area 
between Jan Mayen and Greenland have included whaling, sealing, and 
119     For example, if the maritime feature is considered to be a low-tide elevation, which is not 
above water at high tide.
120     Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Demark v. Nor-
way), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1993, p. 44, para. 11. 
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fishing for capelin and other species. These activities are carried out by vessels 
based in mainland of Norway, not in Jan Mayen.121 
Therefore, “this island cannot sustain and has not sustained human habitation 
or economic life of its own (cf. Article 121, paragraph 3, of the 1982 Convention 
on the Law of the Sea)”.122 However, Jan Mayen Island was considered capable 
of generating continental shelf and fishery zone for Norway as the point of depar-
ture.123 People may doubt, if not deny, the applicability of UNCLOS to the Jan 
Mayen Case decided in 1993. In fact, when the ICJ was trying this case, Denmark 
and Norway had already signed but not ratified UNCLOS,124 which was not far 
from becoming applicable to both Parties.125 It may explain why their attitudes were 
consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS as correctly interpreted, when arguing the 
case at the ICJ. 
The remaining doubts, if any, are cleared in 2006 when Norway submitted 
the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 M in, inter alia, the Norwegian 
Sea to the CLCS for review. The region concerned was called Banana Hole 
whose western boundary was based on, inter alia, Jan Mayen Island. Importantly, 
121     Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Demark v. Nor-
way), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1993, p. 46, para. 15.
122     Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Demark v. Nor-
way), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1993, p. 65, para. 60.
123     Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Demark v. Nor-
way), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1993, p. 45, see Sketch-Map No. 1.
124     Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Demark v. Nor-
way), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1993, p. 59, para. 48.
125     UNCLOS entered into force in 1994. Norway ratified UNCLOS on 24 June 1996. Denmark 
ratified UNCLOS on 16 November 2004, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm, 1 March 2015. However, Denmark had already 
ratified VCLT on 1 June 1976 while VCLT entered into force on 27 January 1980. Thus, 
by the time when Jan Mayen Case was being tried by the ICJ Denmark has been under the 
obligation imposed by Article 18 of VCLT to refrain from any actions which would defeat 
the object and purpose of UNCLOS prior to its ratification. For the record of ratification 
for VCLT, at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no
=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#EndDec, 1 March 2015. 
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Norway’s submission met with the consent from Denmark and Iceland.126 The 
recommendation by the CLCS also confirms Jan Mayen as an island capable of 
generating continental shelf.127 In 2009, Denmark made its submission for the outer 
limits of continental shelf to the north of Faroe Islands concerning the southern 
part of the Banana Hole, which recognized the same western boundary based on 
Jan Mayen Island.128 It reaffirms that the term “island” under Article 121(1) and 
the term “rock” under Article 121(3) are not interchangeable, as contended by 
the Philippines. It also serves a rejection of the Philippines’ theory that the two 
alternative conditions under Article 121(3) may be transplanted to “island” under 
Article 121(1).129
In fact, the attitude of the Philippines confirms the need to distinguish “islands” 
126     On 27 November 2006, Norway made its submission to the CLCS which used Jan Mayen 
as a basis to generate continental shelf extending beyond 200 M in the region of Banana 
Hole. Denmark and Iceland, inter alia, presented their NVs to the UN to express their 
consent for the CLCS to proceed with consideration of Norway’s submission, without 
challenging Jan Mayen as a proper island used for generating continental shelf for 
Norway. The executive summary of Norway’s submission and communications from 
Denmark and Iceland can all be found in CLCS official website, at http://www.un.org/
depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm, 1 March 2015.
127      Section IV-C of Summary of CLCS’ Recommendations for the 2006 Norway’s Submission 
adopted on 27 March 2009, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf, 1 March 2015.
128    On 29 April 2009 Denmark submitted its outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 M 
to the north of Faroe Islands. The executive Summary of this submission and Norway’s 
communication to positively comment on this submission can be found in CLCS offi-
cial website, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_
dnk_28_2009.htm, 1 March 2015.
129     Had the term “island” under Article 121(1) been interpreted as equal and interchangeable 
to “rock” under Article 121(3), the ICJ and the CLCS would have treated Jan Mayen as 
being incapable of generating continental shelf for Norway. Had the island of Jan Mayen 
been turned into a rock as defined by Article 121(3) due to its factual inability to sustain 
human habitation and to have economic life of its own, there would not have been any 
maritime boundary delimitation issue of overlapping continental shelf and fishery zone 
between Jan Mayen and Greenland for the ICJ to settle and no case for outer limits of 
extended continental shelf submission for the CLCS to review in the first place.
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from “rocks” under Article 121. Paragraphs 5.23,130 5.27,131 and 5.44 132 in Chapter 
5 of the Memorial invoke the relevant ICJ judgments to this effect. Professor D. 
W. Bowett, as one of the most respected authorities in terms of the legal regime of 
islands, has also made such distinction, proved by Paragraph 5.54 of Philippines’ 
Memorial.133 It is odd to see that, having such authoritative and differentiated 
treatment of the terms (islands as opposed to rocks) in its own Memorial, the 
Philippines can still advocate such mixed usage of terms without distinctions. By 
contrast, China has been very careful in its invocation of Article 121, in particular 
when criticizing the use of a “rock” called Okinotori Shima by Japan to generate 
not only 200 M continental shelf, but extended continental shelf beyond that. This 
130    See the Memorial, p. 121, para. 5.23. “As the ICJ explained in Nicaragua v. Colombia:
[T]he entitlement to maritime rights accorded to an island by [Article 121(2)] is expressly 
limited by reference to the provisions of [Article 121(3)]. By denying an exclusive 
economic zone and a continental shelf to rocks which cannot sustain human habitation 
or economic life of their own, paragraph 3 provides an essential link between the long-
established principle that ‘islands, regardless of their size … enjoy the same status, and 
therefore generate the same maritime rights, as other land territory’ and the more extensive 
maritime entitlements recognized in UNCLOS and which the Court has found to have 
become part of customary international law. The Court therefore considers that the legal 
regime of islands set out in UNCLOS Article 121 forms an indivisible regime, all of which 
has the status of customary international law.” 
131     See the Memorial, pp. 122~123, para. 5.27. “5.27 In Nicaragua v. Colombia, the ICJ 
interpreted and applied Article 121 in respect of Quitasueno, which, like Scarborough 
Shoal, is an underwater reef with only small protrusions above sea level located in a 
semi-enclosed sea a substantial distance from the coast of the State to which it pertains 
(Colombia). The Court found that ‘all of the features at Quitasueno are minuscule and, 
even on the Grenoble Tide Model, are only just above water at high tide’. Only one such 
feature – QS 32 – was convincingly proven to be above water at high tide. It is shown 
below in Figure 5.2. The Court stated: It has not been suggested by either Party that QS 
32 is anything other than a rock which is incapable of sustaining human habitation or 
economic life of its own under Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS, so this feature 
generates no entitlement to a continental shelf or exclusive economic zone.” 
132     See the Memorial, pp. 127~128, para. 5.44. “In the Libya/Malta Case, the ICJ refused 
to give any effect to Filfla, a small Maltese feature, depicted below at Figure 5.5 (in 
Volume II only), because it was an ‘uninhabited rock’: In this case, the equitableness 
of an equidistance line depends on whether the precaution is taken of eliminating the 
disproportionate effect of certain ‘islet, rocks and minor coastal projections’, to use the 
language of the Court in its 1969 Judgment … The Court thus finds it equitable not to 
take account of Filfla in the calculation of the provisional median line between Malta and 
Libya.” 
133     See the Memorial, p. 130, para. 5.54. “5.54 This interpretation is supported by distingui-
shed commentators. Representative in this regard is Sir Derek Bowett, who observed in 
his monograph on ‘The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law’: ‘The phrase ‘of 
their own’ means that a State cannot avoid a rock being denied both an EEZ and a Shelf 
by injecting an artificial economic life, based on resources from its other land territory’.” 
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is again admitted in Paragraphs 5.30~5.31 of the Philippines’ Memorial.134 
In stage four, the Philippines further shrinks the maritime entitlements that 
an island can have under Article 121(1) by adding one more qualification, after 
the transplantation. In Paragraph 5.36 of the Memorial, the Philippines argues that 
“[t]he text adopted on 28 April 1975 by the informal group on islands stated 
expressly that in order to be entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf, an island 
should be able to sustain population on a permanent basis”.135 In Paragraph 5.48, 
the Philippines argues that “for an insular feature not to be a ‘rock’ within the 
meaning of Article 121(3), its natural conditions must make it capable, by itself, of 
providing the elements required to sustain, that is, to keep alive, a stable community 
of human beings”.136 To support such additional qualification, the Philippines relies 
on scholars’ opinions, i.e., J. M. Van Dyke and R. A. Brooks, in Paragraph 5.46 
of the Memorial.137 However, even such eminent scholars admit that their opinion 
represents lex ferenda,138 instead of lex lata.
Such interpretation of Article 121 is again unlawful. It does not turn the de-
railed train back to the tracks by taking unrepresentative scholars’ opinions that re-
present lex ferenda to support the already wrongful transplantations.139 But here, 
134     See the Memorial, pp. 124~125, paras. 5.30~5.31.
135     See the Memorial, p. 125, para. 5.36.
136     See the Memorial, p. 129, para. 5.48.
137    See the Memorial, p. 128, para. 5.46. “As Van Dyke and Brook explain: ‘The key factor 
must be whether the island can in fact support a stable population’. This is because ‘it 
does not serve the central purposes of the Treaty to grant ocean space to barren atolls that 
have only slight links to some distant nation’. The reference to a ‘distant nation’ serves to 
emphasize that Article 121 is not concerned with the baseline rules applicable to features 
immediately off the coast of a State. The features involved in this case are at considerable 
distances from the main coasts of both Parties, as well as the other States bordering the 
South China Sea.”
138     See the Memorial, p. 128, footnote 463. “The commentators further elaborate: ‘Islands 
should not generate ocean space if they are claimed by some distant absentee landlord 
who now desires the island primarily because of the ocean resources around the island. 
Islands should generate ocean space if stable communities of people live on the island and 
use the surrounding ocean areas’.” 
139     Not to mention that such selective view of scholars is far from representative of most 
highly qualified publicists. There are more eminent scholars that hold opposite views. 
See Jonathan I. Charney, Rocks that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, 1999, pp. 870~871, 876, 868~869; Song Yann-
Huei, Okinotorishima: A “Rock” or an “Island”? Recent Maritime Boundary Controversy 
between Japan and Taiwan/China, in Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon Van Dyke eds, Maritime 
Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea, Leiden/Boston: 
Martinus Hijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 172~173.
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one more rule for the treaty interpretation, i.e. the principle of good faith,140 has 
been violated. As the Philippines itself has acknowledged that the UNCLOS repre-
sents a package deal.141 It justifies the rule that no reservation is allowed.142 The 
revival of the unaccepted proposal during UNCLOS III, through the process of 
treaty interpretation, constitutes an indirect reservation and shall not be permitted, 
as a matter of course.
B. Philippines’ Conclusion Is Based on a Manifest and 
    Essential Error of Fact143
In the Memorial, the basic position of the Philippines is that all the UNCLOS-
consistent maritime entitlements China “may claim” are limited to those generated 
by the maritime features currently occupied by China.144 The rationale is that in 
terms of Sino-Philippine territorial sovereign dispute in the Relevant Area, China 
140     Article 31(1) of VCLT reads: “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.”
141     See the Memorial, p. 121, footnote 443. “During the UNCLOS negotiations, Colombia 
stated that Article 121 constitutes a package.” And see the Memorial, pp. 217~218, para. 
7.4, second bullet. “Compulsory dispute settlement also plays a vital role in maintaining 
the complex balance of interests that UNCLOS represents. When, as here, a convention 
constitutes a consensus package deal …” To be noted, this quotation is from Judge and 
President Thomas A. Mensah, see the Memorial, p. 218, footnote 849.
142      Article 309 of UNCLOS (entitled Reservations and exceptions) reads: “No reservations or 
exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of 
this Convention.”
143    Professor Cheng Bin, as one of the most highly qualified publicists, discusses the nullity 
and voidability of judicial decisions and provides certain causes for annulling, revising 
or otherwise setting aside a final judgment. One of them is manifest and essential error 
in law and in fact. Especially, Professor Cheng says that “VII. Fresh Evidence. – Error 
produced through lack of knowledge, at the time of the judgment, of facts which would 
have exercised a decisive influence upon the decision may be regarded as a particular 
form of error in fact. The Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes … the Statute of the Permanent Court of Justice … and the 
Rules of Procedure of practically every Mixed Arbitral Tribunal set up in pursuance of the 
Treaties of Peace after the First World War consider after-discovered or newly discovered 
evidence as a ground for revising a judgment. The aim is to provide a remedy against 
possible injustice arising from errors of fact which have become demonstrable for the 
first time after the judgment.” See Cheng Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals, London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1953, pp. 361~363.
144     See the Memorial, paras. 5.96 & 5.137 and pp. 142, 159 & 271, Submissions 3~7. This is 
rejected by China’s Position Paper, para. 21.
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is a new comer without “original titles”.145 Thus, not recognizing China’s territorial 
claims on those features, the Philippines argues that the maritime entitlements those 
features may generate under UNCLOS are the maximum China can receive in the 
Relevant Area. 
Here, some clarifications must be made. As shown in Figures 4.1~4.2 in the 
Memorial146 (which are Figs. 11~12 of this paper) there are more “potential” mari-
time entitlements that China may claim. This does not deviate from the above Phi-
lippines’ position, which is confirmed by Paragraphs 5.96, 5.98 and 5.100, where 
Itu Aba, Thitu, and West York are discussed respectively.147 Being the largest mari-
time features in the Spratly Islands Group, they are not even considered by the 
Philippines as “non-rock islands” but mere rocks as defined by Article 121(3).148 
A fortiori, it is not possible for China to use any other smaller maritime features 
in the Spratly Islands Group to claim EEZ or continental shelf from Philippine 
perspective.
As the ICJ in FRG v. Iceland said, the dispute before the Court must be consi-
dered in all its aspects.149 One question should be asked now. Is China a new comer 
in the Sino-Philippine territorial disputes in the Relevant Area? The answer should 
be no, due to much earlier and more comprehensive territorial claims China has 
made in SCS than those of the Philippines. As this litigation is not about which 
Party has a better territorial title to the maritime features in the Relevant Area, it 
suffices to prove that, based on the much older and more comprehensive territorial 
claims made by China, it is fair for the Philippines to win the title of the new 
comer. 
China made a comprehensive territorial claim for the SCS maritime features 
in 1930s, long before the Philippines made its competing claims. The map (Fig. 9 
145     For the concept of original title, see Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, 
Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2008, 
p. 12, paras. 37~38. Also see China’s Position Paper, paras. 4, 6, 22.
146       Figure 4.1 (entitled China’s Entitlements under UNCLOS compared to its Nine-dash line 
Claim in the Northern Sector) is placed after p. 70 of the Memorial, while Figure 4.2 
(entitled China’s Maximum Potential Entitlements under UNCLOS compared to its Nine-
dash line Claim in the Southern Sector) comes after p. 72 of the Memorial.
147      The Memorial, pp. 142~145.
148    See the Memorial, p. 145, para. 5.102. Also see Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Scho-
field, Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Potential South China Sea Change, The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29, 2014, p. 208.
149    Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports, 1974, p. 190, para. 40. 
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of this paper) was produced and published in April 1935 by the Review Committee 
for the Land and Water Maps, established by the then ROC government.150 The 
title of the map is “The Map of Chinese Islands in the South China Sea”. The map 
needs to be appreciated together with a list of names of SCS maritime features 
claimed by China published by the same Committee in both Chinese and English 
languages.151 Published in January that year, the Table of Chinese and English 
Names for Chinese Islands in the South China Sea covers 132 maritime features 
for the four groups of islands, including 96 maritime features found in the present 
Spratly Islands Group (see Table 1 of this paper). To be noted, the 1935 map and 
the name-list were implied in the 2011 Chinese NV, which reads “since 1930s, 
the Chinese Government has given publicity several times the geographic scope 
of China’s Nansha Islands and the names of its components.”152 Somehow the 
two instruments of 1935 are missing by the Memorial, in particular, Paragraphs 
2.34~2.35 in Section III (entitled The SCS in History) - B (entitled “The Colonial 
Era) of Chapter 2 (The Geographical and Historical Context).153
150       Journal of the Review Committee for the Land and Water Maps, No. 2, 1935, pp. 68~69 
(in Chinese). The journal is on file with the author.
151     This table was approved by the Review Committee on 21 December 1934 and published 
in January 1935 by No. 1 of the Journal of the Review Committee for the Land and Water 
Maps, pp. 61~65, 98. See Lyu Yiran ed., SCS Islands: Their Geography, History and 
Sovereignty, Haerbin: Heilongjiang Education Publishing House, 1992, pp. 218~223. (in 
Chinese) 
152    “Since 1930s, the Chinese Government has given publicity several times the geographic 
scope of China’s Nansha Islands and the names of its components.” Mission of the 
People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Note Verbale, CML/8/2011, 14 
April 2011, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/
chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf, 1 March 2015. 
153      The Memorial, pp. 31~32.
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Fig. 9    The 1935 Map of Chinese Islands in the South China Sea
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The 1935 Map constitutes the basis for China’s publication of its 1948 Loca-
tion Map of the South China Sea Islands,155 which is Fig. 6 of this paper. This 
followed China’s recovery of those SCS maritime features in 1946 after Japan 
surrendered in 1945.156 Before publishing the Location Map, Ministry of the Inte-
rior of ROC promulgated the Comparison Table of New and Old Names of South 
China Sea Islands in October 1947.157 There are 167 SCS maritime features, 
including 102 maritime features located in the Spratly Islands Group, that are 
contained on this list with both Chinese and English names (see Table 2 of this 
paper). Two months later, the Ministry of the Interior released only the Chinese 
names of the four groups of SCS Islands in the Central Daily News on December 
1, 1947.158 Such a list of names of 1947 went hand-in-hand with the 1948 Location 
Map and constitutes a reiteration of comprehensive territorial claims made by the 
then Chinese Government for the maritime features enclosed by the U-Shaped Line 
in the SCS. When PRC Government was established in Beijing in 1949, the above 
territorial claims made by the ROC Government were taken over. Later on, the 
National Toponymy Committee of China was commissioned by the PRC Govern-
ment to conduct a census on the names of maritime features in SCS, which was part 
of a general project to standardize geographical names in China. On April 25, 1983, 
this Committee used People’s Daily to announce the List of Partial Standard Names 
for China’s Islands in South China Sea for 287 maritime features in the four groups 
of SCS islands and maritime features.159 
155       This map was produced by the Ministry of the Interior of the ROC Government in Decem-
ber 1946. See the tiny Chinese words at the right hand side of the map. It was kept in 
the archives of the “Presidential Office” in Taiwan, serial no. 50082355. Also see the 
Memorial, p. 34, para. 2.38.
156    Wu Shicun, Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development in the South 
China Sea: A Chinese Perspective, Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2013, p. 38.
157      The table was printed by Division of Territories of Ministry of the Interior in October 19-
47. See Lyu Yiran ed., SCS Islands: Their Geography, History and Sovereignty, Haerbin: 
Heilongjiang Education Publishing House, 1992, pp. 223~232. (in Chinese)
158       Central Daily News, 1 December 1947, p. A4. 
159      The name-list was said to be only part of the complete names of maritime features China 
claims in SCS. It appeared on page A4 of People’s Daily on 25 April 1983. It was repro-
duced on the website of http://www.nansha.org.cn/islandsdatabase/3.html. Also see 
China’s Position Paper, paras. 4 & 20.
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China’s much earlier and more comprehensive territorial claims in SCS help to 
put in perspectives the four Philippines’ military actions in 1970, 1971, 1978, and 
1980 to occupy eight maritime features in the Kalayaan Islands Group,161 which 
is part of the Spratly Islands Group claimed entirely by China since 1930s. The 
eight maritime features occupied by the Philippines are Nanshan Island, Loaita 
Island, Thitu Island, West York Island, Northeast Cay, Flat Island, Loaita Nan, and 
Commodore Reef.162 Importantly, these eight maritime features are all covered by 
the 1935 and 1947 Tables as presented above163 and, of course, claimed by China 
much earlier than the Philippines (see Tables 1~2 of this paper). To be added, 
the 1983 List of Partial Standard Names for China’s Islands in South China Sea 
produced by China also covers these eight maritime features.164 It proves China’s 
continuous territorial claims over these features.165 Regrettably as usual, these 
occupation actions of the Philippines from 1970s to 1980s cannot be found any-
where in the Memorial.
With the above Sino-Philippine SCS territorial disputes in mind, it is justified 
to consider the Philippines as the new comer in the Relevant Area, as compared 
with China. Therefore, it will be fair for the Tribunal to take all the maritime fea-
tures in the Spratly Islands Group into consideration when assessing the maritime 
entitlements China may claim under UNCLOS, instead of only counting those nine 
161     Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), consisting of 53 maritime features within Spratly Islands 
Group, became part of Philippines territories on 11 June 1978 in accordance with Presi-
dential Order No. 1596. KIG is administered under Palawan. See Map of the Republic of 
the Philippines, No. 200, Edition 1, June 30, 1978. Also see China’s Position Paper, para. 
24.
162     Wu Shicun, Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development in the South 
China Sea: A Chinese Perspective, Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2013, p. 132. Also see 
the position paper released by spokesperson Zhang Hua from Chinese Embassy in Manila 
on 3 April 2014, entitled “China’s Position Paper on Sea Disputes with Philippines”, at 
http://www.philstar.com/disputed-seas/2014/04/03/1308385/chinas-position-paper-sea-
disputes-philippines, 1 March 2015. Also see China’s Position Paper, paras. 6~7.
163       Northeast Cay is one of the islands under the name North Danger Reef in the 1935 Table. 
The 1947 Table has the name of N. E. Cay. Loaita Nan (also called Double Egg Yolk 
Shoal or Shuang-huang Sha-zhou) is part of the Loaita Bank and Reefs (now called Dao-
ming Qun-jiao in Chinese) covered by the 1935 and 1947 Tables. At http://www.unanhai.
com/a/nansha/daojiaogaikuang/2012/0328/daomingqunjiao.html, 1 March 2015.
164     1983 List of Partial Standard Names for China’s Islands in South China Sea, at http://ww
w.nansha.org.cn/islandsdatabase/3.html, 1 March 2015. [hereinafter “1983 List”] 
165     The name-list was said to be only part of the complete names of maritime features China 
claims in SCS. 
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features currently occupied by China.166 Otherwise, the award to be given by the 
Tribunal may be tainted with an essential and manifest error in fact.
The second “error in fact” that the Memorial of the Philippines makes is 
the unjustified characterization of those well-recognized non-rock islands in the 
Spratly Islands Group under regime of islands in accordance with Article 121 of 
UNCLOS, as correctly interpreted. Paragraphs 5.96~5.102 of the Memorial pointed 
out that Itu Aba, Thitu, and West York are mere rocks incapable of generating EEZ 
and continental shelf according to Article 121 as interpreted by the Philippines.167 
An interesting treatment done to these maritime features is, instead of providing 
photos for these three features like Figure 5.1,168 satellite images were presented 
in Figures 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21.169 Such images can hardly assist people in telling 
whether these maritime features are islands or not. However, a positive judgment 
has already been provided by one of the leading commentators, Professor Robert 
Beckman, recognized by the Philippines as such.170 According to Beckman,171 and 
Professor Clive Schofield who is another leading scholar,172 Itu Aba is an island 
but not a rock under Article 121 of UNCLOS, capable of generating EEZ and 
continental shelf. As a matter of fact, the high definition color photos for these 
three maritime features are easily accessible through internet. Such photos can 
sufficiently prove that these features are islands but not rocks, as they are not solid 
stony part of the earth’s crust standing out from the sea.
Moreover, Itu Aba, Thitu, and West York are not the only non-rock islands 
in the Spratly Islands Group. There are more. One scholar who teaches at Navy 
Command and Staff College of Defense University in Taiwan, Captain Ruei-Lin 
Yu, has compiled top 15 non-rock islands in terms of area in the Spratly Islands 
Group, while Beckman and Schofield consider 12 of them as “islands” under 
166      See the Memorial, p. 271, Submissions 3~7. To be noted, the eight islands in KIG occupi-
ed by the Philippines since 1970s should be also considered by the Tribunal, as they are 
also claimed by China. See China’s Position Paper, para. 6. For their English names and 
Chinese names in Pinyin, see the 1983 List.
167      The Memorial, pp. 142~145, paras. 5.96~5.102.
168      Figure 5.1 is after p. 116 of the Memorial. See small photos on the right hand side.
169      Figures 5.19, 5.20, 5.21 are all after p. 144 of the Memorial.
170      The Memorial, p. 99, para. 4.71.
171     Robert Beckman, International Law, UNCLOS and the South China Sea, in Beckman, 
Townsend-Gault, Schofield, Davenport, Bernard eds., Beyond Territorial Disputes in the 
South China Sea, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013, pp. 48, 61.
172    Clive Schofield, What’s at Stake in the South China Sea?, in Beckman, Townsend-Gault, 
Schofield, Davenport and Bernard eds., Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China 
Sea, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 23.
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Article 121.173 After double-checking the official information provided by China 
concerning the spelling of the English and Chinese names (including pin-yin) 
of these islands, as well as the coordinates for these islands, a Table of Names 
and Coordinates of the 15 biggest islands in Spratly Islands Group is produced 
as Table 3 of this paper. Such kind of data missing in the Memorial is critical for 
the Tribunal to see, in order to accurately calculate the real maritime entitlements 
China may claim in the Relevant Area. Importantly, each of these 15 islands has 
been covered by the 1935 Table (Table 1 of this paper) and 1947 Table (Table 2 of 
this paper) produced by the ROC Government and the 1983 List made by the PRC 
Government.




Names of the islands
Coordinates OccupantEnglish Chinese Pin-Yin
1 Itu Aba175 太平岛 Taiping Dao
10°23' N
114°22' E Taiwan









115°02' E  Philippines





173     Ruei-Lin Yu, A Study of Strategic Options for [Taiwan] in the South China Sea during 
the Possible Potency of Islands Delimitation, National Defense Journal, No. 1, 2014, pp. 
14~15. (in Chinese) Also see Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, Defining EEZ 
Claims from Islands: A Potential South China Sea Change, The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29, 2014, pp. 210~211.
174       The names of the SCS islands are those adopted by the National Toponymy Committee of 
China and published in the People’s Daily, 25 April 1983. For the size ranking of these 
islands, see Ruei-Lin Yu, A Study of Strategic Options for [Taiwan] in the South China 
Sea during the Possible Potency of Islands Delimitation, National Defense Journal, No. 1, 
2014, pp. 14~15. (in Chinese)
175      For a photo of this island, at http://www.glocal.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/45208
564.jpg, 1 March 2015.
176    For a photo of this island, at http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/23/247525/china-vietna
m-dispute-over-spratlys/, 1 March 2015.
177      For a photo of this island, at http://www.panoramio.com/photo/56907434, 1 March 2015.
178      For a photo of this island, at http://www.unanhai.com/a/nansha/daojiaogaikuang/2012/052
7/nanweidao.html, 1 March 2015.
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5 Northeast Cay (Parola)179 北子岛 Beizi Dao
11°27' N
114°22' E Philippines



































12 Namyit Island186 鸿庥岛 Hongxiu Dao
10°11' N
114°22' E Vietnam



















In conclusion, the Tribunal is advised to avoid making manifest and essential 
179    For a photo of this island, at http://www.panoramio.com/photo/56910828, 1 March 
2015. 
180      For a photo of this island, at https://www.flickr.com/photos/60082435@N05/7409387472/, 
1 March 2015.
181       For a photo of this island, at http://www.unanhai.com/a/nansha/daojiaogaikuang/2012/041
7/JinghongDao.html, 1 March 2015.
182      For a photo of this island, at http://chenwei18196555.blog.163.com/blog/static/142325546
20123297738389 and http://baike.sogou.com/v61274.htm, 1 March 2015.
183      For a photo of this island, at http://gming1983.blog.163.com/blog/static/111390122011713
103033153/, 1 March 2015.
184      For a photo of this island, at http://baike.sogou.com/v61290.htm, 1 March 2015.
185      For a photo of this island, at http://asiadivingvacation.com/diving/layang-layang-island
and http://www.timawa.net/forum/index.php?topic=10149.45, 1 March 2015.
186      For a photo of this island, at http://www.unanhai.com/a/nansha/daojiaogaikuang/2012/110
2/942.html, 1 March 2015.
187      For a photo of this island, at http://www.unanhai.com/a/nansha/daojiaogaikuang/2012/110
2/944.html, 1 March 2015.
188        For a photo of this island, at http://blog.163.com/ytmydihc@126/blog/static/67068195201
35361959673/, 1 March 2015.
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error in fact. China cannot be treated as a new comer in the Sino-Philippine terri-
torial dispute in the Relevant Area. Therefore, when calculating the maximum 
UNCLOS-consistent maritime entitlements China may claim, the Tribunal should 
look at all the maritime features in the Spratly Islands Group which China has con-
sistently claimed since 1930s, instead of those nine maritime features identified 
by the Memorial. Secondly, there are proper islands (which are not rocks) meeting 
the conditions of Article 121 located in the Spratly Islands Group that China may 
lawfully use to claim EEZ and continental shelf. Itu Aba, Thitu, and West York 
are only examples. Information and photos about these islands are available in 
the internet. Credible study shows that there are around twelve to fifteen non-rock 
islands within the Spratly Islands Group, which may be used to generate EEZ and 
continental shelf for China. The Tribunal is advised to take note of such information 
and examine proprio motu the situations of these islands carefully. By doing so, the 
Tribunal can avoid making huge mistakes in the course of the trial and producing 
an award divorced from facts. 
C. Philippines’ Misrepresented Position concerning the Size of the 
     Relevant Area, if Accepted by the Tribunal, Will Constitute Ultra 
    Vires Actions beyond the Mandate of the Tribunal
To be noted, the Tribunal is not authorized to settle the territorial disputes be-
tween China and the Philippines.189 With such jurisdictional limitation, the award to 
be given by the Tribunal shall avoid affecting the legal positions of both China and 
the Philippines concerning their respective territorial claims. In other words, the 
award shall not strengthen or weaken the legal positions of both Parties concerning 
such territorial disputes. As said already, the scope of the Sino-Philippine territorial 
disputes in the SCS covers all the maritime features within the Kalayaan Islands 
Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal, instead of those nine features occupied by 
Beijing Government. However, what is requested by the Philippines of the Tribunal 
in Chapter 5 of the Memorial is to only look at those nine features for assessing 
the scope of China’s maritime entitlements under UNCLOS and impliedly endor-
sing Philippines’ overarching position that China may not claim any EEZ or 
continental shelf entitlements in the Relevant Area that can be generated by other 
islands unoccupied by China. Such request is based on manifest, material, and 
189     See the Notification, p. 3, para. 7. Also see the Memorial, p. 271. 
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essential errors in fact, as stated already. The acceptance of such Filipino request 
by the Tribunal will be seen an ultra vires decision. That is to say, such acceptance 
presupposes a Tribunal’s dismissal of China’s territorial claims for the rest of the 
maritime features within KIG. 
The Philippines may argue otherwise that since the Tribunal has no power to 
settle the Sino-Philippine territorial disputes in KIG and Scarborough Shoal, the 
Tribunal has no power (1) to dismiss Philippines’ competing territorial claims and 
(2) to endorse China’s territorial claims for the remaining part of maritime features 
in KIG when considering whether the remaining maritime features may generate 
EEZ and continental shelf for China. This will put the Tribunal in a dilemma. 
It is submitted that since the Tribunal has no power to settle territorial disputes, 
either decision (to consider or not to consider the remaining maritime features as 
the basis for China to claim maritime entitlements) will constitute an ultra vires 
decision. Therefore, the option for the Tribunal seems to declare that it has no 
jurisdiction to try the dispute as submitted by the Philippines. It is precisely the 
theme of this paper. However, if the Tribunal considers it has jurisdiction to make 
a decision for the questions concerned, then the Tribunal needs to make a choice, 
either to take the view of the Philippines or not to take its view. The fact that China 
has a much longer history of making more comprehensive territorial claims in SCS 
than the Philippines makes it less justified for the Tribunal to take the views of the 
Philippines. Therefore, the above-mentioned Philippine position concerning the 
size of the “Relevant Area” should be rejected by the Tribunal.
V. Admissibility Issues concerning Submission 2
In Submission 2, the Tribunal is requested to adjudge and declare that “China’s 
claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and to ‘historic rights’, with respect to 
the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-called ‘nine-dash 
line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that 
they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements 
under UNCLOS.”190 The focus of this Submission is on the Left-over Area which 
is beyond China’s UNCLOS-consistent maritime entitlements but within the 
U-Shaped Line. And the question is whether China in fact has made any claims to 
190     The Memorial, p. 271.
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sovereign rights and jurisdiction and to historic rights in such Left-over Area. If 
the answer is no, then Submission 2 should be deemed inadmissible, due to lack of 
dispute.
The previous sections have proved that China in fact may claim EEZ and con-
tinental shelf in the Relevant Area. The Left-over Area is reduced heavily while the 
legality dispute of China’s invocation of historic right to support its law enforce-
ment activities becomes hypothetical,191 moot, and consequently, non-justiciable.192 
This is especially true due to the fact that those maritime confrontations between 
China and the Philippines identified in the Memorial did not occur in the Left-over 
Area but in China’s EEZ or continental shelf in the Relevant Area. 
In the Memorial, the Philippines identified five low-tide elevations (LTE) that 
China occupies in KIG which is part of Spratly Islands Group. They are Mischief 
Reef,193 Second Thomas Shoal,194 Subi Reef,195 Gaven Reef,196 and McKennan 
Reef.197 It is argued by the Philippines that none of these LTEs forms part of Chi-
na’s continental shelf. Hence, China must desist from occupying these features 
and from exercising sovereign rights and jurisdictions in the waters surrounding 
these features. The Philippines identified four other maritime features that China 
191    Article 283 of UNCLOS requires the existence of a dispute before the dispute settlement 
mechanism of Part XV of UNCLOS can operate. In Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, 
both Parties emphasized the need of the existence of a dispute according to Art. 283, while 
the Tribunal accepted such interpretation. See Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Award, 
UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (11 April 2006), paras. 74, 80, 196~200, at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1152, 1 March 2015. 
192    J. Collier and A. V. Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions 
and Procedures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 10, 13, 156~157. After the 
heading “Justiciability” the two eminent scholars say that “[i]t was mentioned above that 
not all disputes are suitable for judicial settlement. To be suitable, the dispute must be 
justiciable. A dispute is said to be justiciable if, first, a specific disagreement exists, and 
secondly, that disagreement is of a kind which can be resolved by the application of rules 
of law by judicial (including arbitral) processes … Thus far we have been concerned with 
the task of establishing that a dispute has come into existence. In the case of most (but 
not all) tribunals a further aspect of this precondition of justiciability is that the dispute 
remains in existence up to the point that the judgment or award is given. To put it another 
way, most tribunals will refuse to give rulings on disputes that are hypothetical or have 
become moot.” 
193      The Memorial, pp. 271~272, Submissions 4~5, 12.
194      The Memorial, pp. 271~272, Submissions 4~5, 11, 14.
195      The Memorial, p. 271, Submission 4.
196      The Memorial, p. 271, Submission 6.
197      The Memorial, p. 271, Submission 6.
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occupies in the Relevant Area, namely, Scarborough Shoal,198 Johnson Reef,199 
Cuarteron Reef,200 and Fiery Cross Reef.201 They are considered by the Philippines 
as “rocks” meeting the conditions of Article 121(3), as interpreted by the Memorial. 
The Philippines contends that China relies on historic rights to justify its law 
enforcement activities in the waters surrounding these four “rocks” and beyond 12 
M therefrom. Additionally, Reed Bank was identified by the Memorial as the site 
of Sino-Philippine maritime dispute,202 as Reef Bank is not part of China’s EEZ or 
continental shelf according to the Philippines.
It is submitted that the above-mentioned five “LTEs”, three “rocks” (excluding 
Scarborough Shoal), and Reed Bank, all fall within EEZ and continental shelf 
China may claim from, inter alia, Itu Aba, Thitu, and West York islands. Table 
4 and Fig. 10 of this paper illustrate the distance between these three non-rock 
islands on the one hand and each of these maritime features identified by the 
Philippines, on the other hand. Being all within 200 M from these three non-rock 
islands, these five “LTEs” constitute part of China’s continental shelf as well. China 
is thus entitled to continue its occupation and to exercise sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction under UNCLOS regime of EEZ and continental shelf for these LTEs 
and the waters surrounding them. By the same token, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron 
Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, even if considered as “rocks” under Article 121(3), 
are maritime features located in China’s EEZ and continental shelf. Hence, for the 
maritime area surrounding and beyond these three “rocks”, China is still entitled to 
exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction under EEZ and continental shelf regime 
of UNCLOS. As the Sino-Philippine maritime confrontations identified by the 
Philippines are all located in the EEZ and continental shelf extended from, inter 
alia, these three non-rock islands, the legality dispute concerning China’s historic 
right claim for justifying its law enforcement activities in the area surrounding and 
beyond those five LTEs, three rocks, and Reed Bank becomes moot and pointless 
for the Tribunal to address. 
To be added, the disputes identified by the Philippines in the water surrounding 
Scarborough Shoal,203 though beyond the EEZ generated by the non-rock islands in 
198      The Memorial, pp. 271~272, Submissions 3, 10~11, 13.
199      The Memorial, p. 271, Submission 7.
200      The Memorial, p. 271, Submission 7.
201      The Memorial, p. 271, Submission 7.
202      The Memorial, pp. 164~166, paras. 6.16~6.22.
203      The Memorial, p. 272, Submissions 10~11, 13. 
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the Spratly Islands Group, occurred in the territorial water of Scarborough Shoal. 
Thus the legality dispute concerning China’s historic right claim as justification for 
its law enforcement activities in this water is moot, too.
Fig. 10     Locations of Itu Aba, Thitu and West York Islands and the Nine 
Maritime Features Identified in Submissions 3~7 of the Memorial206
206    The red dots are maritime features occupied by the Philippines. The frog-egg like points 
are maritime features occupied by Chinese Government and identified by the Philippines 
Memorial. Fig. 10 was drawn by Mr. Jui-Hsien Huang for the author.
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VI. Admissibility Issues concerning Submissions 
       3~4 and 6~7
Submissions 3~4 and 6~7 of the Philippines’ Memorial deal with the so-called 
“disputes” concerning (1) legal status of nine maritime features currently occupied 
by China in the Relevant Area, and (2) the legal capability of these features to 
generate maritime zones under UNCLOS legal regime. Detailed arguments are pre-
sented by Chapter 5 of the Memorial, entitled “China’s Claim to Areas of the SCS 
beyond the Entitlements of Maritime Features”.207 The Tribunal is requested to 
adjudge and declare that 
3) Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf;
4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef are LTEs that do 
not generate entitlements to a territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf, and are 
not features that are capable of appropriation by occupation or otherwise;
…
6) Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are LTEs 
that do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf, 
but their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is 
measured;
7) Joshson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no entitle-
ment to an EEZ or continental shelf;208
It is submitted that none of these Submissions should be considered admissible 
for the following reasons.
A. Scarborough Shoal 
To begin with, Submission 3 does not contribute to the formation of any dispu-
te, as no maritime confrontations identified by the Philippines in the Memorial con-
cerning Scarborough Shoal ever occurred in the water beyond the territorial sea 
generated by this feature. 
207     The Memorial, pp. 115~160.
208     The Memorial, p. 271.
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Submission 10 concerns the legality dispute of China’s prevention of Phili-
ppine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with Filipino tradi-
tional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal.209 Submission 11 focuses on China’s 
possible violation of its UNCLOS obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment at Scarborough Shoal.210 Submission 13 addresses the issue of China’s 
breach of its UNCLOS obligation by operating its law enforcement vessels in a 
dangerous manner causing serious risk of collision to Philippine vessels navigating 
in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.211 The activities challenged by these Submi-
ssions all occurred in the territorial waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal. “China’s 
EEZ claim generated by Scarborough Shoal” to justify these disputed activities was 
neither invoked nor needed in the first place. 
Equally important is the fact that the Memorial fails to prove that China 
opposes the Philippines’ position that “Scarborough Shoal generates no EEZ and 
continental shelf”. It is hard for Submission 3 to constitute any dispute212 for the 
Tribunal to settle.213 Therefore, the so-called “dispute” concerning whether Scarbo-
rough Shoal may generate EEZ or continental shelf should be deemed hypothetical, 
moot, non-justiciable,214 and consequently, inadmissible.
209     The Memorial, pp. 171~174, paras. 6.39~6.47.
210     The Memorial, pp. 175~184, paras. 6.50~6.62.
211     The Memorial, pp. 202~207, paras. 6.115~6.127.
212     In the judgment of The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice has defined a dispute as “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a 
conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons.” The Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions, [30 August 1924] PCIJ Series A, No. 2, p. 11, at http://www.icj-cij.org/
pcij/serie_A/A_02/06_Mavrommatis_en_Palestine_Arret.pdf, 1 March 2015. Seen as 
an elaboration of such a definition, J. G. Merrills said that, “a dispute may be defined 
as a specific disagreement concerning a matter of fact, law or policy in which a claim 
or assertion of one party is met with refusal, counter-claim or denial by another.” J. G. 
Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 4th ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, p. 1. A. V. Lowe and J. Collier also describe the dispute as “a specific 
disagreement relating to a question of rights or interests in which the parties proceed 
by way of claims, counter-claims, denials and so on.” J. Collier and A. V. Lowe, The 
Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions and Procedures, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999, p. 1. Clearly, a dispute is built upon a combination of a claim and 
counterclaim.
213      Part XV of UNCLOS also requires the existence of a dispute as a condition for initiation 
of the Annex VII-Tribunal. See UNCLOS, Arts. 279~283, 286~288. 
214     Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Award, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (11 April 2006), 
paras. 74, 80, 196~200, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1152, 1 March 
2015. J. Collier and A. V. Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institu-
tions and Procedures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
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B. Five LTEs within Spratly Islands Group
Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef, and McKennan 
Reef are considered as LTEs in Submissions 4 and 6 for denying their capability 
to generate territorial water, EEZ or continental shelf.215 The critical questions to 
be asked are (1) has China ever used any of these five LTEs to claim territorial sea, 
EEZ, and continental shelf; (2) has China ever used such maritime zones to justify 
its law enforcement, exploration and exploitation activities challenged by the Phili-
ppines’ Memorial?
Submission 12 deals with the problems concerning China’s occupation of 
and construction activities on Mischief Reef which violate (1) China’s UNCLOS 
obligations concerning artificial islands, installations, and structures; (2) China’s 
duty to protect and preserve the marine environment under UNCLOS; and (3) 
China’s duty under UNCLOS as China takes action of attempted appropriation of 
this maritime feature.216 Submission 11 addresses alleged China’s violation of its 
UNCLOS obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment at Second 
Thomas Shoal.217 Submission 14 also deals with the problems occurring in Second 
Thomas Shoal. It is about (1) China’s interference with Philippines’ rights of 
navigation in the water adjacent to this maritime feature, (2) China’s prevention of 
the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed there, and (3) China’s 
actions endangering the health and well-being of these Philippine personnel.218 
To be noted, the Philippines’ Memorial provides no information to prove 
that China justifies these disputed actions with claims of territorial water, EEZ, or 
continental shelf generated by Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal. Thus, 
there can be no dispute concerning the legality of such non-existent maritime 
zones of China. The same applies to other three “LTEs”. Hence, both the “claim” 
presented and the “disputes” created by Submissions 4 and 6 should be considered 
as moot and inadmissible respectively.
215       As to the issue whether LTE can be appropriated as territory, it is the position of China th-
at such an issue is not concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. Chinese 
Government also points out that the Philippines itself claims sovereignty over these LTEs. 
For its legal arguments, see China’s Position Paper, paras. 24~25.
216      The Memorial, pp. 193~200.
217      The Memorial, pp. 184~185.
218      The Memorial, pp. 214~215.
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C. Three “Rocks” within Spratly Islands Group
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef are considered as “rocks” 
by Submission 7. However, the Memorial fails to prove that (1) China uses these 
three “rocks” to claim EEZ or continental shelf and (2) China ever uses such mari-
time entitlements to justify its activities of law enforcement and exploration/exploi-
tation of natural resources in the water and seabed surrounding these “rocks” 
and beyond. Due to lack of dispute, the claims and the disputes presented by 
Submission 7 can only be considered as moot and inadmissible.
D. Spratly Islands Group Is the Real Basis for China’s EEZ 
     and Continental Shelf Claims
Generally, China is using the entire Spratly Islands Group to claim EEZ 
and continental shelf in the Relevant Area of this case, as declared by its 2011 
Note Verbale.219 Particularly, within the Spratly Islands Group there are at least 
12 non-rock islands (e.g. Itu Aba, Thitu, and West York Islands) that China may 
use to claim EEZ and continental shelf,220 reaching far enough to the location and 
adjacent waters of those five LTEs mentioned by Submissions 4 and 6, as well as 
three “rocks” identified by Submission 7, as illustrated by Table 4 of this paper. 
Therefore, all the China’s activities criticised by Submissions 11~12 and 14 of the 
Philippines may be justified by China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the 
EEZ and continental shelf generated by those non-rock islands. 
219      Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Note Verbale, CML/8/20
11, 14 April 2011, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf, 1 March 2015. Also see China’s Position Paper, 
para. 21.
220      Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Poten-
tial South China Sea Change, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 
Vol. 29, 2014, pp. 210~211. The 12 non-rock islands are (1) Taiwan-occupied Itu Aba; 
(2) Philippines-occupied Thitu Island, West York Island, Northeast Cay, Nanshan Island, 
Loaita Island; and (3) Vietnam-occupied Spratly Island, Southwest Cay, Sin Cowe Island, 
Sandy Cay, Namyit Island, and Amboyna Cay.
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Contrary to what the Philippines aspires,221 the real disputes the Tribunal must
address222 cannot be resolved by (1) identifying those five “LTEs” and three “rocks”
in Submissions 4, 6 and 7 and (2) challenging the legal capability of these eight 
maritime features to generate territorial water, EEZ, or continental shelf. If follow-
221    On 22 January 2013, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Mr. Albert del 
Rosario, made a statement in a press conference which explained the initiation by the 
Philippines of an arbitral proceedings against China to achieve a peaceful and durable 
solution to the dispute in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea). In the speech, he 
said that “[t]he initiation of Arbitral Proceedings against China on the nine-dash line is an 
operationalization of President Aquino’s policy for a peaceful and rule-based resolution 
of disputes in the WPS in accordance with international law specifically UNCLOS.” At 
http://www.gov.ph/2013/01/22/statement-the-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-unclos-
arbitral-proceedings-against-china-january-22-2013/, 1 March 2015. 
222      Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports, 1998, pp. 447~449, paras. 29~31. “In order to identify its task in any proceedings 
instituted by one State against another, the Court must begin by examining the Application 
(see Interhandel, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1959, p. 21; Right 
of Passage over Indian Territory, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1960, p. 27; Nuclear 
Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1974, p. 260, para. 24) … However, 
it may happen that uncertainties or disagreements arise with regard to the real subject 
of the dispute with which the Court has been seised, or to the exact nature of the claims 
submitted to it. In such cases the Court cannot be restricted to a consideration of the 
terms of the Application alone nor, more generally, can it regard itself as bound by the 
claims of the Applicant. Even in proceedings instituted by Special Agreement, the Court 
has determined for itself, having examined all of the relevant instruments, what was the 
subject of the dispute brought before it, in circumstances where the parties could not 
agree on how it should be characterized (see Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriyal/
Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1994, pp. 14~15, para. 19, and p. 28, para. 57). It is for 
the Court itself, while giving particular attention to the formulation of the dispute chosen 
by the Applicant, to determine on an objective basis the dispute dividing the parties, by 
examining the position of both parties … It will base itself not only on the Application 
and final submissions, but on diplomatic exchanges, public statements and other pertinent 
evidence (see Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1974, pp. 
262~263).”
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ing the ICJ’s practice in settling UK v. Norway,223 Tunisia v. Libya,224 El Salvador v. 
Honduras,225 Romania v. Ukraine,226 and Nicaragua v. Colombia,227 the Tribunal is 
advised to declare it unnecessary to determine the legal status of these eight mari-
time features.
VII. Jurisdiction Issues concerning the Disputes
        Formulated by Submissions 3~4 and 6~7
A. Such Disputes Fall within Article 298(1)(a)(i) of UNCLOS
223     Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 126. “These are ele-
ments which might furnish reasons in support of the Judgment, but cannot constitute 
the decision. It further follows that even understood in this way, these elements may be 
taken into account only in so far as they would appear to be relevant for deciding the sole 
question in dispute…”
224     Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 
1982, pp. 76~77, para. 105. “Since the Court thus does not find it necessary to pass on 
the question of historic rights as justification for the baselines, it is only if the method of 
delimitation which the Court finds to be appropriate is such that it will or may encroach 
upon the historic rights area that the Court will have to determine the validity and scope 
of those rights, and their opposability to Libya, in the context of a delimitation of the 
continental shelf. If however the method of delimitation thus arrived at, independently 
of the existence of those rights, is such that the delimitation line will undoubtedly leave 
Tunisia in the fill and undisturbed exercise of those rights – whatever they may be – over 
the area claimed to be subject to them, so far as opposable to Libya, then a finding by the 
Court on the subject will be unnecessary.”
225      Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua inter-
vening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1992, p. 555, para. 326. “Secondly, notwithstanding 
the terms of the formal claim in the submission of El Salvador, the Chamber should not 
exercise its jurisdiction so as to make a finding in relation to any islands which are not 
in dispute … the Chamber considers that prima facie the existence of a dispute over an 
island can, in the present proceedings, be deduced from the fact of its being the subject 
of specific and argued claim. The Chamber is entitled to conclude that, where there is 
an absence of such claims, there is no real dispute before the Chamber, since there is no 
‘disagreement on a point of law or fact’ or ‘a conflict of legal views or of interests’, to 
use the terms of the Judgment in the case of the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions 
(Judgment No. 5, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 5, p. 11).”
226    Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 
2009, pp. 122~123, para. 187.
227       It is worth quoting the judgment of Nicaragua v. Colombia, that “[i]n the present case, the
Court similarly concludes that it is not necessary to determine the precise status of the 
smaller islands, since any entitlement to maritime spaces which they might generate within 
the relevant area (outside the territorial sea) would entirely overlap with the entitlement to 
a continental shelf and EEZ generated by the [big] islands of San Andres, Providencia and 
Santa Catalina.” See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports, 2012, p. 68, para. 180. 
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Assuming that the “disputes” concerning the legal status of the four “rocks” 
and the five “LTEs” as identified by Submissions 3~4 and 6~7 do exist, the result 
of such “legal status disputes” should be deemed concerning the application of 
Articles 74(1)228 and 83(1)229 of UNCLOS to Sino-Philippine maritime boundary 
delimitation disputes covered by Article 298(1)(a)(i).230 Such “legal status disputes” 
then become the ones that Annex VII-Tribunal is precluded from settling due to 
China’s 2006 Declaration231 made according to Article 298. Based on the discussion 
in Section III-A any dispute relating to, affecting or important to the application of 
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS to the settlement of maritime delimitation 
dispute by negotiation or by judicial body is covered by Article 298(1)(a)(i) and 
excluded by China’s 2006 Declaration.
Let us imagine, if China wins in any of the “legal status disputes”, a particular 
“rock” may turn into an island and generate entitlements of EEZ and continental 
shelf. One particular “LTE” may turn into a rock and generate territorial water or 
even EEZ and continental shelf for China. As China wins more of the “legal status 
disputes”, the size of overlapping EEZ and continental shelf gets bigger. The final 
result of “equitable solution” as required by Articles 74(1) and 83(1) will be shifted 
accordingly. 
If China loses in any of the “legal status disputes”, China will have one less 
territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf generated by that particular feature. The 
size of total overlapping area of EEZ and continental shelf becomes smaller. 
The application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) would lead to a different “equitable 
solution” accordingly. If China loses in all disputes of this kind, then from Phili-
ppines’ perspectives, China would have no EEZ and continental shelf in the Rele-
vant Area.232 Under such situation, Articles 74(1) and 83(1) will become inappli-
cable for the no-longer-existent delimitation dispute. It is hard to deny that such 
result affects the application of these two provisions. It simply ends the possibility 
228     Article 74(1) of UNCLOS.
229     Article 83(1) of UNCLOS.
230     Article 298(1)(a)(i) of UNCLOS.
231      At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#Chi
na upon ratification, 1 March 2015.  
232      It is the Philippines’ position that China has no EEZ and continental shelf in the Relevant 
Area, as China only can rely on 5 LTEs and 4 “rocks” to claim maritime entitlements 
there. In short, there is no possibility for China to have any overlapping EEZ and conti-
nental shelf with Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf claims in the SCS. See the Memo-
rial, Submissions 3~7 and Chapter 5.
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for these rules to apply. 
Therefore, the “legal status disputes” as brought by the Philippines through 
Submissions 3~4 and 6~7 should be considered as affecting and concerning the 
application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1). The optional exception mechanism estab-
lished by Article 298233 then applies and deprives the Tribunal of its jurisdiction to 
try such “legal status disputes”.
B. Confirmations from Judicial Decisions 
It is argued by the Philippines that neither the disputes brought to the Tribu-
nal nor the disputes of legal status of maritime features occupied by China are 
concerning maritime delimitation.234 However, all the judicial decisions invoked 
by the Philippines in Chapters 5 and 7 of the Memorial are judgments on maritime 
boundary delimitations. They are (1) Qatar v. Bahrain;235 (2) Nicaragua v. Colom-
bia;236 (3) Libya v. Malta;237 (4) Eritrea v. Yemen;238 (5) Canada v. US;239 (6) 
Romania v. Ukraine;240 (7) Bangladesh v. Myanmar.241 In those international judi-
cial decisions settling maritime boundary delimitation disputes, the issues concer-
ning legal status of maritime features (and their legal capability to generate mari-
time entitlements) constituted both preliminary and integral issues for the Court or 
Tribunal to address before coming to the delimitation issues. 
After examining closely, inter alia, Tunisia v. Libya,242 Canada v. US,243 Libya 
233     Article 298(1)(a)(i) of UNCLOS.
234     The Memorial, p. 149, para. 5.113.
235     The Memorial, pp. 117, 139~140, footnote 423, 498, 500 and paras. 5.14, 5.85~5.86.
236     The Memorial, pp. 121, 139~140, 147~149, 258, footnotes 444~445, 497, 500, 540~544, 
974~976 and paras. 5.23, 5.27, 5.85, 5.86, 5.107, 5.110~5.113, 7.122.
237     The Memorial, pp. 127~128, 152, footnotes 459, 552, and paras. 5.44, 5.120.
238     The Memorial, p. 128, footnote 460, and para. 5.45.
239     The Memorial, p. 138, footnote 489, and para. 5.79.
240     The Memorial, p. 147, footnote 538, and paras. 5.107~5.108.
241     The Memorial, pp. 257~258, footnotes 971~973, and para. 7.121.
242    Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1982, 
pp. 88~89, paras. 128~129. In this case, the Kerkennah Islands, surrounded by islets and 
low-tide elevations, constitute by their size and position a circumstance relevant for the 
delimitation, to which the Court must attribute some effect.
243    Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. US), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1984, p. 329, para. 201.
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v. Malta,244 Eritrea v. Yemen,245 Qatar v. Bahrain,246 and Romania v. Ukraine,247 
it becomes clear that the issues on the legal status of maritime features strongly 
affect the result of the settlement of maritime boundary disputes. This observation 
is even admitted by the Philippines itself,248 and confirmed by leading law of the 
244      ICJ in the Libya v. Malta invoked the Judgment of North Sea Continental Shelf Cases to 
say that when drawing a median line, the Court needs to ignore “the presence of islets, 
rocks and minor coastal projections”. In this connection, “the islet of Filfla”, “the unin-
habited islet of Filfla”, or “the uninhabited rock of Filfla” were repeatedly mentioned in 
the Judgment and was ignored as a basepoint at the first step of the delimitation when 
drawing the median line. See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 
1985, pp. 20, 47~48, 52, 57; paras. 15, 62, 64, 72~73, 79-C. 
245      The award of Eritrea v. Yemen is worth quoting that “147. Yemen employed both the small 
island of al-Tayr and the group of islands called al-Zubayr as controlling base points, 
so that the Yemen-claimed median line boundary is ‘median’ only in the area of sea 
west of these islands. These islands do not constitute a part of Yemen’s mainland coast. 
Moreover, their barren and inhospitable nature and their position well out to sea, which 
have already been described in the Award on Sovereignty, mean that they should not be 
taken into consideration in computing the boundary line between Yemen and Eritrea. 
148. For these reasons, the Tribunal has decided that both the single island of al-Tayr and 
the island group of al-Zubayr should have no effect upon the median line international 
boundary.” See Award (17 December 1999) of the Arbitral Tribunal in the 2nd Stage of 
the Proceedings (Maritime Delimitation) pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate dated 3 
October 1996 between Eritrea and Yemen, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_
id=1160, 1 March 2015.
246      In the ICJ Judgment of Qatar v. Bahrain, the Court needs to determine the relevant coasts 
to measure territorial seas. “In order to determine what constitutes Bahrain’s relevant 
coasts and what are the relevant baselines on the Bahraini side, the Court must first 
establish which islands come under Bahraini sovereignty.” One of the issues is to decide 
whether Qit’at Jaradah is an island or low tide elevation. The ICJ decided that it should 
be considered as an island. “195. The Court recalls that the legal definition of an island 
is … The Court has carefully analysed the evidence submitted by the Parties … On these 
bases, the Court concludes that the maritime feature of Qit’at Jaradah satisfies the above-
mentioned criteria and that it is an island which should as such be taken into consideration 
for the drawing of the equidistance line.” Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2001, paras. 184~187, 195. 
247    See 2009 ICJ Judgment of Romania v. Ukraine, where the ICJ needs to address the 
controversial legal status of certain features (Sacalin Peninsula and Sulina dyke) under 
UNCLOS legal regime so as to know if they may be treated as base points for constructing 
provisional equidistance line in the process of maritime delimitation. See Maritime 
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2009, pp. 
105~108, paras. 129~140.
248     See the Memorial, p. 118, footnote 425. “As reflected in the Virginia Commentary (refer-
ring to the treatment of the issue in the United Nations Seabed Committee between 1971 
and 1973): ‘[t]he diversity of islands, and the questions of their status and the criteria to 
be applied in determining that status, were important and contentious issues in the light 
of their importance in the delineation of maritime space.’ United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 3 (M. Nordquist, et al., eds., 2002), para. 
VIII.4. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-146”.
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sea experts, such as Clive Schofield,249 and Yann-Huei Song.250 That is why such 
disputes were requested to be handled first, and such requests were followed by ICJ 
in, e.g. Nicaragua v. Honduras.251 Most interestingly, in the judgment of Nicaragua 
v. Colombia, the ICJ put the sub-section of “Entitlements Generated by Maritime 
Features” under Section V entitled “Maritime Boundary”.252 It proves that the issue 
concerning legal status of maritime features constitutes an integral part of maritime 
boundary delimitation, as also noted in Guyana v. Suriname,253 and Greece v. Tur-
key.254 
This said, it will greatly help if the Philippines can identify any international 
judicial decision addressing the legal status dispute of maritime features while not 
being a maritime boundary delimitation decision, like what the Philippines brings 
249      Clive Schofield, The Trouble with Islands: The Definition and Role of Islands and Rocks 
in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon Van Dyke eds., Mari-
time Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea, Leiden, Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 33. 
250    Song Yann-Huei, Okinotorishima: A “Rock” or an “Island”? Recent Maritime Boundary 
Controversy between Japan and Taiwan/China, in Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon Van Dyke 
eds, Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea, Leiden/
Boston: Martinus Hijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 168.
251     Case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in 
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, I.C.J. Reports, 
2007, pp. 35, 39, paras. 114, 135.
252     Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 20-
12, pp. 47~92, paras. 132~247.
253    “Turning to the question of whether there are any features in the geographical configura-
tion of the relevant coastlines which justify an adjustment of the equidistance line, the 
Tribunal must mention the following observation found in the report of the independent 
expert appointed by Guyana: ‘An important geographic reality in this case is that there 
are no offshore features, such as islands or low-tide elevations that influence the drawing 
of an equidistant line...’” See Guyana v. Suriname, Award (17 September 2007), Annex 
VII Tribunal, para. 376, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1147, 1 March 
2015. 
254     Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 
1978, p. 35, para. 83. “83. The contention based on the proposition that delimitation is 
entirely extraneous to the notion of territorial status appears to the Court to encounter 
certain difficulties. Above all, it seems to overlook the basic character of the present 
dispute, clearly stated though it is in the first submission in Greece’s Application. The 
basic question in dispute is whether or not certain islands under Greek sovereignty are 
entitled to a continental shelf of their own and entitle Greece to call for the boundary to 
be drawn between those islands and the Turkish coast. The very essence of the dispute, 
as formulated in the Application, is thus the entitlement of those Greek islands to a 
continental shelf, and the delimitation of the boundary is a secondary question to be 
decided after, and in the light of, the decision upon the first basic question. Moreover, 
it is evident from the documents before the Court that Turkey, which maintains that the 
islands in question are mere protuberances on the Turkish continental shelf and have no 
continental shelf of their own, also considers the basic question to be one of entitlement.”
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to the Tribunal now. Otherwise, the conclusion will most probably be that the legal 
status dispute of maritime features affects and, therefore, concerns the settlement of 
maritime boundary delimitation dispute.
C. The Phillippines’ Attempt to Have the Unilaterally Drawn 
    Maritime Boundary Endorsed
In the 4th Group of claim contained in the Notification,255 the Philippines re-
quested the Tribunal to “declare that the Philippines is entitled under UNCLOS to 
a 12 M territorial sea, a 200 M EEZ, and a continental shelf under Parts II, V, VI 
of UNCLOS, measured from its archipelagic baselines”. This claim, seen together 
with other claims in the Notification, has been criticized as indirectly bringing a 
case of Sino-Philippine maritime boundary delimitation to the Tribunal.256 Some-
how this position of the Philippines shifts in the Memorial which deletes such a 
claim in the Final Submissions.257 
Has the Philippines given up this claim? The answer is most probably no. In 
fact, the Philippines jumps farther by transforming this claim in the Notification 
into a well-settled premise. What are presented by Submissions 8~9, 12, and 14 
are the legality disputes of China’s actions and omissions trespassing a unilaterally 
drawn Sino-Philippine maritime boundary in the Relevant Area. The Philippines’ 
Memorial reveals ample evidences to prove the existence of such settled maritime 
boundary, namely, (1) Figures 3.4, 4.1, and 4.2; (2) Paragraph 6.6; and (3) Submi-
ssions 3~4 and 6~7.
Firstly, as Figure 3.4 of the Memorial (Fig. 8 of this paper) demonstrates, on 
the east and west sides of the Philippines, there are two continuous lines called “Phi-
lippine 200 M EEZ limit”. For the east part of the line, it seems justified for the 
Philippines to use “continuous line” to draw such undisputed limits as no other 
States have overlapping claims. On the west side (SCS), the use of continuous 
line presupposes the same situation. Such continuous line could not have been 
drawn, if China’s EEZ and continental shelf claims in SCS had not been ignored 
or invalidated. Figure 4.1 of the Memorial (Fig. 11 of this paper) shows something 
255      See the Notification, pp. 14, 18~19, paras. 31, 41.
256       Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-Da-
sh-Line Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default of Appearance, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 28, 
2014, pp. 123~125.
257      The Memorial, pp. 271~272.
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comparable. There is a continuous line between China’s Hainan Province and 
Vietnam to represent the already concluded maritime boundary. The same 
continuous line is used by the Philippines in the west side of the Philippines, 
which confirms the point just mentioned. Besides, a circle of territorial sea exists, 
surrounding Scarborough Shoal. Judging by the title of this Figure, which is “Chi-
na’s Entitlements under UNCLOS Compared to Its Nine-Dash Line Claim in the 
Northern Sector”, Philippines’ position becomes obvious. That is: the Sino-Phi-
lippine maritime boundary in the Northern Sector is already settled or should 
be settled in this way. The same way of drawing sea boundary in SCS is seen 
in Figure 4.2 of the Memorial (Fig. 12 of this paper) while circles of territorial 
waters are drawn to represent “China’s Maximum Potential Entitlements under 
UNCLOS Compared to Its Nine-Dash Line Claim in the Southern Sector”, the 
title of this Figure. It once again demonstrates Philippines’ position that Sino-Phi-
lippine maritime boundary is settled in the Southern Sector or should be settled in 
this fashion. More significantly, putting these three figures in the Memorial, the 
Philippines is using them as a premise upon which the Memorial was written and 
the award should be given.258
Secondly, Paragraph 6.6 of the Memorial represents a giant leap of position as 
compared with the above-mentioned Philippines’ claim in its Notification. It reads:
Under Articles 57 and 76 of UNCLOS, respectively, the Philippines is entitled 
to a 200 M EEZ measured from its archipelagic baselines and a continental 
shelf extending to at least that distance, except only to the extent that nearby 
features generate maritime entitlements that overlap with those of the Phi-
lippines. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, none of the maritime features relevant 
to this case, whether in the Northern or Southern Sector, generates entitle-
ments to an EEZ or continental shelf. Accordingly, the waters, seabed and 
subsoil of the South China Sea within 200 M of the Philippine coast, but 
beyond 12 M from any high tide feature within the South China Sea, constitute 
the EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines. In other areas, it enjoys the 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction that UNCLOS affords.259
258    To be noted, China’s Position Paper shares the same view, but for a different reason, see 
China’s Position Paper, paras. 27, 68~69.
259      The Memorial, p. 162, para. 6.6.
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Fig. 11    Figure 4.1 of Philippines’ Memorial 
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Fig. 12    Figure 4.2 of Philippines’ Memorial
Thirdly, looking at Submissions 3~4 and 6~7, all the Philippines asks of the 
Tribunal is a declaration that China has no EEZ and continental shelf in the Rele-
vant Area. What China has is no more than four circles of territorial waters with 
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disputed ownership generated by the four “rocks” identified in Submissions 3 and 
7. Putting such conclusion together with the above statement in Paragraph 6.6, and 
Figures 3.4, 4.1, and 4.2 in the Memorial, there can be only one interpretation for 
the Philippines’ position. That is: the Sino-Philippine maritime boundary in the 
Relevant Area is well-settled or should be settled like this. Under the worst case 
scenario that the Philippines loses in Submissions 3~4 and 6~7, then the Sino-
Philippine maritime boundary would still be considered settled as a consequence of 
this arbitration but in a different way.
Thus, Submissions 3~4 and 6~7 constitute substantive arguments to vindicate 
the unilaterally drawn Sino-Philippine maritime boundary in the Relevant Area, 
which is prohibited by the ICJ in Canada v. US as against customary international 
law.260 Such endeavor is needed for the Philippines to justify its Submissions 8~9, 
12, and 14 premised on the unilaterally-settled boundary. Hence, like another 
Annex VII Tribunal did in Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago261 as well as what ICJ 
260    See Case concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 
(Canada v. US), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1984, p. 299, para. 112. “The Chamber there-
fore wishes to conclude this review of the rules of international law on the question to 
which the dispute between Canada and the United States relates by attempting a more 
complete and, in its opinion, more precise reformulation of the ‘fundamental norm’ 
already mentioned. For this purpose it will, inter alia, draw also upon the definition of the 
‘actual rules of law … which govern the delimitation of adjacent continental shelves – 
that is to say, rules binding upon States for all delimitations’ which was given by the Court 
in its 1969 Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (I.C.J. Reports, 1969, pp. 
46~47, para. 85). What general international law prescribes in every maritime delimitation 
between neighboring States could therefore be defined as follows: (1) No maritime 
delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally 
by one of those States. Such delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an 
agreement, following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the genuine intention 
of achieving a positive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be achieved, 
delimitation should be effected by recourse to a third party possessing the necessary 
competence.”
261    Annex VII Tribunal in Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago re-characterized the scope of 
dispute by rejecting the Barbados’ argument that the terms of notification submitted to 
institute the arbitration exclude the delimitation of the outer continental shelf. See Award 
of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of Arbitration between Babados and Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 2006 (Permanent Court of Arbitration), para. 213. Also 
see Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-
Dash-Line Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default of Appearance, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 
28, 2014, pp. 123~125. 
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did in FRG v. Iceland,262 the disputes to be formulated by Submissions 3~4 and 
6~7 should be re-characterized as an indirect maritime delimitation dispute falling 
outside the jurisdiction of this Tribunal.
VIII. The Admissibility Issues of Submission 5
For Submission 5, the Philippines respectfully requests the Tribunal “to adju-
dge and declare that (5) Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the 
EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines”. For the following reasons, it is sub-
mitted that such a claim should be deemed inadmissible.
A. Lack of Dispute
No information is provided by the Memorial to prove China’s denial of Mis-
chief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal to be part of EEZ and continental shelf of 
the Philippines. In fact, it will be hard to prove that China ever rejects the idea that 
the Philippines, as another State Party to UNCLOS, has maritime entitlements of 
EEZ and continental shelf extending from its archipelagic baselines, if established 
262     The ICJ redefined the scope of the disputes in FRG v. Iceland. “39. As to the compro-
missory clause in the 1961 Exchange of Notes, this gives the Court jurisdiction with 
respect to ‘a dispute relating to such an extension’, i.e., ‘the extension of the fishery 
jurisdiction of Iceland’. The present dispute was occasioned by Iceland’s unilateral 
extension of its fisheries jurisdiction. However, it would be too narrow an interpretation 
of the compromissory clause to conclude that the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to giving 
an affirmative or negative answer to the question of whether the extension of fisheries 
jurisdiction, as enacted by Iceland on 14 July 1972, is in conformity with international 
law. In the light of the exchanges and negotiations between the Parties, both in 1959 and 
1960 (paragraph 25 above) and in 1971-1972 (paragraphs 28-31 above), in which the 
questions of fishery conservation measures in the area and Iceland’s preferential fishing 
rights were raised and discussed, and in the light of the proceedings before the Court, it 
seems evident that the dispute between the Parties includes disagreements as to the extent 
and scope of their respective rights in the fishery resources and the adequacy of measures 
to conserve them. It must therefore be concluded that those disagreements are an element 
of the ‘dispute relating to the extension of the fishery jurisdiction of Iceland’.” Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case (FRG v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1974, p. 190, para. 
39.
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according to UNCLOS.263 Given the fact that these two maritime features are less 
than 200 M from Philippines’ archipelagic baselines, they form part of Philippines’ 
EEZ and continental shelf. As China does not oppose such Philippines’ claim, it 
is impossible for Submission 5 to constitute a “dispute” for the Tribunal to settle. 
According to Part XV of UNCLOS, one of the conditions to initiate the arbitration 
under Annex VII is the existence of a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of UNCLOS. Any claim impossible to constitute even a dispute should 
be considered hypothetical, moot and inadmissible by the Tribunal. Therefore, Sub-
mission 5 should be deemed inadmissible by the Tribunal.
B. Article 286 Ignored
As just said, what is presented by Submission 5 is not what China and the 
Philippines have been disputing. To build up a dispute, one needs to see what exact-
ly the positions of both parties are, as required by the rulings of relevant judicial 
decisions, e.g. Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago,264 and Greece v. Turkey.265 In the 
present case, the real Chinese position denied by the Philippines is that Mischief 
263    Paragraph 4.32 of the Memorial admitted that “[i]n a 21 June 2011 demarche to the 
Philippine Embassy in Beijing, General Hong Liang, Deputy Director of the Asia 
Department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asserted that, while the Philippines has 
rights under UNCLOS, ‘China also has ‘historical rights’ which are acknowledged under 
UNCLOS. Historical rights cannot be denied and must be respected’. General Hong Liang 
further elaborated: ‘China’s 9-dash line claim and map is based on the 1948 declaration by 
the Kuomintang government. UNCLOS also has a provision that historic rights cannot be 
denied and should be respected. UNCLOS is there, and the parties can use any clause that 
is useful to support its claim …. China understands that the Philippines claim is based on 
its 200 mile EEZ. China hopes, however, that its historic rights in the SCS be respected by 
the Philippines.’” See the Memorial, pp. 81~82.
264      Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of Arbitration between Barbados and Trinidad 
and Tobago, April 11, 2006 (Permanent Court of Arbitration), para. 198. “198. The fact 
that the precise scope of the dispute had not been fully articulated or clearly depicted does 
not preclude the existence of a dispute, so long as the record indicates with reasonable 
clarity the scope of the legal differences between the Parties…” 
265    The issue of existence of a dispute was also addressed in the Aegean Sea Continental 
Shelf Case, “[i]t is clear from the submissions in the Greek Application and Memorial, as 
well as in the observations in the various Turkish diplomatic communications to Greece, 
that Greece and Turkey are in conflict as to the delimitation of the spatial extend of their 
sovereign rights over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Thus there are certain 
sovereign rights being claimed by both Greece and Turkey, one against the other and it 
is manifest that legal rights lie at the root of the dispute that divides the two States. The 
Court therefore finds that a legal dispute exists between Greece and Turkey in respect of 
the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea.” See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece 
v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1978, p. 13, para. 31.
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Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are also part of China’s EEZ and continental 
shelf.266 To understand Philippines’ positions, Submission 12 267 must be looked 
at as context. Submission 12 is built on a premise that Mischief Reef is not part 
of China’s EEZ and continental shelf. Putting Submissions 5 and 12 together, 
it is clear that the real Sino-Philippine disputes concerning these two maritime 
features are two-fold: (1) whether these two features are also part of China’s EEZ 
and continental shelf; and (2) to which Party these two maritime features belong. 
However, these two component disputes are not brought to the Tribunal as required 
by Article 286 of UNCLOS. What is demanded by Article 286 is the identity of (1) 
the disputes left unresolved after the Parties have gone through procedures listed 
in Section 1 of Part XV with (2) the disputes requested to be brought to the chosen 
procedure listed in Section 2 of Part XV.268 Since the Philippines’ Memorial does 
not bring to the Tribunal these real disputes for settlement, Article 286 has not been 
complied with. It is thus unjustified to consider the Philippines entitled to initiate 
the Section 2-Procedure to settle the disputes constituted by Submission 5. The 
Tribunal is advised to declare Submission 5 inadmissible.  
IX. China’s Interference with Philippines’ Exploitation of 
       Natural Resources at Reed Bank, Mischief Reef, Se-
       cond Thomas Shoal and Other Areas: Submissions 8~9
Submissions 8~9 of the Memorial address both actions and omissions of China 
in Reed Bank, Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and some other areas, which 
are located in Philippines’ EEZ while in Philippines’ view not occurring in China’s 
EEZ and continental shelf. Detailed legal arguments are provided by Section 
266     See Table 4 of this paper.
267     The Memorial.
268       Article 286 (Application of procedures under this section) reads: “Subject to section 3, any
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention shall, where no 
settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any 
party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.” 
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I269-A270 of Chapter 6271 of the Memorial. The Tribunal is requested to adjudge and 
declare that
8) China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the 
sovereign rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living 
resources of its EEZ and continental shelf;
9) China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from 
exploiting the living resources in the EEZ of the Philippines;272
It is submitted that both the Submissions involving these three maritime fea-
tures are not admissible, while the “disputes” as constituted by these Submissions 
are beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, for the following reasons. 
A. Common Grounds for Inadmissibility and Lack of Jurisdiction
Submissions 8~9 are premised on an overarching Philippine position that 
China does not have EEZ and continental shelf entitlements in the eastern part of 
SCS within the U-Shaped Line (the Relevant Area),273 which is rather Philippines’ 
EEZ and continental shelf. It seems that such a premise will be vindicated when the 
award for Submissions 3~7 is given in the Philippines’ favor.274 When this happens, 
what China can have in the Relevant Area will be no more than four circles of 
territorial waters surrounding four “rocks” (i.e., Scarborough Shoal, Joshson Reef, 
Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef) with disputed territorial status. Consequently, 
all the law enforcement activities by China in exercising its sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction under EEZ and continental shelf claims in the Relevant Area 
269     Section I of Chapter 6 is entitled “China’s Interference with the Sovereign Rights and 
Jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the Traditional Livelihood of Filipino Fishermen”. See 
the Memorial, p. 162.
270     Section I-A of Chapter 6 is entitled “China’s Interference with the Philippines’ Sovereign 
Rights to Exploit the Living and Non-Living Resources of Its EEZ and Continental Shelf”. 
See the Memorial, p. 162.
271     Chapter 6 of the Philippines’ Memorial is entitled “China’s Violations of the Philippines’ 
Rights under UNCLOS”. The Memorial, p. 161.
272      The Memorial, pp. 271~272.
273      Para. 6.15 of the Memorial said that China relied on historic right as the basis to exercise 
sovereign rights in all the waters enclosed by U-Shaped Line. Such a Philippine argument 
is based on a theory that China has no EEZ and continental shelf in the Relevant Area to 
justify its exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction. The Memorial, p. 164.
274      The Memorial.
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as contested by Submissions 8~14 will be groundless. Following such a theory, 
Submissions 8~9 can be considered as challenging China’s actions overstepping 
Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf.275 However, Submissions 8~9 should be 
considered inadmissible for the following reasons.
Firstly, China and the Philippines have been maintaining territorial disputes 
for all the maritime features in KIG and Scarborough Shoal.276 Obviously, the 
objects of such disputes go beyond those China-occupied nine maritime features 
identified by Submissions 3~7. China and the Philippines have not submitted such 
disputes in totality to any third-party judicial body (including this Tribunal) for 
resolution. Besides, the UNCLOS does not contain any rules governing acquisition 
of territorial sovereignty. Such disputes hence cannot be the ones concerning 
the interpretation or application of UNCLOS and falling within the mandate of 
this Tribunal.277 In addition, both Parties to this litigation have not even started 
negotiating for resolving such dispute bilaterally. Under such circumstances, it 
will be highly unpractical for the Tribunal to expect such dispute to be settled 
during this arbitration and use such settlement as a basis to adjudicate the disputes 
presented by the Philippines.
Secondly, among those maritime features over which such Sino-Philippine 
territorial dispute exist, at least 12 features (not all occupied by China) are consi-
dered as non-rock islands under Article 121 of UNCLOS and capable of generating 
EEZ and continental shelf entitlements for China.278 Such EEZ and continental 
shelf in fact can reach as far as the waters adjacent to, inter alia, Reed Bank, 
Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal (see Table 4 of this paper). It would be 
natural and fair for China to contend that, with its undefeated territorial claims 
over the entire Spratly Islands Group279 including these non-rock islands, it has 
undeniable maritime entitlements of EEZ and continental shelf covering the waters 
275     China’s Position Paper, para. 27.
276     See Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-
Dash-Line Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default of Appearance, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 
28, 2014, pp. 119~121. Also see Notification, p. 8, para. 20; China’s Position Paper, paras. 
6~7.
277      Arts. 286~288 of UNCLOS.
278       Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Poten-
tial South China Sea Change, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 
29, 2014.
279        Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Note Verbale, CML/8/2-
011, 14 April 2011, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf, 1 March 2015.
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surrounding these three maritime features. On the other hand, the Philippines 
may argue that as the Tribunal is powerless to settle the Sino-Philippine territorial 
disputes, the Tribunal may not endorse China’s EEZ and continental shelf claims 
generated by those non-rock islands with unsettled and disputed territorial status.
Such jurisdictional limitation puts the Tribunal in a dilemma. On the one hand, 
it will be unjustified for the Tribunal to uphold the premise as implied by the Phili-
ppines’ Submissions 8~9. By doing this the Tribunal would be seen dismissing Chi-
na’s territorial claims over the entire Spratly Islands Group including those non-
rock islands. On the other hand, it will be unfair for the Tribunal to reject such 
Filipino premise, as the Tribunal would be seen endorsing China’s claims and cros-
sing its jurisdictional boundary. It is indeed premature for such a premise to be 
accepted by the Tribunal as a basis to adjudicate the disputes formulated by Submi-
ssions 8~9.
Thirdly, Reed Bank, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal are located in 
the overlapping areas of EEZ and continental shelf both China and the Philippines 
may claim. These three maritime features are considered by the Philippines as 
LTEs and incapable of generating their own maritime entitlements under UNCLOS, 
not even territorial sea.280 This makes the legal status of the surrounding maritime 
areas very important.281 Since such areas are of the nature of overlapping zone, the 
Tribunal may not entertain the disputes as formulated by Submissions 8~9 without 
answering the preliminary question “on which Party’s EEZ and continental shelf 
these maritime features sit”. This is required by the rulings of Qatar v. Bahrain 
and Malaysia v. Singapore that were recognized by the Philippines itself in the 
280    Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are requested by the Philippines to be declared 
by the Tribunal as LTEs according to Submission 4 of the Memorial (the Memorial, p. 
271). Reed Bank is not even a LTE, as it is a submerged feature.
281    LTEs form part of the seabed and subsoil, and are subject to the regime of the maritime 
zone in which they are found and located. See United States Department of State, China: 
Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, Limits in the Seas, No. 143, p. 9, at http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf, 1 March 2015.
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2015 No. 1)250
Memorial.282 However, the Tribunal is not given any authority to do this preliminary 
job by both China and the Philippines.283
Fourthly, the actions and omissions of China challenged by Submissions 
8~9 and its underlying arguments occurred in the waters adjacent to Reed Bank, 
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal. If the award is given in the Philippines’ 
favor, it would mean that these actions and omissions are unlawful infringements of 
the Philippines’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its EEZ and continental shelf. 
On the other hand, should the award be given in favor of China, it would mean that 
these actions and omissions are lawful in Philippine EEZ and continental shelf. 
In both cases, such actions and omissions would be considered by the Tribunal as 
having occurred in the Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf. It is tantamount to 
declaring that Reed Bank, Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are not located 
in China’s EEZ and continental shelf. In other words, before giving either kind of 
award, the Tribunal must have already drawn the sea boundary in the overlapping 
areas and concluded that these three maritime features are not located on China’s 
side. As the Tribunal is not authorized to draw maritime boundary for these two 
Parties, either kind of award would imply that the Tribunal has gone beyond its 
jurisdiction.
Fifthly, the Philippines would probably respond by saying that China has no 
EEZ and continental shelf entitlements in the Relevant Area, so the overlapping 
EEZ and continental shelf area does not exist here in the first place. However, 
before accepting such a position, the Tribunal has to dismiss China’s territorial 
claims over those well-recognized non-rock islands located in the Spratly Islands 
Group that are capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf. However, the 
Tribunal has no power to settle such hidden Sino-Philippine territorial disputes 
through denying one Party’s territorial claim and upholding another Party’s compe-
ting claim. The Tribunal will have to go beyond such jurisdictional limits in deny-
282     This is admitted by the Philippines itself in the Memorial. See the Memorial, pp. 199~200, 
paras. 6.105~6.106. It is worth quoting that “[t]he Court has made clear that low-tide 
elevation[s] cannot be appropriated under general international law, and that sovereignty 
and other rights in relation to them are determined by the law of the sea, namely by the 
maritime zones in which they are located … In Qatar v. Bahrain, the Court held that Qatar 
had sovereignty over Fasht al-Dibl, a low-tide elevation, because it was located within 
Qatar’s territorial sea. Likewise, in Malaysia/Singapore, the status of South Ledge, a 
low-tide elevation, was held to depend on the outcome of the as-yet unresolved maritime 
delimitation under UNCLOS still to occur between Malaysia and Singapore.”
283      See the Memorial, p. 257, para. 7.120. Also see the Notification, p. 16, para. 40.
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ing China’s territorial claims, too.
Based on the foregoing reasons, it seems fair for the Tribunal to consider 
Submissions 8~9 inadmissible. In the event that the decisions are finally made by 
the Tribunal for the disputes formulated under these submissions, they will most 
probably go beyond the mandate of the Tribunal.
B. Reed Bank Incidents Involving GSEC 101 and MV Veritas Voyager
     Are beyond the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
The first group of China’s actions under Submissions 8~9 to “interfere with the 
Philippines’ exercise of its sovereign rights for non-living natural resources within 
its own EEZ” from February 2010 to March 2011 occurred in Reed Bank. In June 
2002 the Philippines started to have a contract with a UK-based company, Sterling 
Energy, to explore for oil and gas deposits in the area “GSEC 101” near Reed 
Bank.284 In February 2010, the Philippine Government converted such exploration 
contract into a service contract. China started to verbally protest285 and physically 
obstruct286 such attempt of exploitation commissioned by the Philippines. And the 
dispute was crystallized. 
From the Philippines’ perspectives, the area “GSEC 101” is part of Philippines’ 
EEZ alone. However, the foregoing discussion proves that China also has EEZ 
and continental shelf entitlements reaching Reed Bank. And China seems to have 
claimed so.287 Therefore, what really happened in the area “GSEC 101” should be 
properly re-characterized as reflecting an unresolved Sino-Philippine boundary 
delimitation dispute arising from overlapping EEZ and continental shelf claims, 
284    The Philippines said that China did not protest against this. But there is no evidence to 
support this. See the Memorial, p. 164, para. 6.16.
285       The Memorial, p. 165, paras. 6.17~6.19.
286       The Memorial, pp. 165~166, paras. 6.20~6.21.
287      As stated in the Philippines’ Memorial, on 22 February 2010, the Chinese Embassy in 
Manila sent a diplomatic note to the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, expre-
ssing its “strong objection and indignation” concerning the conversion of GSEC 101 
into a service contract, asserting that the “so-called ‘GSEC101’ is situated in the waters 
of China’s Nansha [Spratly] Islands”. On May 13, 2010, another diplomatic note of 
China “re-emphasize[d]” its “indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and its 
adjacent waters”. China asserted the grant of “the Service contract relating to the so-called 
‘GSEC101’ licence” by the Philippines “has seriously infringed on China’s sovereignty, 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and is therefore illegal and invalid”. See the Memorial, 
p. 165, paras. 6.17~6.18.
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which is hard to be denied by this Tribunal.288 It follows that the Tribunal should 
not deny China’s rights under Article 246 of UNCLOS with respect to the foreign 
activities occurring in the area “GSEC 101” near Reed Bank. A separate cause then 
arises to deprive the Tribunal of its jurisdiction to address the dispute concerned.
The 2006 Chinese Declaration289 has removed, inter alia, the dispute under 
Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS from the scope of jurisdiction of this Tribunal. It 
covers “disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a … tribunal under 
article 297, paragraph 2.”290 The “disputes excluded” under Article 297(2)(a)(i) are 
the ones arising out of the exercise by the coastal State of a right or discretion in 
accordance with Article 246.291 
Article 246(2) provides that “[m]arine scientific research in the EEZ and on 
the continental shelf shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal State.” 
Article 246(3) provides that, in normal circumstances, coastal States shall grant 
their consent for marine scientific research projects by other States in their EEZ 
or continental shelf “to be carried out in accordance with this Convention exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes and in order to increase scientific knowledge of the 
marine environment for the benefit of all mankind.” Article 246(5)(a)~(c) allows 
the coastal States to withhold their consent when the project “(a) is of direct 
significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, whether living 
or non-living; (b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives 
288     The distance between Itu Aba island and the area “GSEC 101” near Reed Bank is less th-
an 200 M. See Table 4 of this paper.
289      At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#Chi
na upon ratification, 1 March 2015.  
290    Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS reads: “When signing, ratifying or acceding to this 
Convention or at any time thereafter, a State may, without prejudice to the obligations 
arising under section 1, declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of 
the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following 
categories of disputes: … (b) disputes concerning military activities, including military 
activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and 
disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign 
rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297, 
paragraph 2 or 3; ...” 
291     Article 297(2)(a)(i) (Limitations on applicability of section 2) of UNCLOS reads: “2. (a) 
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Convention 
with regard to marine scientific research shall be settled in accordance with section 2, 
except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the submission to such 
settlement of any dispute arising out of: (i) the exercise by the coastal State of a right or 
discretion in accordance with article 246; ...” 
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or the introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment; (c) involves 
the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, installations and structures 
referred to in articles 60 and 80.”292
In the present dispute concerning Reed Bank, the situation should be fairly 
characterized as marine scientific research for the purpose of the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources in China’s continental shelf as defined by Article
246(5)(a)~(c). Accordingly, China may withhold its consent and exercise jurisdic-
tion by interfering with the team dispatched or authorized by the Philippines, i.e. 
the survey vessel MV Veritas Voyager. Under the 2006 Chinese Declaration, the 
disputes arising out of such a refusal or interference by China (which is exactly 
what happened on the ground) would be excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
present Tribunal.
C. The Confrontations at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal 
     Are beyond the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Paragraph 6.35 of the Memorial indicates the disputes concerning the legality 
of China’s actions that interfered with Philippine fishing activities in the waters 
adjacent to Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal.293 As said above, it is hard for 
the Tribunal to deny that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal also fall with 
China’s EEZ and continental shelf. It follows that, for the living natural resources 
found in the waters adjacent to these two LTEs, China may (1) exercise its sove-
reign rights for conservation and management purposes, and (2) exercise jurisdic-
tion for protecting and preserving the marine environment, in accordance with 
292      Article 246 of UNCLOS.
293     That paragraph also indicates the disputes of China’s interference with Philippine fishing 
activities in the waters adjacent to Scarborough Shoal. This will be addressed in Section X 
of this paper.
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Article 56 of UNCLOS.294 With this in mind, it is fair to characterize the dispute 
arising from the alleged China’s interference with Philippine fishing activities in the 
waters adjacent to Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal as the dispute relating 
to China’s sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in China’s EEZ and 
China’s exercise of such sovereign rights under Article 56. 
Such disputes fall within the scope of disputes indicated by Article 297(3)
(a)295, therefore is part of the dispute identified by Article 298(1)(b).296 As the 2006 
China’s Declaration excludes Annex VII-Tribunal’s jurisdiction for the categories 
of disputes referred to in, inter alia, Article 298(1)(b), this Tribunal becomes po-
werless to try the dispute in question.
D. The Incidents of Service Contract 54, 14, 58, 63 and AREAs 3~4
     Are Covered by Article 298(1)(a)(i) or 297(2)(a)(i) and beyond 
     the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Another bunch of China’s “interference with Philippines’ exercise of its sove-
reign rights for non-living natural resources within its own EEZ” was verbal pro-
tests from July 2010 to June 2011, focusing on the designated areas under Service 
294    Article 56 (Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic 
zone) of UNCLOS reads: “1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed 
and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, 
currents and winds; (b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this 
Convention with regard to: (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations 
and structures; (ii) marine scientific research; (iii) the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment; (c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 2. 
In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other 
States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 3. The 
rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in 
accordance with Part VI.”
295    Article 297(3)(a) of UNCLOS reads: “Disputes concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of the provisions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in 
accordance with section 2, except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the 
submission to such settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect 
to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its 
discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the 
allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions established in its 
conservation and management laws and regulations.” 
296      Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS.
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Contract (SC) 14, 54, 58, and 63 297 as well as AREAs 3~4.298 No coordinates for 
these areas were provided by the Memorial of the Philippines, though two figures 
to depict the locations of SC 58 and AREAs 3~4 were provided in Volume II of the 
Memorial.299 It may be justified from Philippine perspectives to present this claim 
without providing the coordinates, because from Philippine perspectives China has 
no EEZ and continental shelf in the Relevant Area. No matter where the petroleum 
blocks are, they will be away from China’s EEZ/continental shelf generated by 
China or Hainan Island. However, as has been proved, China may not be denied 
EEZ and continental shelf entitlements in the Relevant Area generated by non-
rock islands located in the Spratly Islands Group. Therefore, it is imperative for 
the Philippines, as an applicant of this litigation, to provide coordinates for the 
petroleum blocks as identified in this part of the claim. Otherwise, the Tribunal 
will not be able to know whether these blocks also fall within China’s EEZ or 
continental shelf in the Relevant Area. Before that, such submission can hardly be 
deemed admissible.
After the coordinates are provided by the Philippines, either of the two scena-
rios will occur. For those disputes occurring in China’s EEZ and continental shelf, 
which means less than 200 M from, inter alia, Nanshan Island,300 the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal has been excluded by China’s 2006 Declaration in joint operation of 
Articles 298(1)(b), 297(2)(a)(i) and 246, for the same reason as the previous section 
addressing the incidents occurring in Reed Bank (see Section IX-B of this paper).
On the other hand, for those disputes occurring beyond China’s EEZ and 
continental shelf but within U-Shaped Line, then the real dispute between China 
and the Philippines would be two-fold: (1) the legality dispute of China’s historic 
right claim to justify China’s law enforcement actions complained of by the 
Philippines in Paragraphs 6.24~6.27; and (2) the legality dispute of the U-Shaped 
Line as boundary of China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction based on historic 
297      See the Memorial, p. 167, paras. 6.24~6.25. The contractor of SC 14, 54, 58 and 63 is Ni-
do Petroleum Philippines Pty, Ltd.
298      See the Memorial, pp. 167~168, para. 6.27. AREAs 3~4 are among the 15 petroleum blo-
cks tendered for exploration and development by the Philippine Department of Energy.
299      They are Figures 6.2 and 4.7, available only in Volume II of the Memorial. 
300     The coordinates for Nanshan Island is 10°44' N, 115°48' E. Among the proper islands in 
the Spratly Islands Group, Nanshan Island is located at the easternmost point. It means 
that China’s EEZ to be generated from Nanshan Island stretches to the closest points 
of outer limits of Philippines’ territorial water in SCS and produces maximum amount 
of overlapping EEZ between these two Parties. Nanshan Island is occupied by the 
Philippines, but claimed by China since much earlier time.
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2015 No. 1)256
rights according to customary international law. As proved by Section III-A and 
III-B of this paper, these two kinds of disputes are also beyond the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal.
E. The Disputes concerning China’s Fishing Ban and Hainan Provincial
     Regulation on the Control of Coastal Border Security Are 
     beyond the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Paragraphs 6.30~6.32 of the Philippines’ Memorial challenge the legality of 
China’s implementation of fishing ban for a two-and-a-half-month period since 
May 2012 for the area indicated in Figure 6.3 of the Memorial301 (see Fig. 13 of this 
paper). Paragraphs 6.33~6.34 criticize Hainan Provincial Regulation on the Control 
of Coastal Border Security, as revised in December 2012.302 It is submitted that the 
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to address the “disputes” to be constituted by these two 
claims, for the following reasons. 
First, the basis for the Philippines to consider these two actions as illegal under
UNCLOS is that the boundary for the implementation of these two rules is the 
U-Shaped Line. However, the Memorial provides no information to prove that 
U-Shaped Line has been announced by China to be the outer limits for the imple-
mentation of these two rules. In fact, the Philippines’ Memorial has admitted for 
301     The Memorial, pp. 168~169.
302     The Memorial, pp. 169~170.
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three times that China does not have clear position in this regard.303 Besides, Figure 
6.3 of the Memorial, showing the maritime area where the fishing ban is applicable, 
is not supported by any footnote or official publications of China.304 Given such 
insufficient evidence, it is doubtful that any dispute between the Philippines and 
China can exist as to the legality of using the U-Shaped Line as the outer limits for 
the enforcement of these two Chinese domestic rules. Hence, it seems difficult to 
consider such claims to be admissible.
Second, if the U-Shaped Line is deemed as the boundary for the implemen-
tation of China’s fishing ban, the Tribunal probably has no jurisdiction to try 
the legality dispute of two component areas within the U-Shaped Line. The first 
component area is China’s EEZ and continental shelf in SCS which may not be 
denied by the Tribunal. In this connection, the legal arguments based on Articles 
56, 297(3)(a), and 298(1)(b) concerning Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal 
(see Section IX-C of this paper) would apply mutatis mutandis to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal to try such disputes.
The second component area is the Left-over Area that is outside of China’s 
EEZ and continental shelf in the Relevant Area, but within the U-Shaped Line. As 
has been proved in Section III-A and III-B of this paper, the dispute concerning 
the legality of China’s historic right claim to justify China’s sovereign rights and 
303     In para. 6.34 of the Memorial, the Philippines admits that “[a]s discussed, the Philippines 
has repeatedly requested clarification as to the scope of these regulations; in particular, 
whether they will be applied to all areas encompassed by the nine-dash line. China has 
declined to provide the requested clarification – at least directly.” The Memorial, p. 169. 
Also see para. 3.57 of the Memorial, which read: “In December 2012, China revised 
the ‘Hainan Provincial Regulation on the Control of Coastal Border Security’ to require 
foreign vessels to seek permission before entering ‘China’s waters’ within the South China 
Sea. The regulations also authorized China’s law enforcement vessels to board, inspect, 
detain, expel or confiscate foreign ships that have entered the waters ‘illegally’ or are 
conducting ‘illegal activities’ there. The Philippines has repeatedly requested clarification 
as to whether the regulations will be applied to the entire area within the nine-dash line 
or to a more limited area. It has received no response from China.” The Memorial, p. 60. 
Also see para. 4.15 of the Memorial, the Philippines states that “[i]n December 2012, 
China revised the ‘Coast Border Security Regulations’ for Hainan Province, to require 
consent by the provincial authorities for entry by any foreign vessel into any waters in the 
South China Sea under Chinese jurisdiction. Vietnam formally protested these regulations 
as ‘infring[ing] upon the sovereignty, sovereign rights and national jurisdiction of Viet 
Nam in the East Sea [South China Sea]’, adding that ‘Viet Nam resolutely opposes and 
demands China immediately cancel those wrongful activities’. For its part, the Philippines 
requested clarification of China’s new regulations, in particular in regard to whether they 
are intended to apply within the entire area covered by the nine-dash line. China has not 
formally responded to the Philippines’ request.” The Memorial, pp. 73~74.
304      The Memorial, p. 168, para. 6.30.
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jurisdiction in the Left-over Area is beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
As the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to address the dispute concerning each of 
the above-mentioned two component areas, the dispute over the combination of 
these two components goes beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Fig. 13     Area Covered by China’s 2012 Fishing Ban 
(Figure 6.3 of Philippine Memorial)
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X. China’s Interference with Filipino Traditional Fishing
      at Scarborough Shoal: Submission 10 
In Submission 10, the Philippines requests the Tribunal to adjudge and declare 
that “China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their li-
velihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal”.305 
Detailed legal arguments are provided by Section I-B306 of Chapter 6 of the Memo-
rial. It is submitted that such claim should be considered as inadmissible, while 
the disputes to be constituted by such submission go beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, for the following reasons.
A. Inadmissible Claim as No Dispute Exists concerning the 
    Interpretation or Application of UNCLOS
 
1. The Inapplicability of Article 279
Paragraphs 6.39~6.42 of the Memorial provide that China since April 2012 
started to exercise control over Scarborough Shoal and stopped Philippine fisher-
men from pursuing their traditional fishing activities in the adjacent waters thereto. 
The last sentence of Paragraph 6.42 reads “these acts violate China’s obligations 
under the Convention.” However, as said in Paragraph 6.40, “the Philippines wish-
es to make clear that it does not here make a claim to ‘historic rights’ that were, 
as described in Chapter 4, superseded by UNCLOS.” Then in Paragraph 6.43 the 
Philippines moves on by saying “[u]nder Article 279 of UNCLOS, China and 
the Philippines are required to ‘settle any dispute between them concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance 
with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations’”. Clearly, the 
Philippines argues that China fails to comply with the requirements under Article 
279.307 However, it is doubtful that the condition under Article 279 has ever been 
305     The Memorial, p. 272.
306    Section I-B of Chapter 6 is entitled “China’s Interference with the Traditional Livelihood 
of Filipino Fishermen at Scarborough Shoal”. See the Memorial, pp. 171~174, paras. 
6.39~6.47.
307      Article 279 (Obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means) of UNCLOS provides: “States 
Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application 
of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the 
Charter of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek a solution by the means indicated 
in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.” 
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met for China in the first place.
The problem is, to apply Article 279 in the present case there must be a dispute 
between China and the Philippines concerning the interpretation or application of 
any other separate article of UNCLOS. Otherwise, Article 279 can open the door 
for any dispute (e.g. trade dispute under WTO legal regime) to be settled by the 
procedures under Part XV of UNCLOS. 
What is exactly the provision of UNCLOS whose interpretation or application 
has been disputed by China and the Philippines here? No answer can be found 
in Section I-B of Chapter 6 of the Memorial. The only thing close to this is in 
Paragraph 6.45, which reads: “China’s actions have also unlawfully endangered 
justice by exacerbating the dispute between it and the Philippines concerning their 
maritime rights and entitlements in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal. This is also 
inconsistent with China’s obligation (and the Philippines’ right) under Article 279 
to settle the dispute by peaceful means, a long-recognized corollary of which is the 
prohibition of any acts that might aggravate or extend the dispute.”308 
Summing up, apart from “justice”, the Philippines only uses Article 279 to 
build up a dispute concerning interpretation or application of UNCLOS between 
China and the Philippines. It would be fair to conclude that, before any other 
separate article of UNCLOS can be invoked by the Philippines, Article 279 remains 
inapplicable. As a consequence, there is lack of dispute as required by this article. 
Submission 10 should be considered as inadmissible.
2. Innocent Passage Rules Are Not Invoked
As the Tribunal has no power to settle Sino-Philippine territorial disputes in 
SCS, the Tribunal may not deny the territorial claims of China over Scarborough 
Shoal. Thus, the Tribunal is also powerless to deny that the 12 M adjacent water 
surrounding Scarborough Shoal constitutes China’s territorial sea. As UNCLOS 
imposes no obligation on how to conserve and manage living natural sources in 
territorial water, China’s prevention of Philippines’ fishing vessels from harvesting 
living resources in this water is not an issue of interpretation or application of 
UNCLOS, except the rules governing innocent passage.
However, the Philippines does not invoke the rules concerning innocent passa-
ge in presenting its Submission 10, so as to justify the existence of a dispute con-
cerning interpretation or application of UNCLOS and to render Article 279 appli-
cable. This inaction confirms the position that the “dispute” to be created by Submi-
308      The Memorial, p. 173.
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ssion 10 cannot be considered as any issue concerning interpretation or application 
of UNCLOS.
3. Submission 10 Is Self-contradictory and Inadmissible
The traditional fishing rights or historic fishing rights, if any, must exist in 
territorial water of another coastal State, according to Section II-A-1 of Chapter 4 
of the Philippines’ Memorial.309 However, the Philippines claims sovereignty over 
Scarborough Shoal as well as 12 M waters adjacent thereto. Such territorial water 
claim of the Philippines is irreconcilable with its traditional fishing right claim in 
the same waters. This conflict in legal positions defeats Submission 10. Before the 
Philippines abandons its claim of territorial sovereignty over the area concerned, 
its traditional fishing can hardly exist in the same area in the eyes of customary 
international law. Consequently, it remains doubtful whether any legality dispute 
exists regarding China’s interference with the exercise by the Philippine fishermen 
of their so-called traditional fishing right in “Filipino” territorial water.
4. Disputes concerning Traditional Fishing Right Are Not Concerning the 
Interpretation or Application of UNCLOS
Assuming the Tribunal considers the legality dispute of China’s interference 
with the exercise of Filipino traditional fishing right to be existent, the Philippines 
still keeps a distance from such a legal regime.310 Should the Philippines invoke 
historic fishing rights or traditional fishing rights under customary international 
law in the later stage of this litigation, it must be submitted that, since such legal 
regimes are not part of UNCLOS, such invocation may not help to build up a 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, either. Assuming 
that such a dispute is deemed concerning the interpretation or application of UN-
CLOS, such a dispute should be considered as concerning the application of Arti-
cles 74(1) and 83(1),311 covered by Article 298(1)(a)(i), and therefore removed from 
the jurisdiction of this Tribunal due to the 2006 China’s Declaration.
B. The Core Territorial Dispute Renders the Claim Inadmissible and 
     the Dispute beyond the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
The core issue underneath and the real reason for the maritime confrontations 
309     The Memorial, pp. 84~91, paras. 4.38~4.54.
310     The Memorial, p. 171, para. 6.40.
311     See Section III-A of this paper.
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indicated by Submission 10 in the water adjacent to Scarborough Shoal is the Sino-
Philippine competition for territorial title over this “rock”.312 Before this territorial 
dispute is resolved, it is premature to examine (1) the legality of the alleged 
Filipino traditional fishing rights in this water and (2) the illegality of China’s 
interference with such fishing rights. The reason is simple. Should the Philippines 
win the territorial title for Scarborough Shoal after settling such a dispute with 
China in a separate forum, it would be unnecessary for the Tribunal to address the 
Filipino traditional fishing rights there, as this issue becomes moot. Put differently, 
the award in favor of the Philippines given by this Tribunal would become pointless 
under this situation. Only after the Philippines loses such territorial title elsewhere 
will it make sense for the Tribunal to address the issue whether the Philippines has 
nevertheless acquired any traditional fishing rights in China’s territorial waters and 
whether China’s interference violated international law. 
Not being concerned with the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, such 
a preliminary territorial dispute is not the one that the Tribunal has jurisdiction 
over. It makes the claim under Submission 10 inadmissible. Even assuming such 
submission is admissible, China’s actions of interference with Philippine fisher-
men’s exercise of traditional livelihood (or traditional fishing rights) may justifiably 
be characterized as military activities for maintaining China’s territorial integrity in 
and around Scarborough Shoal. Such military actions are covered by Article 298(1)
(b)313 of UNCLOS. By virtue of the 2006 China’s Declaration which excludes 
Annex VII-Tribunal’s jurisdiction for the disputes referred to in, inter alia, Article 
298(1)(b), this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the legality dispute of such actions 
of interference.
XI. China’s Failure to Protect and Preserve Marine
       Environment at Scarborough Shoal and 
       Second Thomas Shoal: Submission 11
In Submission 11, the Philippines requests the Tribunal to adjudge and decla-
re that “China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and 
preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Sho-
312     See China’s Position Paper, paras. 6 & 49. 
313     Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS.
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al”.314 The corresponding legal arguments are provided in Sections II-A,315 II-B,316 
and II-C 317of Chapter 6. The following sections will identify the legal problems 
concerning the jurisdiction and admissibility for the dispute to be constituted by 
Submission 11, and the claim as reflected by this submission.
A. Inadmissibility and Lack of Jurisdiction over the Dispute 
     Relating to Scarborough Shoal
1. The Facts Identified by the Philippines
Section II-A of Chapter 6 of the Philippines’ Memorial describes how Chinese 
government vessels CMS 75, CMS 84, CMS 71, and FLEC 310 started in early 
April 2012 to protect a large fleet of Chinese fishing vessels which harvested li-
ving resources in the waters adjacent to Scarborough Shoal.318 On April 10, 2012, 
Philippine Navy personnel attached to the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, which suspec-
ted the Chinese fishermen of illegal poaching, boarded the vessels to inspect 
their catch. Chinese government vessels then intervened and tried to prevent the 
Philippine law enforcement actions. However, the Philippine side finally succeeded 
and discovered that these fishing vessels were filled with assorted corals and giant 
clams, and endangered species.319 Later on, under the escort of Chinese government 
vessels, the Chinese fishing vessels were able to harvest living resources in that 
waters, but were observed by the Philippine government personnel to have been 
engaged in taking endangered species.320 The Philippines goes on by listing eleven 
incidents of the environmentally harmful fishing activities done by Chinese fishing 
314      The Memorial, p. 272.
315    Section II of Chapter 6 is entitled “China Has Breached Its Obligations Not to Harm the 
Marine Environment”, see the Memorial, p. 174. Section II-A of Chapter 6 is entitled 
“Damage to the environment at Scarborough Shoal”. See the Memorial, pp. 175~184, 
paras. 6.50~6.62.
316     Section II-B of Chapter 6 is entitled “Damage to the Environment at Second Thomas 
Shoal”. See the Memorial, pp. 184~185, paras. 6.63~6.65.
317    Section II-C of Chapter 6 is entitled “China Has Violated Its International Obligations to 
Protect and Not Pollute the Marine Environment”. See the Memorial, pp. 185~193, paras. 
6.66~6.89. There are three sub-sections in Section II-C. They are: Section II-C-1 “China 
Has Violated Its Obligation to Protect and Preserve the Marine Environment”; Section II-
C-2 “China Has Violated Its Obligation to Prevent Pollution of the Marine Environment”, 
and Section II-C-3 “China Has Violated the Convention on Biological Diversity”. See the 
Memorial, pp. 185~193.
318      The Memorial, pp. 175~176, para. 6.50.
319      The Memorial, p. 176, para. 6.51.
320      The Memorial, pp. 178~179, paras. 6.53~6.54.
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vessels and apprehended by the Philippine authorities since January 17, 1998, to 
April 8, 2006, “with China’s full knowledge”.321 Apart from endangered species, the 
Philippines said that “many of the Chinese fishing vessels inspected or apprehended 
in the incidents described above were found to be in possession of dynamite or 
other explosives”, as well as cyanide “used to stun and immobilize fish”.322 Since 
May 2012, the Philippines discontinued its law enforcement actions due to China’s 
warning. “In the meantime, Chinese government vessels have continued to patrol 
the waters at Scarborough Shoal, providing cover for the activities of Chinese 
fishermen”.323 
2. The Unsettled Legal Status of the Waters Adjacent to 
Scarborough Shoal Makes Inadmissible the Reports Produced by 
Philippines’ Law Enforcement Agencies
The Philippines claims to be entitled to enforce its domestic laws in the 
waters adjacent to Scarborough Shoal, based upon a premise that the territorial 
sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal belongs to the Philippines. Such a premise 
may not be endorsed by the Tribunal that is powerless to settle the ongoing Sino-
Philippine territorial dispute over this maritime feature. Consequently, to recognize 
Philippines’ territorial claim over the adjacent waters of this “rock” would be 
without any grounds. Therefore, the official reports produced by Philippines’ law 
enforcement agencies describing the alleged unlawful activities of Chinese fishing 
vessels sighted in this waters should be considered unacceptable and inadmissible 
for the purpose of this arbitration.
3. China’s Action of Obstruction Can Be Seen for Defending Its Territorial 
Integrity in Scarborough Shoal and Its Adjacent Waters
Assuming the Tribunal recognizes the legitimacy of Philippines’ law enforce-
ment because this water is deemed Philippines’ territorial sea, the Chinese fishing 
boats found there would be subject to the national laws of the Philippines. As to 
China’s law enforcement vessels, they would be legally incompetent to enforce 
Chinese laws in such foreign territorial water and to arrest Chinese fishing vessels, 
even if they wish to do so. It would be impossible for Chinese government to 
breach its UNCLOS obligation to protect and preserve marine environment, if any, 
by defaulting to enforce its law against the Chinese fishing vessels in such “foreign” 
321      The Memorial, pp. 179~181, para. 6.55.
322      The Memorial, pp. 182~183, paras. 6.58~6.61.
323      The Memorial, p. 184, para. 6.62.
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water.
Even assuming that China’s laws may be enforced in this water through Chi-
na’s government vessels, China’s government vessels there would have a different 
problem more urgent to tackle. No matter what ruling is given by the Tribunal, 
China may probably and justifiably insist on its unaffected sovereignty over the 
territorial water surrounding Scarborough Shoal due to lack of Tribunal’s power to 
reject China’s territorial claim over Scarborough Shoal. Based on such a position, 
China’s government vessels there would not be obligated to yield to their Filipino 
counter-part who wishes to enforce Philippine law upon Chinese fishing vessels 
harvesting in that “Chinese territorial water”. Instead, China’s law enforcement 
vessels would obstruct Philippines’ counter-part from enforcing Filipino law there 
upon Chinese fishing vessels so as to deny Philippines’ exercise of competing sove-
reignty claim on the very water and to display China’s competing sovereignty.
Besides, the core territorial dispute, being unrelated to the interpretation or 
application of UNCLOS, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Assuming that 
the Tribunal considers the legality dispute of China’s obstruction actions to be 
concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, its jurisdiction to try such 
dispute has still been removed already. It is because that China has used govern-
ment vessels to engage in non-commercial service, i.e. preventing Filipino law en-
forcement vessels from entering the water, so as to achieve the military purpose of 
maintaining its territorial integrity. It would turn the dispute in question into the one 
concerning military activities, meeting the condition indicated by Article 298(1)
(b),324 thus exempting from adjudication by the Tribunal according to 2006 China’s 
Declaration.
B. Inadmissibility and Lack of Jurisdiction over the Disputes 
    Relating to Second Thomas Shoal
1. The Facts Identified by the Philippines
Paragraphs 6.63~6.65 of the Philippines’ Memorial describe the situation 
happening at Second Thomas Shoal since May 2013. Under protection of Chinese 
State vessels, CMS 71, CMS 84, CMS 167, and PLAN 562, a large fleet of Chinese 
fishing vessels arrived at Second Thomas Shoal. “On May 11, 2013, a Philippine 
marine air patrol photographed a Chinese fishing vessel loaded with giant clams 
324     Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS.
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and corals”. As Chinese government vessels took control of the water surrounding 
Second Thomas Shoal, the Philippines has been unable to stop Chinese illegal fish-
ing activities ever since.325 Bearing in mind the above Philippines’ observations, it 
is submitted however that the disputes to be formulated thereby are still beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal while the claims should be considered inadmissible, due 
to following reasons.
2. The Legal Status of Second Thomas Shoal
Second Thomas Shoal, if considered as an island under Article 121 of UN-
CLOS (be it a rock as defined by Article 121(3) or not), will have territorial water 
and share the same situation as Scarborough Shoal in this particular Submission. 
Then all the legal arguments that China may use for Scarborough Shoal apply 
mutatis mutandis to Second Thomas Shoal. On the other hand, it will be hard 
for the Tribunal to deny that this maritime feature, if deemed a LTE, falls within 
China’s EEZ in the Relevant Area generated by those non-rock islands in the 
Spratly Islands Group, like Itu Aba, Thitu, and West York Islands,326 which China 
maintains much older territorial claims.327 
Based on such legal status of Second Thomas Shoal, the legality disputes brou-
ght by the Philippines concerning the obstruction of Philippines’ law enforcement 
activities by China’s government vessels there should be re-characterized as a 
dispute concerning the exercise of the sovereign rights of China (as a coastal State) 
for “conserving and managing” the living resources in its EEZ according to Article 
56(1)(a)328 of UNCLOS. Such sovereign rights are exclusive in nature. China 
cannot exercise such rights without first precluding the competing Filipino law 
enforcement activities against Chinese fishing vessels in the same water. Therefore, 
such obstruction of Filipino law enforcement activities should be deemed an inhe-
rent and inseparable part of the exercise of China sovereign rights under Article 
56(1)(a). Covered by Article 297(3)(a)329 of UNCLOS, such disputes have been 
removed from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal according to Article 298(1)(b)330 
together with the 2006 China’s Declaration.
325      The Memorial, pp. 184~185.
326      See Table 4 of this paper.
327     See Tables 1~2 of this paper. Check the names of Itu Aba, Thitu Island, West York Island, 
and Second Thomas Shoal there.
328      Article 56 of UNCLOS.
329      Article 297(3)(a) of UNCLOS.
330      Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS.
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3. The Report Made by the Philippine Law Enforcement Vessels 
Should Be Considered as Inadmissible
As said already, it is hard to deny that the area of Sino-Philippine overlapping 
EEZ and continental shelf covers Second Thomas Shoal and its adjacent waters. 
The Tribunal has no mandate to draw the maritime boundary, so as to decide to 
which Party Second Thomas Shoal belongs. Before settling such a preliminary 
issue, it would be unjustified to endorse the legitimacy of application and enforce-
ment of the Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf laws in the area concerned. 
Should the Submission 11 be entertained before settling such a preliminary issue, 
an ultra vires judgment may be seen as being made for such boundary delimitation 
dispute in favor of the Philippines. Therefore, the Tribunal is advised not to admit 
the report made by the Philippine law enforcement vessels in the area concerned, 
whose foundation is still missing.331 
4. Article 297(1)(c) Is Inapplicable to Establish 
the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
The Philippines might invoke Article 297(1)(c)332 to justify the position that 
the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute in question. However, the Philippines 
needs to 
(1) recognize Itu Aba or other maritime features in Spratly Islands Group to 
be “non-rock islands” under Article 121 so as to make the owner of such maritime 
features a “coastal State” for the purpose of Article 297(1)(c); 
(2) recognize China to be the owner of the foregoing features so that China fits 
in the role of “coastal State” in this provision; and 
(3) prove the existence of a specified international rule and standard for the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment applicable to the “adjacent 
water” of Second Thomas Shoal and established by or in accordance with UN-
CLOS. 
331      The Memorial, pp. 184~185, paras. 6.64~6.65.
332    Article 297(1)(c) of UNCLOS (Limitations on applicability of section 2) reads:”1. Dis-
putes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention with regard to the 
exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction provided for in this 
Convention shall be subject to the procedures provided for in section 2 in the following 
cases: … (c) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of specified 
international rules and standards for the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment which are applicable to the coastal State and which have been established 
by this Convention or through a competent international organization or diplomatic 
conference in accordance with this Convention.” 
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Obviously, it is hard for the Philippines to make such arguments, as the Phili-
ppines (1) denies that all the maritime features within KIG to be capable of genera-
ting EEZ and continental shelf;333 (2) denies China to be the owner of all the mari-
time features found in KIG; and (3) has not proved the existence of a specified 
international rule or standard. To conclude, Article 297(1)(c) can hardly assist in 
establishing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over the dispute constituted by Submi-
ssion 11. Assuming Article 297(1)(c) to be applicable, it will then be hard for the 
Philippines to oppose the application of Article 297(3)(a), as China’s obstruction of 
Filipino law enforcement vessels in the latter’s exercise of authority constitutes a 
dispute relating to China’s exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to the living 
resources in China’s EEZ and continental shelf. The result will be the same that the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction for this issue has been removed.
C. Inadmissibility for Claims Based on Stockholm Declaration and
     Agenda 21 Which Are Not concerning the Interpretation or 
     Application of UNCLOS
Judging by the rules invoked by the Philippines in Section II-C-1 of Chapter 
6, it is hard to believe that any dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of UNCLOS has been submitted, so as to make such claim admissible. The “rules” 
invoked by the Philippines consist of (1) Article 192 of UNCLOS;334 (2) Prin-
ciple 21 of Stockholm Declaration;335 (3) Principle 17 of Agenda 21.336 To be no-
ted, Article 192 is too imprecise to apply and needs other detailed provisions to 
substantiate its legal meaning. Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration has been 
subsumed to Article 194(2) of UNCLOS and will be discussed in the next section. 
Principle 17 of Agenda 21 is soft law and devoid of legally binding force. What 
333     The Memorial, p. 142, para. 5.96.
334     Article 192 (General obligation) of UNCLOS reads: “States have the obligation to protect 
and preserve the marine environment.” 
335     Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration reads: “States have, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and 
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.” At http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=9
7&articleid=1503, 1 March 2015.
336    Agenda 21, at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf, 1 
March 2015. See the Memorial, p. 187, paras. 6.71~6.72.
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is contended by the Philippines is that the latter two bodies of “rules” serve to 
interpret and substantiate Article 192 of UNCLOS. However, the second “rule” will 
only serve to defeat the legal arguments of the Philippines, as will be proved soon. 
The third body of non-binding “rules” may only weaken, instead of substantiating, 
Article 192. Additionally, the Philippines fails to establish the linkage between such 
non-legally-binding and inapplicable “rules” on the one hand, and UNCLOS on the 
other hand, so as to present a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
UNCLOS to the Tribunal.
Due to lack of dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UN-
CLOS, the “dispute” to be presented by Submission 11 in this section should be 
considered inadmissible.
D. Inapplicability of Article 194 of UNCLOS and Inadmissibility 
     of Philippines’ Claim
Paragraphs 6.75~6.81 of the Memorial apply Article 194(1), (3), and (5) as the 
legal basis to establish the State responsibility of China for tolerating its fishermen 
who use cyanide in the waters concerned.337 However, the fundamental question 
337     The Memorial, pp. 188~190.
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is the applicability of Article 194 338 to the alleged actions or omission of China 
in the first place. To be submitted, Article 194 should be considered inapplicable 
to the incidents in Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal as described by 
Section II of Chapter 6 of the Memorial. Consequently, the “disputes” presented by 
Submission 11 can hardly concern the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. 
Hence, such claim should be deemed inadmissible.
Clearly, for the purpose of Article 194(2) the “measures” China is obligated to 
take are confined to those necessary to ensure that activities under its jurisdiction 
or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to “other States 
and their environment”, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities 
under China’s jurisdiction or control does not spread “beyond the areas where 
they exercise sovereign rights” in accordance with UNCLOS. So far no sufficient 
evidence has been provided by Philippines’ Memorial to demonstrate the existence 
338     Article 194 (Measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment) 
of UNCLOS reads: “1. States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures 
consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable 
means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavour 
to harmonize their policies in this connection. 2. States shall take all measures necessary 
to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause 
damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising 
from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the 
areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention. 3. The 
measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution of the marine 
environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed to minimize to the 
fullest possible extent: (a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially 
those which are persistent, from land-based sources, from or through the atmosphere or by 
dumping; (b) pollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing accidents and 
dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing intentional 
and unintentional discharges, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, 
operation and manning of vessels; (c) pollution from installations and devices used in 
exploration or exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular 
measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety 
of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and 
manning of such installations or devices; (d) pollution from other installations and devices 
operating in the marine environment, in particular measures for preventing accidents and 
dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the 
design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such installations or devices. 
4. In taking measures to prevent, reduce or control pollution of the marine environment, 
States shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried out by other 
States in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in conformity with 
this Convention. 5. The measures taken in accordance with this Part shall include those 
necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of 
depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.”
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of pollution on the ground. Even assuming there is any pollution in the areas 
concerned the measures as defined by Article 194(2) do not cover the measures 
China may take here for the purpose of environmental protection. 
Based on previous discussions on legal status of Scarborough Shoal and 
Second Thomas Shoal and the waters surrounding them, none of the conditions 
indicated above, namely, “causing damage to other States (that is: the Philippines) 
and their environment” and “pollution … spread beyond the areas where they (that 
is: China) exercise sovereign rights”, can be fulfilled. More important is the lack 
of evidences detailing the “wide-spread impact” of the use of cyanide from the 
Memorial. Somehow the Philippines has overlooked Article 194(2), while iden-
tifying Article 194(3) and 194(5) as legal basis to criticize China for failing to 
comply with the obligations under that article. However, the “measures” under 
Article 194(3) and 194(5) that China is required to take are defined by Article 
194(2). As Article 194(2) does not apply to the measures that China may take in the 
“maritime areas concerned”, the obligations imposed by Article 194(3) and 194(5) 
are all rendered inapplicable to China. To conclude, the legal basis, i.e. Article 
194, invoked by the Philippines in Section II-C-2 of Chapter 6 can hardly help to 
build up any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. The 
“dispute” to be formulated by Submission 11 should be considered as inadmissible.
E. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
     Excludes Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
In Section II-C-3 of Chapter 6, the Philippines argues that China has violated 
the CBD.339 Several legal problems are involved which may prevent the Tribunal 
from having jurisdiction over such breach of CBD.
1. Article 8(c)~(d) of CBD Imposes No Legal Obligations
The provisions of CBD identified by the Philippines as having been violated 
by China are Article 8(c)~(d),340 which reads: 
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: …
(c) Regulate or manage biological resources important for the conser-
339      Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), at http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/, 1 Mar-
ch 2015. 
340      The Memorial, p. 192, paras. 6.85 & 6.87, footnotes 732 & 736.
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vation of biological diversity whether within or outside protected areas, with a 
view to ensuring their conservation and sustainable use; 
(d) Promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the mainte-
nance of viable populations of species in natural surroundings.341 
Importantly, the ambiguous wording “as far as possible and as appropriate” 
and “promote” demonstrates lack of strict legal obligation for the Contracting Party 
to comply with immediately. It is hard to say that a violation of these two provi-
sions constitutes any violation of China’s legal obligation imposed by CBD, not to 
mention that it is hard to tell when and how such a violation can occur.
2. A Breach of CBD Obligation Does Not Necessarily Lead to 
a Breach of UNCLOS Obligation
Even if the violation of these two provisions constitutes a breach of China’s 
legal obligations under CBD, the Philippines has not proved that such a breach of 
obligation under CBD is equivalent to a breach of China’s legal obligation under 
UNCLOS. Put differently, the Philippines has not proved the existence of any Sino-
Philippine dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS based 
on the alleged China’s violation of two provisions of CBD. The Philippines does 
mention that Article 22 is involved in two different ways that makes CBD related 
to UNCLOS. 
On the one hand, the Philippines argues that “to the extent that Chinese activi-
ties cause serious damage or threat to biological diversity at Scarborough Shoal 
or Second Thomas Shoal, the CBD ‘affect[s] the rights and obligations’ of China 
under UNCLOS”.342 Then the Philippines puts a citation for this statement, which 
is footnote 729. That footnote invokes Article 22(1) of CBD which reads: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations 
of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, 
except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a 
serious damage or threat to biological diversity.343 
Clearly, the wording of Article 22(1) of CBD serves to warn how two parallel 
341     Article 8(c)~(d) of CBD.
342     The Memorial, p. 191, para. 6.83.
343     Article 22(1) of CBD.
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treaty regimes might conflict and admits that an implementation of CBD may in 
exceptional situations constitute a breach of UNCLOS obligation for a certain 
Contracting Party. It does not touch upon the issue of violation of CBD rules. 
Hence, it is still hard to conclude that a breach of CBD is a breach of UNCLOS.
On the other hand, the Philippines argues that “the CBD must be implemented 
‘consistently with the rights and obligations of States under law of the sea’.”344 
To support this statement, footnote 727 is used which cites Article 22(2) of CBD, 
which reads “Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention with respect to 
the marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under 
the law of the sea.”345 To be submitted, such wording indicates that an action or 
omission inconsistent with UNCLOS may lead to a violation of CBD, but not the 
other way around. It is still insufficient to support the position that a breach of CBD 
definitely and necessarily constitutes a breach of UNCLOS, without proving the 
breach of concrete rules of UNCLOS in each case.
3. Article 27 of CBD Fits in Article 281(1) of UNCLOS and 
Deprives the Annex VII-Tribunal of Its Jurisdiction
Even assuming arguendo the breach of provisions of CBD constitutes a brea-
ch of UNCLOS, and a Sino-Philippine dispute concerning the interpretation or ap-
plication of UNCLOS has arisen as said by this Submission,346 the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal however has been excluded because the conditions imposed by Article 
281 of UNCLOS have not been fulfilled. Article 281(1) reads: 
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the 
dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided 
for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse 
to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any 
344     The Memorial, p. 191, para. 6.83.
345      Article 22(2) of CBD.
346     Such kind of assumption should not be done lightly. The award on jurisdiction and admi-
ssibility for Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) Case suggests that caution must be exercised 
when linking the UNCLOS with an “implementing treaty” so as to put the dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the implementing treaty into the compulsory 
dispute settlement procedure entailing binding decisions. See Southern Bluefin Tuna Case 
between Australia and Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, Decision of August 4, 2000, pp. 45~46, para. 63, at http://legal.un.org/
riaa/cases/vol_XXIII/1-57.pdf, 1 March 2015.
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further procedure.347 
In other words, if apart from UNCLOS, there is an agreement between China 
and the Philippines which provides a separate dispute settlement mechanism as a 
peaceful means of their own choice, the Annex VII-Tribunal, as one of the proce-
dures provided in Part XV of UNCLOS, may have jurisdiction to try such dispute 
if and only if (1) no settlement has been reached between China and the Philippines 
by recourse to such separate dispute settlement mechanism; and (2) the agreement 
providing such separate dispute settlement mechanism does not exclude recourse 
to the Annex VII-Tribunal as the further procedure of dispute settlement. As none 
of these two conditions are fulfilled, the jurisdiction of this Tribunal would be 
removed for trying the dispute concerned, if any. The detailed reasoning is as 
follows.
First, as proved by the Philippines itself,348 CBD is not only an agreement bet-
ween China and the Philippines, but also a legally binding treaty which doubtless-
ly fulfils the requirement of “the agreement” under Article 281(1). More important-
ly and surprisingly omitted by the Philippines’ Memorial, CBD has a dispute settle-
ment mechanism of its own, which is embodied in Article 27. It is a peaceful means 
of the common choice of China and the Philippines within the meaning of Article 
281(1). Such mechanism is autonomous,349 self-sufficient, and self-contained.
Second, no evidence has been provided by the Memorial, nor can any informa-
tion be obtained from the news papers and internet, that the Philippines has ever 
negotiated as required by Article 27 of CBD350 or exchanged views351 with China 
347     Article 281(1) of UNCLOS.
348     The Memorial, p. 190, para. 6.82.
349     Compare with the reasoning of the Annex VII-Tribunal on the SBT Case, Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Case between Australia and Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Decision of August 4, 2000, para. 57, pp. 43~44.
350     Article 27(1) of CBD provides the obligation to negotiate as a way to seek solution of the 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of CBD.
351    Article 283 of UNCLOS considers negotiation as a way to exchange views for the pur-
pose of settling disputes. It proves that one of the purposes for having negotiations is to 
exchange views between the disputing parties. It is inconceivable for any dispute to be 
settled without exchanging views even if the parties have been sitting together around 
the negotiating table. Therefore, it is safe to say that an integral part of the obligation 
to negotiate is the obligation to exchange views. Judicial decisions put emphasis on the 
importance of exchange of views. See Southern Bluefin Tuna, Order of 27 August 1999, 
ITLOS Reports, 1999, p. 280; MOX Plant, Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 
2001, ITLOS Reports, 2001, p. 95, para. 60; Land Reclamation, Provisional Measures, 
Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports, 2003, p. 10, para. 47.
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for seeking solution of the dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
CBD identified by the Memorial, prior to the initiation of this arbitration. In other 
words, the obligation of “by recourse to such means” under Article 281(1) has not 
been fulfilled at all. As rightly quoted by the Philippines in its Memorial, “[i]t was 
considered to be consistent with international jurisprudence that a party may submit 
a case to the procedure specified in Part XV whenever it [i.e. the Applicant State] 
considers that the procedure chosen by the parties is no longer likely to lead to a 
settlement”.352 Given this, it will still be unfair to accept the Philippines’ conclusion 
that the dispute settlement mechanism under Article 27 of CBD is no longer likely 
to lead to a settlement between it and China, when the Philippines has not even had 
any recourse to such mechanism to settle the dispute with China in the first place.
The Philippines may invoke Guyana v. Suriname to argue that there is no need 
to request for a separate exchange of views with respect to this particular dispute 
which has been subsumed within the main disputes between the two Parties.353 
However, Guyana v. Suriname is fundamentally different from the present case, 
making such analogy inappropriate. The main disputes in the present case are 
maritime boundary delimitation in the SCS plus territorial issues hidden inside 
as the core.354 The Sino-Philippine Arbitration is unlike Guyana and Suriname, 
because China as the respondent has made written a declaration according to Article 
298 of UNCLOS to exclude Annex VII Tribunal from settling maritime boundary 
delimitation disputes. Such excluded main disputes are not formally and directly 
submitted by the Philippines to this Tribunal that is incapable of resolving such 
disputes even when submitted indirectly. It will be impossible for the particular 
issues identified by Submission 11 concerning violation of CBD to be subsumed 
within such “unsubmitted main disputes” so as to do away with the requirement of 
352      See the Memorial, p. 236, para. 7.60, and footnote 903.
353       Guyana v. Suriname, Award (17 September 2007), Annex VII Tribunal, para. 410, at http://
www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1147, 1 March 2015. “This dispute has as its 
principal concern the determination of the course of the maritime boundary between 
the two Parties – Guyana and Suriname. The Parties have, as the history of the dispute 
testifies, sought for decades to reach agreement on their common maritime boundary. The 
CGX incident of 3 June 2000, may be considered incidental to the real dispute between 
the Parties. The Tribunal, therefore, finds that in the particular circumstances, Guyana was 
not under any obligation to engage in a separate set of exchange of views with Suriname 
on issues of threat or use of forces. These issues can be considered as being subsumed 
within the main dispute.”
354       Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-Da-
sh-Line Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default of Appearance, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 28, 
2014, pp. 119~121.
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exchange of views on the part of the Philippines.
Third, no matter whether the Philippines has been seeking a resolution of such 
dispute with China concerning the interpretation or application of CBD by recourse 
to the means provided by Article 27 of CBD, this article at least has impliedly355 
excluded the recourse to, inter alia, Annex VII-Tribunal as one of the compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures entailing binding decisions. Article 27 (Settlement of 
Disputes) of CBD reads:
1. In the event of a dispute between Contracting Parties concerning the inter-
pretation or application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall seek 
solution by negotiation.
2. If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation, they 
may jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation by, a third party.
3. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, 
or at any time thereafter, a State or regional economic integration organization 
may declare in writing to the Depositary that for a dispute not resolved in 
accordance with paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 above, it accepts one or both of 
the following means of dispute settlement as compulsory:
(a) Arbitration in accordance with the procedure laid down in Part 1 of 
Annex II; 
(b) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
4. If the parties to the dispute have not, in accordance with paragraph 3 
above, accepted the same or any procedure, the dispute shall be submitted to 
conciliation in accordance with Part 2 of Annex II unless the parties otherwise 
agree.
5. The provisions of this Article shall apply with respect to any protocol 
except as otherwise provided in the protocol concerned.
Strictly speaking, the conciliation under Article 27(4) is the only real compul-
sory means for dispute settlement provided by this article. However, it is a means 
355     The Annex VII-Tribunal for the SBT Case allows implied exclusion of further procedure. 
See Southern Bluefin Tuna Case between Australia and Japan and between New Zealand 
and Japan, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Decision of August 4, 2000, p. 43, 
para. 57. In the Memorial of the Philippines, the dissenting opinions of Judge Keith are 
quoted as against such an implied exclusion. However, such opinions have been outvoted 
by the majority of the Tribunal. It proves that the majority ruling supporting implied 
exclusion is more justified. See the Memorial, p. 239, para. 7.68.    
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not entailing binding decisions, unlike Annex VII-Tribunal. For the rest of the 
means of dispute settlement to be utilized, the consent in each case of all parties 
to the dispute is required. In other words, what Article 27 rules out includes any 
compulsory dispute settlement mechanism entailing binding decision. 
Critically, what needs to be done to employ “compulsory” procedures entai-
ling binding decisions provided by this article (i.e. Arbitration or ICJ) is by 
“opting in” by all the disputing parties before a dispute arises according to Arti-
cle 27(3), instead of “at the request of any party to the dispute” in the words of 
Article 286 of UNCLOS. Such an arrangement is totally against the spirit of 
compulsory mechanism demonstrated by “opting out” formula under Article 298 
of UNCLOS.356 It reaffirms that all “compulsory” dispute settlement procedures 
entailing binding decisions have been excluded from Article 27 of CBD. Hence, 
the Annex VII-Tribunal as one of such procedures should naturally be considered 
excluded by Article 27 as a matter of course. Even if we take the broader view by 
considering the two means under Article 27(3) as also real compulsory methods, 
the Arbitration under Article 27(3)(a) of CBD357 is still different from Annex VII-
Tribunal of UNCLOS. In other words, what may be opted in by the operation of 
Article 27(3) as the “compulsory means” does not include Annex VII-Tribunal. It 
proves the exclusion of Annex VII-Tribunal under the dispute settlement regime of 
Article 27.
To be noted, the last five words of Article 27(4) provide an opportunity of cre-
ating compulsory dispute settlement procedure apart from the means identified by 
this article, if agreed by all the parties to the dispute in advance. However, China 
has not agreed to use Annex VII-Tribunal to settle the dispute in question with the 
Philippines before (and even after) such “dispute” concerning the interpretation 
or application of CBD arises. Therefore, the last chance of using this Annex VII-
Tribunal as a compulsory means to settle the present dispute is missed. 
To conclude, assuming there is a dispute concerning interpretation or applica-
tion of UNCLOS based on a dispute on interpretation or application of CBD, the 
jurisdiction of this Annex VII-Tribunal is still removed in accordance with Article 
356    See also the reasoning of the Annex VII-Tribunal on the SBT Case, which would be 
supportive for this line of arguments. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case between Australia and 
Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Decision of August 4, 2000, pp. 43~44, para. 57.
357     See Part I of Annex II to CBD. It is clear that the Arbitration under CBD is definitely not 
the same as Annex VII-Tribunal of UNCLOS.
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281 of UNCLOS in joint operation of Article 27 of CBD.
XII. China’s Building of Artificial Islands 
         at Mischief Reef: Submission 12
In Submission 12, the Philippines requests the Tribunal to adjudge and declare 
that: “China’s occupation of and construction activities on Mischief Reef: (a) 
violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands, installations, 
and structures; (b) violate China’s duties to protect and preserve the marine 
environment under the Convention; and (c) constitute unlawful act of attempted 
appropriation in violation of the Convention”.358 The legal arguments are provided 
by Section III of Chapter 6 of the Philippines’ Memorial.359
A. The Facts Identified by the Philippines
The Philippines argues that “since January 1995, China – without obtaining 
the Philippines’ authorization – has constructed artificial islands on top of Mischief 
Reef”.360 According to the Philippines, Mischief Reef is “part of Philippines’ 
territory”361 and “not within 200 M of any other feature claimed by China that 
is capable of generating an EEZ or a continental shelf”.362 Under Philippines’ 
protests, China responded by saying that the structures built on there were not 
military but of civilian nature and for civilian purposes.363 Because China acted 
without Philippines’ authorization, it violated Articles 56(1)(b)(i), 60(1), and 80 
of UNCLOS.364 Besides, the Philippines contends that China has violated Articles 
192 and 194(5) of UNCLOS, as China constructed artificial islands on the coral 
reef at Mischief Reef.365 Moreover, the Philippines considers that China violated 
Article 206 of UNCLOS due to lack of an environmental impact assessment and 
358     The Memorial, p. 272.
359     The Memorial, pp. 193~202, paras. 6.90~6.113.
360     The Memorial, p. 193, para. 6.92.
361     The Memorial, p. 194, para. 6.93.
362     The Memorial, p. 198, para. 6.103.
363     The Memorial, pp. 194~196, paras. 6.93~6.94, 6.96~6.97.
364     The Memorial, p. 198, para. 6.103.
365     The Memorial, pp. 200~201, paras. 6.108~6.111.
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communication of its results.366
B. Inadmissible Claim Due to Unsettled Premise
Obviously, Submission 12 is premised on the position that Mischief Reef (as 
a LTE) is part of the Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf, but not China’s. As 
stated in Section IX-A of this paper, it is premature for the Tribunal to accept such 
a premise. Hence, the claim as reflected by Submission 12 should be considered 
inadmissible by the Tribunal.
C. The Alleged Environmental Violation in Section III-D-1 of Chapter 6
     of the Memorial Is Based on Speculation and an Inadmissible Report 
The alleged environmental damage resulting from China’s construction of arti-
ficial island on Mischief Reef in Section III-D-1 of Chapter 6 is based on the so-
called Carpenter Report,367 which does not draw on the on-site study of Mischief 
Reef but is full of speculation. The dispute built upon such a weak assumption sho-
uld be deemed inadmissible by any Tribunal including the present one. Otherwise, 
all the artificial islands and structures made by various States on maritime features 
in the world can be equally damaging and constitute breaches of UNCLOS and 
international environmental law, based on such a report.
D. Judging by the Philippines’ Memorial, There Can Be No Dispute
     concerning the Interpretation or Application of UNCLOS 
     Submitted to the Tribunal to Try
Firstly, the Philippines invokes Article 192 368 as a legal basis to condemn Chi-
na’s environmental violation by building artificial island on Mischief Reef. How-
ever, this provision is too imprecise to create any concrete legal obligation. It is 
doubtful whether China’s action as identified by the Philippines, which follows 
subsequent practice of many State Parties to UNCLOS, can be considered as a 
violation of this article and constitutes any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
366     The Memorial, pp. 201~202, paras. 6.112~6.113.
367     The Memorial, p. 201, footnotes 767~771.
368     Article 192 (General obligation) of UNCLOS reads: “States have the obligation to protect 
and preserve the marine environment.” 
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application of this article.
Secondly, the Philippines also invokes Article 194(5) as legal basis. However, 
Section XI-D of this paper has indicated the inapplicability of this provision due 
to inapplicability of Article 194(2) to the activities done by China on the maritime 
features China claims while the wide-spread damaging effect of such activities is 
yet to be proved by the Philippines.
Thirdly, the Philippines invokes Article 206 369 to accuse China for not making 
environmental impact assessment. However, Article 206 imposes no strict legal 
obligation for making such assessment in the first place. Hence, the dispute as 
indicated by the Philippines in Section III-D-2 of Chapter 6 cannot be considered 
as any legal dispute concerning the interpretation or application of Article 206.
E. The Chapeau of Article 297(1) Excludes Tribunal’s Jurisdiction to Try
    the Dispute concerning Application of Articles 56, 60 and 80 
    of UNCLOS
Having claimed territorial sovereignty over all the maritime features (including 
non-rock islands) in the Spratly Islands Group, China may use those non-rock 
islands to claim EEZ and continental shelf. As indicated by Table 4 of this paper, 
such EEZ and continental shelf can reach, inter alia, Mischief Reef. According 
to Articles 56(1)(b), 60(1)~(2)370 and 80371 of UNCLOS, China is entitled to have 
jurisdiction for building artificial island in Mischief Reef as part of China’s EEZ 
369     Article 206 (Assessment of potential effects of activities) of UNCLOS reads: “When Sta-
tes have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction 
or control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the 
marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential effects of such 
activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of the results of such 
assessments in the manner provided in article 205.” 
370     Article 60(1)~(2) of UNCLOS (Artificial islands, installations and structures in the exclu-
sive economic zone) provides: “1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State 
shall have the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, 
operation and use of: (a) artificial islands; (b) installations and structures for the purposes 
provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes; (c) installations and structures 
which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone. 2. The 
coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations and 
structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immi-
gration laws and regulations.”
371      Article 80 of UNCLOS (Artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental 
shelf) provides: “Article 60 applies mutatis mutandis to artificial islands, installations and 
structures on the continental shelf.” 
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and continental shelf. Therefore, it is fair to re-characterize the dispute as reflected 
by Submission 12 to be the ones concerning the interpretation or application of 
UNCLOS with regard to the exercise by China, as a coastal State, of its jurisdiction 
provided for in the UNCLOS. Such a dispute is covered by the chapeau of 
Article 297(1) concerning limitation on applicability of Section 2 of Part XV. 
Consequently, the Tribunal may not have jurisdiction to try the dispute in question. 
To conclude, the disputes to be built upon Submission 12 cannot be considered 
as any real legal dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. 
Therefore, Submission 12 should be considered inadmissible by the Tribunal.
XIII. China’s Endangering of Filipino Navigational Safety
          at Scarborough Shoal: Submission 13
In submission 13, the Philippines requests the Tribunal to adjudge and declare 
that “China has breached its obligation under the Convention by operating its 
law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner causing serious risk of collision 
to Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal”. Detailed 
arguments are presented in Section IV of Chapter 6 of the Memorial.372
A. The Facts Identified by the Philippines
The Philippines identifies two near-collision incidents on April 28 and May 
26 of 2012 which occurred in the territorial waters of Scarborough Shoal. Articles 
21(4), 24, and 94 of UNCLOS as well as the 1972 Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS 1972) are invoked as the 
legal basis.
On April 28, 2012, the Philippine Coast Guard vessel, BRP Pampanga, nearly 
collided with Chinese fisheries and law enforcement command vessel, FLEC 310. 
Then FLEC 310 nearly rammed another Philippine government vessel, BRP Edsa 
II.373 On May 26, a vessel of Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, 
MCS 3008, was traversing the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal to resupply a 
Philippine Coast Guard vessel, BRP Corregidor. Its operation was obstructed by 
Chinese Marine Surveillance vessel, CMS 71, which nearly collided with MSC 
372     The Memorial, pp. 202~213.
373     The Memorial, p. 206, para. 6.126.
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3008.374 Then another Chinese government vessel FLEC 303 tried to block the way 
of CMS 71.375 Later on another Chinese government vessel, CMS 84, also came 
close to colliding with the MCS 3008.376 When the MCS 3008 navigated toward 
the basin of Scarborough Shoal, three Chinese vessels – FLEC 303, CMS 71, and 
FLEC 306 – approached MSC 3008, trying to block its way. Collisions nearly 
happened.377
The Memorial states that
In May 2012, China warned the Philippines to stop sending its vessels to Scar-
borough Shoal or face the consequences. The attempts by Chinese government 
vessels to ram or harass Philippine vessels approaching the Scarborough 
Shoal demonstrated that China was prepared to back up its threat. As a 
consequence … the Philippines decided to refrain from sending its vessels to 
the Scarborough Shoal area…378
B. The Claim Reflected by Submission 13 Is Inadmissible, as Certain
     Preliminary Territorial Issues Have Not Been Resolved
As the ongoing Sino-Philippine territorial disputes over the entire maritime 
features within KIG as well as Scarborough Shoal have not been submitted to 
the Tribunal, the core issue underlying the maritime confrontations identified by 
Submission 13 is officially unknown to the Tribunal. This does not justify the use 
of the premise (for Submission 13) that Sino-Philippine territorial disputes do not 
or no longer exist while Scarborough Shoal belongs to the Philippines. 
The Tribunal may not answer the question as to who is right on the near-colli-
sion dispute without answering a preliminary question — who owns the territorial 
sea of Scarborough Shoal. If the water belongs to the Philippines’ territorial sea, 
then the Philippines has the sovereignty over that area while China would only 
enjoy the right of innocent passage. If it is China’s territorial water, then China will 
be justified in interfering with foreign vessels which violate the rules of innocent 
374     The Memorial, pp. 202~203, paras. 6.115~6.118.
375     The Memorial, p. 204, paras. 6.119~6.120.
376     The Memorial, p. 204, paras. 6.121~6.122.
377     The Memorial, pp. 205~206, paras. 6.123~6.124.
378     The Memorial, p. 207, para. 6.127.
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passage.379 Not being authorized to settle such preliminary territorial issues, the 
Tribunal lacks legal grounds to rule on Submission 13, which should then be 
considered inadmissible.
C. The Claim Brought by the Philippines Is Inadmissible as the Disputes
     Underlying the Maritime Confrontations Are Not Concerning 
     the Interpretation or Application of UNCLOS
The fact that China’s government vessels have prevented their Filipino coun-
ter-parts from approaching Scarborough Shoal demonstrates the ongoing territo-
rial dispute which better characterizes the issues brought by the Philippines in Sub-
mission 13. The two Parties started to intensify such dispute since April 2012.380 
It should be understandable why China’s government vessels did not and could 
not observe COLREGS 1972 when approached by their Philippine counter-parts, 
as the cost of losing in the competition for controlling the territory and territorial 
water is too high to bear. However, both Parties have exercised restraint as 
demonstrated by the facts. Instead of sending naval warships to exchange bullets 
for occupying Scarborough Shoal, they sent law enforcement vessels. This does not 
alter the fundamental nature of the struggle, which is for territorial title. To decide 
which side should prevail in terms of international law, the rules of customary 
international law governing acquisition of territorial sovereignty apply.381 As such 
rules are not part of UNCLOS, the dispute over territorial sovereignty underpinning 
such Sino-Philippine near-collision incidents should not be considered as anything 
379    Article 24(1) of UNCLOS provides that the coastal State shall not hamper the innocent 
passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea except in accordance with UNCLOS. 
380     Since April 2012 China effectively prevented the Philippine government vessels from 
enforcing the latter’s domestic law in the waters adjacent to Scarborough Shoal and from 
arresting China’s fishing vessels there. Since May 2012 China started to enforce China’s 
law in that water on Philippines’ fishing vessels. See the Memorial, pp. 57~59, paras. 
3.51~3.54. 
381      Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008, pp. 123~162.
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concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS.382 Therefore, the claim 
brought by Submission 13, after such a re-characterization, should be considered 
inadmissible.
D. The Claim Based on Article 21(4) Is Inadmissible
The Philippines has been claiming territorial sovereignty over Scarborough 
Shoal and considers the adjacent waters thereto its own territorial waters. Based on 
this position, the Philippines invokes Article 21(4)383 of UNCLOS as a legal basis 
to condemn China’s “dangerous” actions. However, Article 21(4) is inapplicable 
to China’s vessels while in the territorial waters of Scarborough Shoal, before 
a preliminary decision is made to justify China being treated as a foreign State. 
Without mandate to settle Sino-Philippine territorial dispute over, inter alia, 
Scarborough Shoal, the Tribunal may not address such a preliminary issue, not 
to mention to resolve such dispute in the Philippines’ favor. Lacking such a pre-
condition, the Philippines’ claim as reflected by Submission 13 based on Article 
21(4) should be considered inadmissible.
E. The Philippines Is in No Position to Invoke Article 24 of UNCLOS
    against China in the “Dispute” under Submission 13
After applying Article 21(4) of UNCLOS, the Philippines invokes Article 24 
382    Article 4 (entitled “functions of arbitral tribunal”) of Annex VII to UNCLOS provides: 
“An arbitral tribunal constituted under Article 3 of this Annex shall function in accordance 
with this Annex and the other provisions of this Convention”. While Annex VII does not 
regulate the subject matter for settlement by the Tribunal, Part XV of UNCLOS confines 
the disputes to those concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. Such 
limitation was required by Articles 279~284, 286~288, and 297 in Sections 1, 2, and 3 of 
Part XV, respectively.  
383      Article 21(4) of UNCLOS reads: “4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally 
accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.” 
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of UNCLOS384 against China, based on a contradictory premise by taking China 
as a coastal State. Such application of two conflicting articles serves to defeat 
both of them. The Tribunal under such circumstance will be left with a dispute not 
concerning the interpretation or application of both provisions of UNCLOS. Such a 
dispute, if any, should be deemed inadmissible. More importantly, the fact that the 
Tribunal lacks any mandate to settle Sino-Philippine territorial disputes leaves the 
Tribunal equally powerless to treat China as a coastal State in the waters adjacent to 
Scarborough Shoal. It makes Philippines’ claim based on Article 24 inadmissible, 
too.
F. The Tribunal Has No Jurisdiction to Entertain the Disputes 
    as They Are Concerning Military Activities under Article 298(1)(b)
The Sino-Philippine territorial dispute over, inter alia, Scarborough Shoal 
continues and remains unsettled. From the observation of this author, China, as 
the one getting upper hand only recently, has been vigilant for the danger of its 
territory to be lost again to the Philippines (including Scarborough Shoal and 
Second Thomas Shoal). No matter what kind of operation carried out by the Phili-
ppines, be it by civilians385 or officials, through fishing boats or law enforcement 
vessels, either navigable or immobile,386 the reactions of China may be primarily 
384     Article 24 (Duties of the coastal State) of UNCLOS reads: “1. The coastal State shall 
not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea except in 
accordance with this Convention. In particular, in the application of this Convention or of 
any laws or regulations adopted in conformity with this Convention, the coastal State shall 
not: (a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying 
or impairing the right of innocent passage; or (b) discriminate in form or in fact against 
the ships of any State or against ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State. 
2. The coastal State shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation, of which 
it has knowledge, within its territorial sea.” 
385     The Philippine civilian, Cloma, who was an owner of a fishing company and director of 
the Philippine Maritime Institute, sailed to Spratly Islands and “discovered” Kalayaan 
Islands (the Freedomland) in May 1956. Then in December 1974, President Marcos of the 
Philippines received a document from Cloma transferring all the rights of Tomas Cloma 
& Associates in “Freedomland” to the Philippine Government. In June 1978 President 
Marcos issued a decree officially claiming part of the Spratly Islands and making it a 
municipality in Palawan province. The area claimed was almost identical with Cloma’s 
claim. Wu Shicun, Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development in the 
South China Sea: A Chinese Perspective, Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2013.
386     On Second Thomas Shoal, the Philippines has used an immobile warship, BRP Sierra 
Madre, to occupy that maritime feature since 1999. See the Memorial, p. 61, para. 3.59. 
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for maintaining its territorial integrity by holding on to the territories it has reco-
vered. The rules governing China’s law enforcement vessels, in this context, turn 
to be the limitations imposed by the principle of self-defense under the United 
Nations Charter and customary international law.387 When sovereignty is at stake, it 
will be inappropriate to apply Article 94 of UNCLOS and COLREGS 1972 to the 
near-collision incidents in the territorial waters of Scarborough Shoal. Otherwise, 
the award to be given by the Tribunal will be detached from reality and hard to 
implement. In case these rules are considered applicable, the dispute will still 
be removed from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as it falls within the scope of 
disputes concerning military activities covered by Article 298(1)(b), as well as the 
2006 China’s Declaration.
XIV. China’s Interference with Filipino Navigational
         Rights, Resupply and Rotation of Personnel at 
         Second Thomas Shoal: Submission 14 
In Submission 14, the Philippines requests the Tribunal to adjudge and declare 
that 
Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, China has un-
lawfully aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other things: 
(a) Interfering with the Philippines’ rights of navigation in the waters at, 
and adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal;
(b) Preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed 
at Second Thomas Shoal; and
(c) Endangering the health and well-being of Philippine personnel 
stationed at Second Thomas Shoal.388
For this submission, legal arguments are presented at Section V of Chapter 6389 
387       For the two authoritative treatments of this topic, see D. W. Bowett, Self-Defense in Inter-
national Law, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958; Ian Brownlie, Inter-
national Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963; China’s 
Position Paper, paras. 6~7.
388      The Memorial, p. 272.
389      The Memorial, pp. 214~215.
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and Paragraphs 3.59~3.67 of Chapter 3.390
A. Facts identified by the Philippines
It was said by the Philippines that since 1999, the Philippines had maintained 
a peaceful and continuous presence at the Second Thomas shoal by deploying a 
small detachment of sailors and marines to the BRP Sierra Madre, an old naval 
ship that had been run aground there. On April 11, 2013, China started to request 
the Philippines to remove its presence from the shoal. Then China sent two vessels 
from China Marine Surveillance and one navy missile frigate, Type 053H1G 
(Jianghu-V Class).391 As a response, the Philippines sent China a Note Verbale on 
May 9, 2013 in which it stated, inter alia, “that Second Thomas Shoal constitutes 
part of the Philippines’ continental shelf and that China’s conduct with regard to 
it contravened UNCLOS”.392 Then on March 9, 2014, two Chinese Coast Guard 
vessels chased away two Philippine-chartered civilian vessels for resupply mission 
for the people stationed on BRP Sierra Madre.393 Another Note Verbale sent by the 
Philippines to China said “the Philippines observes that there are no insular features 
claimed by China in the South China Sea capable of generating any potential en-
titlement in the area where Ayungin [Second Thomas] Shoal is located”. Later 
on, the Philippines was able to provide food to its personnel stationed at Second 
Thomas Shoal through airdrops. However, it still has not been able to rotate the per-
sonnel on the Sierra Madre. Then, as said by the Philippines, China’s strategy at 
Second Thomas Shoal and other features within SCS was explained by one Chinese 
senior military official, Major General Zhang Zhaozhong, who said that China was 
employing a cabbage strategy. China would seal and control a maritime feature by 
surrounding it with fishing administration vessels, marine surveillance vessels and 
navy warships until the feature is wrapped layer by layer like a cabbage. “Without 
the supply for one or two weeks, the troopers stationed there will leave the islands 
on their own. Once they have left, they will never be able to come back”.394 In 
Section V of Chapter 6, Articles 56, 77, 279 of UNCLOS are invoked by the 
Philippines to prove that China violated UNCLOS.
390     The Memorial, pp. 61~64.
391     The Memorial, p. 61, paras. 3.59~3.60.
392     The Memorial, pp. 61~62, para. 3.61.
393     The Memorial, p. 62, para. 3.62.
394     The Memorial, p. 64, para. 3.67.
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B. Inadmissibility for Submission 14 Due to Certain 
    Unresolved Preliminary Issues
Submission 14 was premised on a position that Second Thomas Shoal is part 
of Philippines’ (but not China’s) EEZ and continental shelf. As discussed in Section 
IX-A of this paper, this premise may not be endorsed by the Tribunal and should 
not even be used for the purpose of this arbitration. It makes the claim as presented 
by Submission 14 inadmissible.
C. The Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to Settle the Dispute 
    Has Been Excluded by Article 298(1)(b)
In case the Tribunal considers the claim advanced by the Philippines’ Submi-
ssion 14 to be admissible, the dispute to be constituted by such a claim is still be-
yond the power of the Tribunal to resolve. The Philippines quotes the remarks 
made by Major General Zhang Zhaozhong concerning China’s “cabbage strategy” 
at Second Thomas Shoal.395 If the quotation by the Philippines is relevant to Submi-
ssion 14, the “interference” carried out by those Chinese government vessels, 
i.e. China Marine Surveillance vessels, Chinese navy missile frigate, and China 
Coast Guard vessels, constituted both military and law enforcement activities to 
obtain the exclusive presence on Second Thomas Shoal, as part of the continental 
shelf China may claim. Such activities are covered by Article 298(1)(b). As the 
2006 China’s Declaration396 has removed the jurisdiction of Annex VII Tribunal to 
settle the category of dispute referred to in Article 298(1)(b), the Tribunal has no 
jurisdiction over such dispute as constituted by Submission 14.
D. The Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to Settle the Dispute Has Been
     Excluded by the Chapeau of Article 297(1)
Paragraph 1 of Article 297 (entitled “Limitations on applicability of section 2”) 
of UNCLOS reads: 
395     The Memorial, p. 64, para. 3.67.
396      At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#Chi
na upon ratification, 1 March 2015.
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1. Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
with regard to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or 
jurisdiction provided for in this Convention shall be subject to the procedures 
provided for in section 2 in the following cases:
(a) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention 
of the provisions of this Convention in regard to the freedoms and rights of 
navigation, overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or in 
regard to other internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in article 58;
(b) when it is alleged that a State in exercising the aforementioned 
freedoms, rights or uses has acted in contravention of this Convention or 
of laws or regulations adopted by the coastal State in conformity with this 
Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this 
Convention; or
(c) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of 
specified international rules and standards for the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment which are applicable to the coastal State and which 
have been established by this Convention or through a competent international 
organization or diplomatic conference in accordance with this Convention. 
Obviously, the chapeau of Article 297(1) excludes from jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal the disputes concerning a coastal State’s exercise of its sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction, except those listed in subparagraphs (a)~(c). This is also admitted 
in the Memorial of the Philippines.397 To be submitted, the dispute brought by the 
Philippines through its Submission 14 should be considered as falling with the 
scope of chapeau of Article 297(1) while not covered by any dispute indicated by 
Article 297(1)(a)~(c). Therefore, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over such dispute, 
for the following reasons.
1. Such Dispute Is Concerning the Exercise of China’s Sovereign 
Right Covered by Chapeau of Article 297(1)
The dispute brought by the Philippines should be considered as falling within 
the chapeau of paragraph 1 of Article 297. To begin with, the Philippines denies 
China the legal status as a coastal State who has maritime entitlements of EEZ and 
continental shelf in the Relevant Area for the purpose of application of Article 297. 
397     The Memorial, p. 250, para. 7.96.
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If China does not have such rights, there is no question of the exercise of such non-
existent rights.398 
However, based on the reasons presented in Section IX-A of this paper, the 
Tribunal is advised not to accept such Philippine position. China should not be 
denied the status of a coastal State whose EEZ and continental shelf stretch to the 
location of Second Thomas Shoal for the purpose of application of Article 297. 
Consequently, the legality dispute of China’s interference with the actions of the 
Philippines to resupply its military personnel stationed on BRP Sierra Madre 
is concerning the exercise by China as a coastal State of its sovereign rights or 
jurisdiction over its continental shelf and EEZ as provided for in UNCLOS. 
To be specific, based on Articles 60(1)(c) and 80 of UNCLOS, the coastal 
State shall have the exclusive right in its EEZ and continental shelf to authorize and 
regulate the operation and use of installations and structures which may interfere 
with the exercise of its rights as the coastal State in the zone. Besides, according 
to Article 60(2) the coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such 
installation and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to immigration laws 
and regulations. Applying the rules to the situation on the ground, as the immobile 
Filipino ship BRP Sierra Madre can serve as a solid military base which may most 
probably be used to interfere with China’s exercise of its sovereign rights in its 
undeniable EEZ and continental shelf here, China as the coastal State may take 
actions to regulate the use of such vessel according to Articles 60(1)(c) and 80. By 
appearance the vessel is not as permanent as an installation and structure. However, 
since China has the exclusive right to authorize and regulate the operation and 
use of installation and structure that is, by nature, fixed and more permanent than 
vessels. A fortiori, China should be no less entitled to such exclusive right for 
the less permanent thing like this foreign-occupied vessel which however can be 
more functional and threatening than a normal installation and structure. Not to be 
overlooked, such a heavy metal vessel is actually hard to move by force of its own 
or from outside, making it as fixed as the normal installation and structure.399 On 
the other hand, since the Philippine personnel to be transported to such an immo-
bile vessel may serve to interfere with China’s future exercise of its sovereign righ-
ts under its EEZ and continental shelf entitlements, China may invoke Article 60(2) 
to exercise jurisdiction to enforce China’s immigration laws and regulations upon 
398     The Memorial, Chapter 5, p. 252, para. 7.105.
399     See China’s Position Paper, para. 51.
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those personnel engaging in illegal rotation, too.
2. Such a Dispute Is Not Covered by Article 297(1)(a)
The legality dispute of China’s interference with the Philippines’ resupply 
actions is not concerning the actions of China, as a coastal State, in contravention of 
UNCLOS provisions regarding the Philippines’ freedoms and rights of navigation, 
overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or in regard to other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in Article 58. Article 58 provides the 
rights and duties of other States in the EEZ, which reads that 
[I]n the EEZ, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the 
relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of 
navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, 
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms… 
Besides, Articles 88~115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to 
the EEZ in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.400 As Articles 87~115 
fall within Part VII (High Seas) of UNCLOS, the rights to be protected by Article 
297(1)(a) are those rights classified as high sea freedoms and rights. In other words, 
for the Philippines to fit in Article 297(1)(a) to claim infringement of its rights, it 
must be treated as a State whose high sea freedoms and rights as provided by Part 
VII of UNCLOS are infringed by China. However, what is complained of by the 
Philippines in Submission 14 is China’s infringement of Filipino sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction derived from its maritime entitlements of EEZ and continental 
shelf401 which cover Second Thomas Shoal. Therefore, Article 297(1)(a) may not be 
used by the Philippines to assert that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute 
400     Article 58(2) of UNCLOS.
401    “China’s aggressive actions at Second Thomas Shoal violate the sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction of the Philippines in multiple respects. As the Philippines observed in its 11 
March 2014 Note Verbale to the Embassy of China in Manila: In accordance with Articles 
76 and 77 of the UNCLOS, only the Philippines has sovereign rights over the continental 
shelf in the area where Ayungin Shoal [Second Thomas] is located. No other State is 
lawfully entitled to assert sovereign rights or jurisdiction over said area. In this respect, 
the Philippines observes that there are no insular features claimed by China in the South 
China Sea capable of generating any potential entitlement in the area where Ayungin 
Shoal is located.” The Memorial, p. 214. para. 6.149. Also, “China therefore has no 
right to assert law enforcement or any other kind of jurisdiction in the vicinity of Second 
Thomas Shoal. Its interdiction of Philippine vessels navigating in the area violates the 
exclusive rights and jurisdiction appertaining to the Philippines under Articles 56 and 77 
of the Convention.” The Memorial, para. 6.150.
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as formulated by Submission 14.
3. Such Dispute Is Not Covered by Article 297(1)(b)
The legality dispute of China’s interference with Philippines’ resupply actions 
is not concerning China’s exercise of its high seas freedoms and rights that violates 
UNCLOS or the domestic laws or regulations of the Philippines as a coastal State. 
As already presented, in the Second Thomas Shoal China should be considered as 
another coastal State, same as the Philippines. The legal basis for China to interfere 
with the Philippines’ resupply actions is China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
deriving from its maritime entitlements of EEZ and continental shelf generated 
by non-rock islands in KIG. Therefore, Article 297(1)(b) may neither be invoked 
against China nor be used for the Tribunal to establish jurisdiction over the legality 
dispute of China’s interference with Philippines’ resupply actions as reflected by 
Submission 14.
4. Such Dispute Is Not Covered by Article 297(1)(c)
China should be considered a coastal State in the Relevant Area, especially 
Second Thomas Shoal, as already proved. However, it is one thing to say that 
China is a coastal State, it is another thing for the Philippines to take this position 
as a premise to justify its potential invocation of Article 297(1)(c) to assert that the 
Tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute reflected by Submission 14. Such position 
of the Philippines would contradict its basic position (that China has no EEZ or 
continental shelf in the Relevant Area which can reach Second Thomas Shoal) 
and defeat its own legal arguments. Even if the Tribunal considers it lawful for the 
Philippines to recognize China as a coastal State in Second Thomas Shoal, Article 
297(1)(c) still remains inapplicable, as other conditions are not fulfilled. 
On the one hand, through the Memorial, the Philippines does not prove the 
existence of any specified international rules and standards for the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment with legally binding force which are 
applicable to the coastal State (that is: China) and which have been established 
by UNCLOS or through a competent international organization or diplomatic 
conference according to UNCLOS. 
On the other hand, even if such rules do exist, China’s interference actions as 
complained of by the Philippines in Submission 14 are irrelevant to the issue of 
marine environmental protection and preservation. This has been said in Section 
IX-C of this paper.
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XV. Concluding Remarks
Based on the above-mentioned reasons, it is justified to conclude that none of 
the Submissions 1~14 made by the Philippines in its Memorial should be consi-
dered admissible, while the disputes to be constituted by each of the Submissions 
and all of them as a whole should be considered as falling outside the jurisdiction 
of this Tribunal.
